A Potential Tension in DSM-5: The General Definition of Mental Disorder versus Some Specific Diagnostic Criteria

Author(s):  
M Cristina Amoretti ◽  
Elisabetta Lalumera
2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel Cooper

This paper aims to understand the DSM-5 through situating it within the context of the historical development of the DSM series. When one looks at the sets of diagnostic criteria, the DSM-5 is strikingly similar to the DSM-IV. I argue that at this level the DSM has become ‘locked-in’ and difficult to change. At the same time, at the structural, or conceptual, level there have been radical changes, for example in the definition of ‘mental disorder’, in the role of theory and of values, and in the abandonment of the multiaxial approach to diagnosis. The way that the DSM-5 was constructed means that the overall conceptual framework of the classification only barely constrains the sets of diagnostic criteria it contains.


Author(s):  
Derek Bolton

Proposals have been made in connection with ICD and DSM revisions to separate the concepts of mental disorder and of impairments in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning. The proposals are consistent with viewing disability as a social concept rather than a medical one. It is argued here on the basis of two main premises that mental disorder specifically cannot be conceptualized independently of social impairments. The first premise is that in general medicine the definition of disease essentially turns on impairments of normal function of an organ or system leading to poor outcomes. The second, compound premise is that one normal function of the central nervous system is the regulation of behaviour in the external world, and that this function is approximately the domain of the mental. The conclusion is drawn that mental disorder conceptually involves downturn in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.


2006 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 210-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerome C Wakefield ◽  
Stuart A Kirk ◽  
Kathleen J Pottick ◽  
Derek K Hsieh ◽  
Xin Tian

Background: Conduct disorder (CD) must be distinguished from nondisordered delinquent behaviour to avoid false positives, especially when diagnosing youth from difficult environments. However, the nature of this distinction remains controversial. The DSM-IV observes that its own syndromal CD diagnostic criteria conflict with its definition of mental disorder, which requires that symptoms be considered a manifestation of internal dysfunction to warrant disorder diagnosis. Previous research indicates that professional judgments tend to be guided by the dysfunction requirement, not syndromal symptoms alone. However, there are almost no data on lay conceptualizations. Thus it remains unknown whether judgments about CD are anchored in a broadly shared understanding of mental disorder that provides a basis for professional–lay consensus. Objective: The present study tests which conception of CD, syndromal-symptoms or dysfunction-requirement, corresponds most closely to lay judgments of disorder or nondisorder and compares lay and professional judgments. We hypothesized that lay disorder judgments, like professional judgments, tend to presuppose the dysfunction requirement. Method: Three lay samples (nonclinical social workers, nonpsychiatric nurses, and undergraduates) rated their agreement that youths described in clinical vignettes have a mental disorder. All vignettes satisfied DSM-IV CD diagnostic criteria. Vignettes were varied to present syndromal symptoms only, symptoms suggesting internal dysfunction, and symptoms resulting from reactions to negative circumstances, without dysfunction. Results: All lay samples attributed disorder more often to youths whose symptoms suggested internal dysfunction than to youths with similar symptoms but without a likely dysfunction. Conclusions: The dysfunction requirement appears to reflect a widely shared lay and professional concept of disorder.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Dan J. Stein ◽  
Andrea C. Palk ◽  
Kenneth S. Kendler

Abstract The question of ‘what is a mental disorder?’ is central to the philosophy of psychiatry, and has crucial practical implications for psychiatric nosology. Rather than approaching the problem in terms of abstractions, we review a series of exemplars – real-world examples of problematic cases that emerged during work on and immediately after DSM-5, with the aim of developing practical guidelines for addressing future proposals. We consider cases where (1) there is harm but no clear dysfunction, (2) there is dysfunction but no clear harm, and (3) there is possible dysfunction and/or harm, but this is controversial for various reasons. We found no specific criteria to determine whether future proposals for new entities should be accepted or rejected; any such proposal will need to be assessed on its particular merits, using practical judgment. Nevertheless, several suggestions for the field emerged. First, while harm is useful for defining mental disorder, some proposed entities may require careful consideration of individual v. societal harm, as well as of societal accommodation. Second, while dysfunction is useful for defining mental disorder, the field would benefit from more sharply defined indicators of dysfunction. Third, it would be useful to incorporate evidence of diagnostic validity and clinical utility into the definition of mental disorder, and to further clarify the type and extent of data needed to support such judgments.


2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Cristina Amoretti ◽  
Elisabetta Lalumera ◽  
Davide Serpico

AbstractThe latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) included the Social (Pragmatic) Communication Disorder (SPCD) as a new mental disorder characterized by deficits in pragmatic abilities. Although the introduction of SPCD in the psychiatry nosography depended on a variety of reasons—including bridging a nosological gap in the macro-category of Communication Disorders—in the last few years researchers have identified major issues in such revision. For instance, the symptomatology of SPCD is notably close to that of (some forms of) Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). This opens up the possibility that individuals with very similar symptoms can be diagnosed differently (with either ASD or SPCD) and receive different clinical treatments and social support. The aim of this paper is to review recent debates on SPCD, particularly as regards its independence from ASD. In the first part, we outline the major aspects of the DSM-5 nosological revision involving ASD and SPCD. In the second part, we focus on the validity and reliability of SPCD. First, we analyze literature on three potential validators of SPCD, i.e., etiology, response to treatment, and measurability. Then, we turn to reliability issues connected with the introduction of the grandfather clause and the use of the concepts of spectrum and threshold in the definition of ASD. In the conclusion, we evaluate whether SPCD could play any role in contemporary psychiatry other than that of an independent mental disorder and discuss the role that non-epistemic factors could play in the delineation of the future psychiatry nosography.


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