Preempting the Entry of Near Perfect Substitutes

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vilen Lipatov ◽  
Damien Neven ◽  
Georges Siotis
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Generic Version ◽  
Differentiated Products ◽  
Quality Competition ◽  
Pharmaceutical Drug ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Number Of Firms

Abstract When firms compete on price and quality-enhancing promotion in a market for differentiated products, entry of a nearly perfect substitute to one of such products, for example, a generic version of a pharmaceutical drug, intensifies price competition but softens quality competition. We show that consumers are likely to gain from entry when quality is relatively unimportant for them, when business stealing generated by promotion is substantial, and when products are poor substitutes. We also show that entry may be more attractive for consumers in less concentrated markets, as a smaller number of firms and asymmetric market shares may be associated with higher quality.

scholarly journals Mergers with Differentiated Products: Where Do We Stand?

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-212
Author(s):  
Tommaso Valletti ◽  
Hans Zenger
Keyword(s):  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Differentiated Products ◽  
Horizontal Merger ◽  
10Th Anniversary ◽  
Merger Guidelines ◽  
Competitive Effects ◽  
Unilateral Effects ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Differentiated Product Markets

AbstractOn the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, this article provides an overview of the state of economic analysis of unilateral effects in mergers with differentiated products. Drawing on our experience with merger enforcement in Europe, we discuss both static and dynamic competition, with a special emphasis on the calibration of competitive effects. We also discuss the role of market shares and structural presumptions in differentiated product markets.

scholarly journals When Demand Increases Cause Shakeouts

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 216-249
Author(s):  
Thomas N. Hubbard ◽  
Michael J. Mazzeo
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Quality Competition ◽  
Swimming Pools ◽  
Standard Models ◽  
The 1960S

Standard models that guide competition policy imply that demand increases should lead to more, not fewer firms. However, Sutton’s (1991) model shows that demand increases instead can lead to shakeouts if non-price competition takes the form of fixed investments. We investigate this effect in the 1960s–1980s hotel and motel industry, where quality competition arose through investments in swimming pools. We show that demand increases associated with highway openings led to fewer firms, particularly in warm places. We do not find this effect in other industries that serve travelers, gasoline retailing, and restaurants, where quality competition does not involve fixed investments. (JEL G34, K21, L13, L15, L40, L83)

PRODUCTION SUBSIDY AS A MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN A STAGNATION ECONOMY

2008 ◽  
Vol 53 (02) ◽  
pp. 317-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
WATARU JOHDO
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Utility Function ◽  
Monopolistic Competition ◽  
Full Employment ◽  
Macroeconomic Policy ◽  
Elasticity Of Substitution ◽  
Nominal Wage ◽  
Differentiated Products ◽  
Effective Demand ◽  
Number Of Firms

This paper analyzes the effects of a changing production subsidy in a model with money-in-the-utility function for households, monopolistic competition amongst an endogenously-determined number of firms, and nominal wage sluggishness that can prevent the equilibrium from attaining full employment. Its conclusion is that in a steady state with less than full employment (that is, under stagnation), a larger production subsidy will promote entry and stimulate effective demand provided that the elasticity of substitution among the differentiated products is sufficiently high. This paper is motivated by recent Japanese experiences.

scholarly journals Advertising Competition in Retail Markets

2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyle Bagwell ◽  
Gea M Lee
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Comparative Statics ◽  
Productive Efficiency ◽  
Production Costs ◽  
Retail Markets ◽  
Social Surplus ◽  
Price Advertising ◽  
Search Rule ◽  
Number Of Firms

Abstract We consider non-price advertising by retail firms that are privately informed as to their respective production costs. We construct an advertising equilibrium in which informed consumers use an advertising search rule whereby they buy from the highest-advertising firm. Consumers are rational in using the advertising search rule since the lowest-cost firm advertises the most and also selects the lowest price. Even though the advertising equilibrium facilitates productive efficiency, we establish conditions under which firms enjoy higher expected profit when advertising is banned. Consumer welfare falls in this case, however. Under free entry, social surplus is higher when advertising is allowed. In addition, we consider a benchmark model of price competition; we provide comparative-statics results with respect to the number of informed consumers, the number of firms and the distribution of costs; and we consider the possibility of sequential search.

scholarly journals Do Switching Costs Make Markets Less Competitive?

2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 435-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Pierre Dubé ◽  
Günter J. Hitsch ◽  
Peter E. Rossi
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Switching Costs ◽  
Realistic Model ◽  
Differentiated Products ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Equilibrium Prices ◽  
Dynamic Price ◽  
Packaged Goods ◽  
Order Of Magnitude ◽  
Lock In

The conventional wisdom in economic theory holds that switching costs make markets less competitive. This article challenges this claim. The authors formulate an empirically realistic model of dynamic price competition that allows for differentiated products and imperfect lock-in. They calibrate this model with data from frequently purchased packaged goods markets. These data are ideal in the sense that they have the necessary variation to identify switching costs separately from consumer heterogeneity. Equally important, consumers exhibit inertia in their brand choices, a form of psychological switching cost. This makes the results applicable to the broad range of products that are distinctly identified (i.e., branded) rather than just to products for which there is a product adoption cost or explicit switching fee. In the simulations, prices are as much as 18% lower with than without switching costs. More important, equilibrium prices do not increase even in the presence of switching costs that are of the same order of magnitude as product price.

scholarly journals Off-Patent Biological and Biosimilar Medicines in Belgium: A Market Landscape Analysis

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yannick Vandenplas ◽  
Steven Simoens ◽  
Philippe Van Wilder ◽  
Arnold G. Vulto ◽  
Isabelle Huys
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Quality Care ◽  
Added Value ◽  
Stakeholder Perceptions ◽  
Structured Interviews ◽  
Financing System ◽  
Market Data ◽  
Quantitative And Qualitative Research ◽  
Therapeutic Class ◽  
Market Shares

Background and objective: Best-value biological medicines may generate competition in the off-patent biologicals market, resulting in having more resources available to provide patients with access to necessary medicines while maintaining high-quality care. Belgium is a country known to have low biosimilar market shares, suggesting a malfunctioning market for off-patent biologicals. This study aims to gain an in-depth understanding of the Belgian off-patent biologicals market, by looking at the evolution in volumes and costs of the relevant products in the market.Methods: This study included a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods. The quantitative part of this study consisted of the analysis of market data obtained by the National Institute for Health and Disability Insurance (NIHDI) for all relevant products in the Belgian off-patent biologicals market (i.e. TNF-inhibitors, insulins, granulocyte colony-stimulating factors, epoetins, rituximab, trastuzumab). In addition, for the qualitative part of this study, semi-structured interviews with Belgian stakeholders were conducted between December 2019 and March 2020.Results: Belgian market data and stakeholder perceptions suggest a suboptimal market environment for off-patent biological and biosimilar medicines. Shifts are observed after loss of exclusivities of originator biologicals toward second-generation products or new therapeutic class products, at a higher cost and often limited added value. Moreover, cost reductions for off-patent biologicals after biosimilar market entry are mainly determined by mandatory price reductions applicable to both originator and biosimilar products, and not by lower prices induced by competition. For products used in the retail setting, significant mandatory price reductions for both originator and reference products with low biosimilar volumes were pointed out as the main reasons for the lack of price competition. For products dispensed in hospitals, the hospital financing system is important. First, it does not always encourage the use of lower cost alternatives. Second, competition mainly takes place at the level of confidential discounts in tenders. Most interviewees acknowledged the lack of a competitive environment, which is not supportive of a sustainable Belgian off-patent biologicals market.Conclusion: Market data and stakeholder perceptions indicate that the sustainability of the Belgian market for off-patent biologicals is challenged. A sustainable market ensures access to biological therapies now and in the future.

Eurotunnel versus the Ferries

2017 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
David Besanko ◽  
Christopher Stori ◽  
Ed Kalletta
Keyword(s):  
Competitive Advantage ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Marginal Cost ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Differentiated Products ◽  
Horizontal Differentiation ◽  
Passenger Traffic ◽  
History Of ◽  
Key Drivers ◽  
The Cross

Considers the competitive strategy of the Channel Tunnel just prior to the time it opened for business in 1994. Focusing specifically on the tunnel's Le Shuttle service for freight and passenger traffic, gives students an opportunity to explore whether Le Shuttle should follow a premium pricing strategy relative to the cross-channel ferries, match the ferries' prices, or undercut the ferries' prices. Following a section on the history of the tunnel's construction, provides an in-depth discussion of the cross-channel ferry business and the Le Shuttle services. Concludes by posing the question: What pricing strategy should Le Shuttle follow?To illustrate the key drivers of price competition in a differentiated products industry: differences in marginal cost; vertical differentiation among competitors; the degree of horizontal differentiation in the market; and the sources and sustainability of competitive advantage.

Procurement Mechanisms for Assortments of Differentiated Products

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Saban ◽  
Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Consumer Surplus ◽  
Differentiated Products ◽  
The World ◽  
Substitute Products ◽  
Practical Implications ◽  
Chilean Government

Many procurement agencies around the world construct assortments of differentiated products from which consumers can buy from. A leading example is framework agreements, a type of procurement mechanism commonly used by governments. This type of practice is studied head on. The authors introduce a mechanism design formulation of the procurement agency’s problem and solves it under progressively more realistic implementation constraints. The results show how restricting entry of close-substitute products into the assortment can increase price competition, reducing spending significantly, without much damage to the variety offered to consumers. Furthermore, the results have practical implications that can be used by procurement agencies to increase consumer surplus and have already been used to redesign FAs in the Chilean government.

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