The DSM-5 definition of mental disorder

2013 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 393-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dusan Kecmanovic
Keyword(s):  
Dsm 5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Bolton

Proposals have been made in connection with ICD and DSM revisions to separate the concepts of mental disorder and of impairments in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning. The proposals are consistent with viewing disability as a social concept rather than a medical one. It is argued here on the basis of two main premises that mental disorder specifically cannot be conceptualized independently of social impairments. The first premise is that in general medicine the definition of disease essentially turns on impairments of normal function of an organ or system leading to poor outcomes. The second, compound premise is that one normal function of the central nervous system is the regulation of behaviour in the external world, and that this function is approximately the domain of the mental. The conclusion is drawn that mental disorder conceptually involves downturn in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Dan J. Stein ◽  
Andrea C. Palk ◽  
Kenneth S. Kendler

Abstract The question of ‘what is a mental disorder?’ is central to the philosophy of psychiatry, and has crucial practical implications for psychiatric nosology. Rather than approaching the problem in terms of abstractions, we review a series of exemplars – real-world examples of problematic cases that emerged during work on and immediately after DSM-5, with the aim of developing practical guidelines for addressing future proposals. We consider cases where (1) there is harm but no clear dysfunction, (2) there is dysfunction but no clear harm, and (3) there is possible dysfunction and/or harm, but this is controversial for various reasons. We found no specific criteria to determine whether future proposals for new entities should be accepted or rejected; any such proposal will need to be assessed on its particular merits, using practical judgment. Nevertheless, several suggestions for the field emerged. First, while harm is useful for defining mental disorder, some proposed entities may require careful consideration of individual v. societal harm, as well as of societal accommodation. Second, while dysfunction is useful for defining mental disorder, the field would benefit from more sharply defined indicators of dysfunction. Third, it would be useful to incorporate evidence of diagnostic validity and clinical utility into the definition of mental disorder, and to further clarify the type and extent of data needed to support such judgments.


2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Cristina Amoretti ◽  
Elisabetta Lalumera ◽  
Davide Serpico

AbstractThe latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) included the Social (Pragmatic) Communication Disorder (SPCD) as a new mental disorder characterized by deficits in pragmatic abilities. Although the introduction of SPCD in the psychiatry nosography depended on a variety of reasons—including bridging a nosological gap in the macro-category of Communication Disorders—in the last few years researchers have identified major issues in such revision. For instance, the symptomatology of SPCD is notably close to that of (some forms of) Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). This opens up the possibility that individuals with very similar symptoms can be diagnosed differently (with either ASD or SPCD) and receive different clinical treatments and social support. The aim of this paper is to review recent debates on SPCD, particularly as regards its independence from ASD. In the first part, we outline the major aspects of the DSM-5 nosological revision involving ASD and SPCD. In the second part, we focus on the validity and reliability of SPCD. First, we analyze literature on three potential validators of SPCD, i.e., etiology, response to treatment, and measurability. Then, we turn to reliability issues connected with the introduction of the grandfather clause and the use of the concepts of spectrum and threshold in the definition of ASD. In the conclusion, we evaluate whether SPCD could play any role in contemporary psychiatry other than that of an independent mental disorder and discuss the role that non-epistemic factors could play in the delineation of the future psychiatry nosography.


2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel Cooper

This paper aims to understand the DSM-5 through situating it within the context of the historical development of the DSM series. When one looks at the sets of diagnostic criteria, the DSM-5 is strikingly similar to the DSM-IV. I argue that at this level the DSM has become ‘locked-in’ and difficult to change. At the same time, at the structural, or conceptual, level there have been radical changes, for example in the definition of ‘mental disorder’, in the role of theory and of values, and in the abandonment of the multiaxial approach to diagnosis. The way that the DSM-5 was constructed means that the overall conceptual framework of the classification only barely constrains the sets of diagnostic criteria it contains.


Author(s):  
Rebecca McKnight ◽  
Jonathan Price ◽  
John Geddes

One in four individuals suffer from a psychiatric disorder at some point in their life, with 15– 20 per cent fitting cri­teria for a mental disorder at any given time. The latter corresponds to around 450 million people worldwide, placing mental disorders as one of the leading causes of global morbidity. Mental health problems represent five of the ten leading causes of disability worldwide. The World Health Organization (WHO) reported in mid 2016 that ‘the global cost of mental illness is £651 billion per year’, stating that the equivalent of 50 million working years was being lost annually due to mental disorders. The financial global impact is clearly vast, but on a smaller scale, the social and psychological impacts of having a mental dis­order on yourself or your family are greater still. It is often difficult for the general public and clin­icians outside psychiatry to think of mental health dis­orders as ‘diseases’ because it is harder to pinpoint a specific pathological cause for them. When confronted with this view, it is helpful to consider that most of medicine was actually founded on this basis. For ex­ample, although medicine has been a profession for the past 2500 years, it was only in the late 1980s that Helicobacter pylori was linked to gastric/ duodenal ul­cers and gastric carcinoma, or more recently still that the BRCA genes were found to be a cause of breast cancer. Still much of clinical medicine treats a patient’s symptoms rather than objective abnormalities. The WHO has given the following definition of mental health:… Mental health is defined as a state of well- being in which every individual realizes his or her own po­tential, can cope with the normal stresses of life, can work productively and fruitfully, and is able to make a contribution to her or his community.… This is a helpful definition, because it clearly defines a mental disorder as a condition that disrupts this state in any way, and sets clear goals of treatment for the clinician. It identifies the fact that a disruption of an individual’s mental health impacts negatively not only upon their enjoyment and ability to cope with life, but also upon that of the wider community.


Author(s):  
Sally-Ann Cooper

Mental disorders are common in people with intellectual disability, with a reported point prevalence of 36% in children and young people (including challenging behaviours), and 40.9% in adults (or 28.3% excluding challenging behaviours). People with intellectual disability experience all types of mental disorders, some more commonly than the general population, e.g. autism, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, schizophrenia, bipolar affective disorder, and dementia. Challenging behaviours are also common, and have no clear general population equivalent. Multi-morbidity of mental and physical disorders is typical. Mental disorder assessments are complex due to multi-morbidity and polypharmacy, in addition to impairments in communication, understanding, vision, and hearing, and the need to work with family and paid carers as well as the person with intellectual disability. Mental disorder classificatory systems have been developed for people with intellectual disability, in view of under-reporting when using general population manuals: DC-LD was designed to complement ICD-10, and DM-ID 2 to interpret DSM-5.


2019 ◽  
Vol 215 (5) ◽  
pp. 633-635
Author(s):  
Sheila Hollins ◽  
Keri-Michèle Lodge ◽  
Paul Lomax

SummaryIntellectual disability (also known as learning disability in UK health services) and autism are distinct from the serious mental illnesses for which the Mental Health Act is designed to be used. Their inclusion in the definition of mental disorder is discriminatory, resulting in unjust deprivations of liberty. Intellectual disability and autism should be excluded from the Mental Health Act.Declaration of interestNone.


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