Part X Judicial Review, Judicial Performance, and Enforcement, 30 Improving Judicial Performance in Matters Involving International Arbitration

Author(s):  
Strong SI

This chapter focuses on the issue of judicial competency in international arbitration. Participants in international arbitration often view national courts as the ‘weak link’ in the chain of arbitral practice and procedure. Although parties can and often do contract in advance for experienced arbitrators and efficient procedures, all of that planning and forethought can come to naught if a judge refuses to enforce an arbitration agreement or award. Recalcitrant courts are often branded as parochial, a move which suggests that the judges in question know what the proper course of action is, but simply prefer to protect national interests or parties. However, what appears to be a conscious desire to thwart the international arbitral regime could actually be nothing more than a judicial misunderstanding of a particularly complex area of law. The remainder of the chapter discusses structural and educational efforts of states to improve judicial decision-making.

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (8) ◽  
pp. 1167-1181
Author(s):  
Laura M. Henderson

AbstractThe cases challenging the European Stability Mechanism in Eurozone creditor states show the concern courts have with protecting and promoting democratic contestation. This Article shows how John Hart Ely’s theory of process-based review provides the theoretical basis for understanding how attention to democratic contestation contributes to the legitimacy of courts reviewing legislation against constitutional norms. By focusing on promoting democratic procedures, Ely argues that courts can avoid substantive decisions that are best left to the legislature. Yet, as my discussion of the constitutional theory of constituent and constituted powers shows, no form of constituted power can avoid some exercise of constituent power. In other words, even a process-based approach cannot avoid substantive judgments. The legitimacy of these decisions depends on the availability of avenues for contestation in the judicial decision-making process itself.


2011 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
John Kong Shan Ho ◽  
Rohan Bruce Edward Price

AbstractSince 2001, a number of common law jurisdictions have initiated reforms to their charity law and the United Kingdom has taken the lead. This article examines what Hong Kong and Australia can learn from the United Kingdom in reforming their own outdated and fragmented charity laws. It is contended that the lessons and experiences of the United Kingdom provide good insights for Hong Kong and Australia as each jurisdiction anticipates implementing a broadly similar regime to the United Kingdom's to modernize regulation of their charity sectors. This article contends that there is no need to make a choice between retaining judicial decision-making over charities (inconsistent as it is) and establishing a type of charity commission which makes determining charitable status akin to a decision of a government department. Instead, Hong Kong and Australia can have charity commissions with missions that are sensitive to their own legal terrains but which are subject to judicial review.


2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 220-246
Author(s):  
Christoph Engel ◽  
Werner Gueth

Decision-makers often mean to react to the behavior of others, knowing that they only imperfectly observe them. Rational choice theory posits that they should weigh false positive versus false negative choices, and assess possible outcomes and their probabilities, if necessary, attaching subjective values to them. We argue that this recommendation is not only utterly unrealistic but highly error prone. We contrast it with an approach inspired by satisficing, where the decision-maker contents herself with gauging her confidence in not making too big a mistake by adopting one course of action. We model the competing approaches, using judicial decision-making as a graphic illustration.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ◽  
Chris Guthrie ◽  
Andrew J. Wistrich

Legal Studies ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Claire Hamilton

Abstract The changes to the Irish exclusionary rule introduced by the judgment in People (DPP) v JC mark an important watershed in the Irish law of evidence and Irish legal culture more generally. The case relaxed the exclusionary rule established in People (DPP) v Kenny, one of the strictest in the common law world, by creating an exception based on ‘inadvertence’. This paper examines the decision through the lens of legal culture, drawing in particular on Lawrence Friedman's distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ legal culture to help understand the factors contributing to the decision. The paper argues that Friedman's concept and, in particular, the dialectic between internal and external legal culture, holds much utility at a micro as well as macro level, in interrogating the cultural logics at work in judicial decision-making.


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