4 Legal Acts, 4.2 Solange I, BverfGE 37, 291, 29 May 1974; Solange II , BverfGE 73, 339, 22 October 1986; Solange III, BverfGE 89, 155 12 October 1993; and Solange IV, BverfGE 102, 147, 7 June 2000

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hilpold Peter
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Control Activity ◽  
Community Law ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
European Court

The Solange case-law stands for a specific form of interaction between the legal order of the European Union (EU) and the legal orders of the member states (MS) or, respectively, between the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the national Constitutional Courts of the MS. At the start of this line of cases the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht—BverfG) first upheld its power to consider the compatibility of Community law rules with fundamental rights of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) ‘as long as the integration process has not progressed so far that Community law receives a catalogue of fundamental rights’ (Solange I). Afterwards, when fundamental rights protection had become sufficiently strong within the EC/EU the BVerfG declared to refrain from such a control activity ‘as long as the European Communities ensure effective protection of fundamental rights’ (Solange II). Subsequently, this case-law was further clarified.

Local law repercussions on EU extradition law

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 116-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Niblock ◽  
Anna Oehmichen
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Special Focus ◽  
Mutual Trust ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Local Law

The present article examines the developments of extradition law in Europe, with a special focus on case law in England & Wales and Germany. It explores the effects that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union has had on extradition law within Europe, and how the tensions between mutual trust and fundamental rights protection in this area have been addressed by the two jurisdictions.

scholarly journals La aplicación judicial de la CDFUE; un decálogo a partir de la jurisprudencia del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea

2017 ◽  
pp. 333
Author(s):  
Rafael Bustos Gisbert
Keyword(s):  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Basic Point ◽  
Derechos Humanos ◽  
High Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights

En este ensayo se pretende examinar cuáles son las pautas que ha de seguir el juez nacional cuando se enfrenta a la aplicación de la CDFUE. El punto de referencia básico en esta materia ha de ser la jurisprudencia sobre el tema del Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea. De forma complementaria habrá de tenerse en cuenta la posición del Tribunal Constitucional y del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. A partir de lo ocurrido en los casos más importantes hasta ahora planteados se pretende esclarecer cuándo y cómo ha de seguirse la jurisprudencia de los tres altos tribunales.This essay tries to establish the basic patterns that judges must follow when facing the adjudication of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The basic point of reference is the case law of the European Court of Justice. But they also must be take into account the case law of the Spanish Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights. After the study of the most important cases in the topic, the essay attempts to clarify when and how to follow the jurisprudence of these High Courts.

The Decision of the AustrianVerfassungsgerichtshofon the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: An Instrument of Leverage or Rearguard Action?

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1429-1448 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Orator
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Administrative Action ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Adjudication ◽  
The Eu

In a landmark decision of 2012 on the relevance of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) in domestic constitutional adjudication, the AustrianVerfassungsgerichtshof(Constitutional Court) substantially extended the applicable yardstick, according to which the constitutionality of ordinary laws and administrative action may be assessed, to certain Charter rights. At the same time, theVerfassungsgerichtshofclaimed its active commitment to judicial dialogue with the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) through the preliminary reference procedure pursuant to Article 267 TFEU to effectively protect Charter-based fundamental rights of individuals. Arguably, both the domestic and Union-wide ramifications of this “instant classic” case of a domestic constitutionalization of the Charter are substantial, delivering insight not least as to the transformative role of the Charter for domestic fundamental rights protection and the adaptations of domestic constitutional courts in such a changed environment.

scholarly journals ¿Es real el diálogo entre tribunales? Cuestión prejudicial y control de constitucionalidad por vulneración de derechos y libertades fundamentales

2017 ◽  
pp. 529
Author(s):  
Encarnación Roca Trías ◽  
Susana García Couso
Keyword(s):  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
European Court Of Justice ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
National Constitution

Es de sobra conocida la tensión existente entre los Tribunales Constitucionales de los Estados miembros y el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea a raíz del planteamiento de cuestiones prejudiciales ante el TJUE en supuestos en los que, aunque el asunto se plantee como una cuestión interpretativa del derecho de la Unión, comprende, además, un problema de derechos fundamentales susceptibles de ser controlados, también, constitucionalmente. Ambos procedimientos terminan con una decisión de compatibilidad con los derechos fundamentales. Este artículo pretende hacer una reflexión acerca de los problemas que suscita el hecho de que dos Tribunales —TJUE y TC— competentes en materia de protección de derechos fundamentales, y, al mismo tiempo, interpretadores de un mismo ordenamiento jurídico, puedan emitir juicios paralelos sobre una misma norma que ha sido sometida a su control y con parámetros diferentes de control: la Carta de Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea y la Constitución.This paper purports to reflect on the complex issues that arise from the fact that both the European Court of Justice and the national constitutional court have the power to adjudicate on fundamental rights and that, therefore, on the basis of the application of different rules — the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the national Constitution — they can occasionally arrive at different decisions. National courts are more and more aware of this dual avenue to challenge national regulations, through the preliminary reference to the ECJ and through the reference to the Constitutional Court of constitutional doubts with regard to national legislation. In consequence, national Constitutional Courts must accommodate into this new scenario.

scholarly journals The Spanish Constitutional Court and Fundamental Rights Adjudication After the First Preliminary Reference

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1509-1528
Author(s):  
Miryam Rodríguez-Izquierdo Serrano
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Legal Doctrine ◽  
Law System ◽  
Community Law ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights

The purpose of the preliminary reference procedure is to ensure a uniform application and interpretation of Community law across all the Member States, including European fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The entry into force of the Charter has reinforced the authority of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the field of fundamental rights adjudication. But the Charter may also be a new source of conflicts between the jurisdiction of the CJEU and the jurisdiction of national constitutional courts. Indeed, compliance with the indirect rulings over national law contained in the CJEU decisions became something logical for the national ordinary courts from the beginning of the integration process, but it was not the same for national constitutional courts. Most of them have always disliked the idea of asking for the CJEU's opinion on a conflict of law involving national constitutional provisions. The CJEU succeeded in establishing a legal doctrine through principles of Community law—supremacy and direct effect being the pioneers—that meant a material constitutionalization of the European Union (EU) law system. And for the national constitutional courts, such an understanding of EU law made a rival of the CJEU.

Verfassungsanalogien – Das Bundesverfassungsgericht an der Grenze der Verfassungsinterpretation

Der Staat ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-41
Author(s):  
Carsten Bäcker
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Federal State ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Sich Eine ◽  
Statutory Interpretation ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Federal Constitutional

Analogien sind methodologisch hoch umstritten; sie bewegen sich an der Grenze der Gesetzesinterpretation. Dem methodologischen Streit um die Analogien unterliegt die Frage nach den Grenzen der Gesetzesinterpretation. In der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts finden sich eine Reihe von Verfassungsanalogien. Diese Analogien zum Verfassungsgesetz werden zwar nur selten ausdrücklich als solche bezeichnet, sie finden sich aber in einer Vielzahl von dogmatischen Konstruktionen in der Rechtsprechung – wie etwa der Erweiterung des Grundrechtsschutzes für Deutsche auf EU-Bürger oder der Annahme von Gesetzgebungskompetenzen des Bundes als Annex zu dessen geschriebenen Kompetenzen. Die Existenz derartiger Analogien zum Verfassungsgesetz verlangt nach Antworten auf die Fragen nach den Grenzen der Kompetenz zur Verfassungsinterpretation. Der Beitrag spürt diesen Grenzen nach – und schließt mit der Aufforderung an das Bundesverfassungsgericht, die Annahme von Verfassungsanalogien zu explizieren und die sich darin spiegelnden Annahmen über die Grenzen der Kompetenz zur Verfassungsinterpretation zu reflektieren. Constitutional analogies. The Federal Constitutional Court at the limit of constitutional interpretation From a methodological point of view, the use of analogies in legal argument is highly controversial, for they reach to the limits of statutory interpretation. Underlying the methodological dispute over analogies is the question of what the limits of statutory interpretation are or ought to be. A number of analogies from constitutional law can be found in the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court. Although these analogies to constitutional law are rarely explicitly designated as such, in the case law they can be found in a variety of dogmatic constructions – for example, in the extension of Germans’ fundamental rights protection to EU citizens, or the assumption of legislative powers of the federal state as an appendix to its written powers. The existence of such analogies to constitutional law calls for answers to the question of the limits of the power to interpret the Constitution. It is the aim of this article to trace these limits, and in its conclusion it calls on the Federal Constitutional Court to explicate the adoption of analogies in constitutional law and to reflect on the assumptions found therein – respecting the limits of the power to interpret the Constitution.

Fundamental Rights Protection between Strasbourg and Luxembourg

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katalin Ligeti
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
European Court ◽  
Charter Of Fundamental Rights ◽  
Grand Chamber

Since long before the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), the two highest courts in Europe, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have sought to develop their respective jurisprudence in such a way as to ensure a strong protection of individual rights, whilst avoiding clashes between the decisions taken in Luxembourg and Strasbourg. An important statement in this regard is provided by the Bosphorus judgment, in which the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR recognised the existence of a presumption of equivalent protection of fundamental rights under EU law. The presumption is rebuttable, but expresses the trustful attitude (and a certain degree of deference) of Strasbourg towards the ability of EU law (and of the CJEU) to protect Convention rights.

The German Constitutional Court and Preliminary References—Still a Match not Made in Heaven?

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
German Constitutional Court ◽  
In The Beginning ◽  
The Eu

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).

Between Informal Dialogue and Official Criticism

2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 409-420
Author(s):  
Anna Podolska
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Mutual Recognition ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
European Court ◽  
Protection Of Human Rights ◽  
Judicial Proceedings

Abstract There are various forms of jurisdictional dialogue. In addition to drawing from the case law of another court or seeking direct assistance of such another court in passing the judgment, we can notice in practice situations when by issuing a verdict the courts are communicating with each other. The rulings of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the European Court of Human Rights regarding the free movement of judgments in the European Union and protection of fundamental rights are the example of such activities. Each of these bodies was interpreting separately the extent to which the mechanisms of recognising and executing the judgments may interfere with the level of protection of fundamental rights. A common conclusion concerns assigning the priority to protection of fundamental rights, while individual bodies were determining differently the standards of such protection. The analysed judgments can be construed as a communication between these bodies. Although no direct discussion takes place between these courts, this is still a form of interaction which affects the development of the case law and understanding of the boundaries of mutual recognition of judgments and protection of human rights within judicial proceedings.

scholarly journals Globalization and the Law: Deciphering the Message of Transnational Human Rights Litigation

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (12) ◽  
pp. 1499-1520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peer Zumbansen
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Basic Law ◽  
European Court ◽  
Federal Constitutional ◽  
The Law ◽  
German Federal Constitutional Court ◽  
German Federal Constitutional

On 14 October 2004, theBundesverfassungsgericht(BVerfG – German Federal Constitutional Court) voided a decision by theOberlandesgericht(Higher Regional Court) Naumburg, finding a violation of the complainant's rights guaranteed by theGrundgesetz(German Basic Law). The Decision directly addresses both the observation and application of case law from the European Court of Human Rights under the Basic Law's “rule of law provision” in Art. 20.III. While there is a myriad of important aspects with regard to this decision, we may limit ourselves at this point to the introductoryaperçucontained in the holdings of the case. One of them reads as follows:Zur Bindung an Gesetz und Recht (Art. 20 Abs. 3 GG) gehört die Berücksichtigung der Gewährleistungen der Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten und der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte im Rahmen methodisch vertretbarer Gesetzesauslegung. Sowohl die fehlende Auseinandersetzung mit einer Entscheidung des Gerichtshofs als auch deren gegen vorrangiges Recht verstoßende schematische “Vollstreckung” können gegen Grundrechte in Verbindung mit dem Rechtsstaatsprinzip verstoßen

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