Part 3 The Post 9/11-Era (2001–), 61 The Intervention of France and African Countries in Mali—2013

Author(s):  
Bannelier Karine ◽  
Christakis Theodore

This contribution analyses the joint French-African intervention in Mali in 2013. After recalling the facts of the intervention, it examines the legal positions of the main protagonists and the reactions of third States and international organizations. It then tests the operation in Mali against the international legal framework governing the use of force as it stood at the time of the events. While the French and African military Operations in Mali were clearly legal, they raise important questions of jus ad bellum regarding the legal arguments put forward to justify them: collective self-defense, intervention by invitation and UNSC authorization. The final section analyses the intervention’s precedential value and its impact on the law against force.

Author(s):  
Geoffrey S. Corn

The lawful use of force in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense by states requires compliance with the universally recognized elements of necessity and proportionality. Both of these elements frame the justification of resorting to self-help action. These two elements of self-defense, while often treated as distinct requirements, may be better understood as integrated into the assessment of overall strategic justification, with proportionality defining whether the scope and duration of military action in self-defense is genuinely necessary to protect against the unlawful threat. Thus, there is logic in conceptualizing proportionality not as distinct from the necessity requirement but as an integral component of that requirement. Linking proportionality assessments to the necessity of acting in self-defense leads to a rational link between the threat requiring self-defense action and the strategic scope and duration of operations to protect against that unlawful threat. This will contribute to careful tailoring of self-defense military operations to the overall nature of that threat. Of equal importance, this strategic-oriented focus will ideally offset the temptation to judge jus ad bellum proportionality by applying jus in bello principles. If nothing else, greater emphasis on the important differences between these two variants of the international legal proportionality requirement will enhance the impact on each of these variants on the success and legitimacy of self-defense operations.


Author(s):  
Weller Marc

This contribution discusses the Iraq War of 2003. It begins by setting out the facts and context of the US and British invasion. It then considers the legal justifications put forward by the intervening states and assesses the reaction of the international community to these events. It then tests the legality of the intervention against the international legal framework governing the use of force as it stood at the time of the events. In particular it considers whether UNSC Resolution 1441 provided a legal basis for the use of force against Iraq. The final section examines if, and to what extent, the case had an impact on the further development of the jus ad bellum. The Iraq War of 2003 did indeed have an effect on the erosion of the prohibition of the use of force, however it was a cumulative effect, rather than an immediate and decisive one.


Author(s):  
Kritsiotis Dino

This contribution discusses the 1971 Indian intervention in east Pakistan. It sets out the facts and context of the crisis, the legal positions of the main protagonists (India and Pakistan), and the international community’s reactions. It then tests the legality of the Indian intervention against the international legal framework governing the use of force as it stood at the time of the events. The final section examines if, and to what extent, the case has had an impact on the further development of the jus ad bellum, in particular whether it is a precedent for humanitarian intervention.


Author(s):  
Ruys Tom

This contribution discusses the 1961 Indian intervention in Goa. It sets out the facts and context of the crisis, the legal positions of the main protagonists (India and Portugal), and the international community’s reactions. It then tests the legality of the Indian intervention against the international legal framework governing the use of force as it stood at the time of the events. The final section examines if, and to what extent, the case has had an impact on the further development of the jus ad bellum, in particular whether it has contributed to an exception to the prohibition on the use of force for the recovery of 'pre-colonial' title.


Poliarchia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (9) ◽  
pp. 51-95
Author(s):  
Dariusz Stolicki

The Organizational and Personal Framework of the “Global War on Terror” in the Light of the Decisions of the United States Courts The article analyses the law of military detention applicable to the ongoing conflict with Al‑Qaeda and associated forces, to the extent that that law emerges from the jurisprudence of U.S. federal courts, and particularly of the D.C. Circuit. It discusses four major issues: the types of organizations against which military force can be used in accordance with the Congressional authorization, the range of persons subject to military detention in connection with such use of force (in terms of both legal categories and factual predicates), the scope of the battlefield on which the use of force is authorized, and the extent to which American citizens or foreigners lawfully present in the U.S. territory enjoy special immunity from military detention. The article concludes that the impact of the D.C. Circuit decisions on those questions extends beyond the issue of military detention, and provides the general legal framework applicable to other military operations directed against terrorist organizations in the Middle East, such as target strikes or the campagin against the self‑styled Islamic State.


Author(s):  
Fernando R. Tesón ◽  
Bas van der Vossen

We introduce general concepts of just war theory and describe different kinds of war: national self-defense, collective self-defense, and humanitarian intervention. After laying down the conditions for the justification of humanitarian intervention, we highlight some of our differences. We conclude with an outline of the international law of use of force and some jurisprudential themes that bear on the current humanitarian intervention debate.


2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 855-874 ◽  
Author(s):  
KARINE BANNELIER ◽  
THEODORE CHRISTAKIS

AbstractResponding to an urgent request by the authorities of Mali, France launched Operation Serval against several terrorist armed groups in January 2013. The French troops were assisted by a Chadian contingent and by forces progressively deployed by other African countries within a UNSC authorized African force (Resolution 2085). While the French and African military operations in Mali were clearly legal, they raise important questions of jus ad bellum in relation to the two legal arguments put forward to justify them: intervention by invitation, and UNSC authorization. In this paper we first discuss the general rules of international law applying to intervention by invitation. We explain that such an intervention could sometimes be contrary to the principle of self-determination and we propose a purpose-based approach. We then apply these rules to the situation in Mali and conclude that the French and Chadian interventions were legal because, on the one hand, the request was validly formulated by the internationally recognized government of Mali and, on the other hand, their legitimate purpose was to fight terrorism. The UNSC approved this legal basis and ‘helped’ France and Chad appeal validly to it by listing the enemy as ‘terrorist groups’. It gave its ‘blessing’ to these interventions, without authorizing them, and observed the events with relief. The adoption of Resolution 2100 on 25 April 2013 raises new legal questions. The Council creates a UN peace enforcement mission in Mali, MINUSMA, which has a robust use-of-force mandate. Created just a few weeks after the DRC Intervention Brigade, this force seems to indicate an ongoing evolution (revolution?) in UN peacekeeping, notwithstanding the assurances by some UNSC member states that MINUSMA will avoid ‘offensive counter-terrorism operations’. At the same time Resolution 2100 gives a restricted use-of-force mandate to France (to protect MINUSMA), without challenging the legal validity of intervention by invitation for all other tasks. The conflict in Mali might thus remain for some time yet between the latitude of UNSC authorization and the longitude of unilateral intervention by invitation.


Author(s):  
Hofer Alexandra

This chapter examines the intervention led by France, the United Kingdom and Israel against Egypt in 1956. After recalling the facts of the Suez Canal Crisis, it examines the legal positions of the main protagonists (Israel, France, the United Kingdom and Egypt) and the reactions of United Nations member states. The intervention’s legality is then assessed against the international legal framework governing the use of force as it stood in 1956. The final section analyses the intervention’s precedential value and its impact on the jus ad bellum. It is argued that if the intervention initially undermined the United Nations, the forceful reaction of UN member states affirmed the importance of the UN Organization and its principles.


2021 ◽  
pp. 251-272
Author(s):  
Anders Henriksen

This chapter discusses the regulation of when and for what purpose a state may use force against another state jus ad bellum. It provides an overview of the legal framework in the 1945 UN Charter. It analyses the content of the prohibition on the use of force in article 2(4) of the Charter; discusses the competences of the UN Security Council; and examines the right to self-defence. The Security Council is entrusted with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council may authorize the use of force if required to maintain and/or restore the peace. Article 51 of the Charter allows a state to defend itself in the case of armed attack.


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