Collective Self-Defense and the Use of Regional or Subregional Authority as Justification for the Use of Force

1984 ◽  
Vol 78 ◽  
pp. 69-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Domingo E. Acevedo
Author(s):  
Fernando R. Tesón ◽  
Bas van der Vossen

We introduce general concepts of just war theory and describe different kinds of war: national self-defense, collective self-defense, and humanitarian intervention. After laying down the conditions for the justification of humanitarian intervention, we highlight some of our differences. We conclude with an outline of the international law of use of force and some jurisprudential themes that bear on the current humanitarian intervention debate.


1991 ◽  
Vol 85 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Franck ◽  
Faiza Patel

The United Nations system is an elegant, carefully crafted instrument to make war illegal and unnecessary. To this end, in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, members are required to “refrain … from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”If such force is used despite that prohibition, the Charter envisages two kinds of military remedies: wars of self-defense and police actions. Article 51 authorizes members to use military force in exercise of the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs” in violation of Article 2(4). This provision merely recognizes that the old war system may still be needed until the new system of global policing can secure the peace for all.


Author(s):  
Geoffrey S. Corn

The lawful use of force in the exercise of individual or collective self-defense by states requires compliance with the universally recognized elements of necessity and proportionality. Both of these elements frame the justification of resorting to self-help action. These two elements of self-defense, while often treated as distinct requirements, may be better understood as integrated into the assessment of overall strategic justification, with proportionality defining whether the scope and duration of military action in self-defense is genuinely necessary to protect against the unlawful threat. Thus, there is logic in conceptualizing proportionality not as distinct from the necessity requirement but as an integral component of that requirement. Linking proportionality assessments to the necessity of acting in self-defense leads to a rational link between the threat requiring self-defense action and the strategic scope and duration of operations to protect against that unlawful threat. This will contribute to careful tailoring of self-defense military operations to the overall nature of that threat. Of equal importance, this strategic-oriented focus will ideally offset the temptation to judge jus ad bellum proportionality by applying jus in bello principles. If nothing else, greater emphasis on the important differences between these two variants of the international legal proportionality requirement will enhance the impact on each of these variants on the success and legitimacy of self-defense operations.


Author(s):  
Bannelier Karine ◽  
Christakis Theodore

This contribution analyses the joint French-African intervention in Mali in 2013. After recalling the facts of the intervention, it examines the legal positions of the main protagonists and the reactions of third States and international organizations. It then tests the operation in Mali against the international legal framework governing the use of force as it stood at the time of the events. While the French and African military Operations in Mali were clearly legal, they raise important questions of jus ad bellum regarding the legal arguments put forward to justify them: collective self-defense, intervention by invitation and UNSC authorization. The final section analyses the intervention’s precedential value and its impact on the law against force.


2021 ◽  
pp. 186-203
Author(s):  
Ester Herlin-Karnell

The chapter sets out to explore the notion of self-defense and how it is manifested in contemporary law of war. In addition, the chapter discusses the notion of collective self-defense in the context of the European Union (EU). The chapter links this debate to Ripstein’s Kant and the Law of War by using the EU as a test case of Kantian war theory. The chapter focuses on the imminence criteria for deciding on self-defense, in the context of EU security law, and to the extent to which Kant completely ruled out any preventive use of force. The EU’s fight against terrorism and security regulation appears to have many parallels with the “war” model which will be discussed in this chapter.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 79
Author(s):  
Pshtiwan Mohammed Qader

The present paper examines the problem of cyber-attacks under existing international law. It takes the view that the (United Nations) UN Charter provisions on the use of force can be extended to cyber-attacks by means of interpretation although the relevant provisions do not explicitly address such issue. This Article argues that cyber-attacks resulting in material damage or destruction to property, death or injury to persons, or severe disruption of the functioning of critical infrastructures can be characterized as use of armed force and therefore violate the prohibition contained in article 2(4) of the Charter. However, cyber-attacks not resulting in the above consequences may be illegal intervention in the internal affairs of other states if such attacks are coercive in nature. In addition, the current study discusses that a cyber-attack which amounts to a use of armed force per se is not sufficient to give the victim state the right to self-defense, unless its scale and effects are equivalent to those of a conventional armed attack. Finally, the study concludes that an international cyber treaty is truly necessary to more effectively address cyber-attacks.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-36
Author(s):  
David Little

Abstract The article challenges the fashionable but finally unsupportable opinion in political and academic circles that there exists no compelling, unitary, universally resonant moral and legal justification of human rights. The argument is intimated by two overlooked passages in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that presuppose the right of self-defense against arbitrary force, understood as both a moral and legal concept, and as relevant both to personal and collective life. It shows how the logic of defensive force underlies the three formative human rights instruments: the UDHR, and the two covenants on political, legal, economic, social, and cultural rights. The underlying claim is that good reasons of a particular kind are required to justify any use of force, a claim that makes perfect sense against the backdrop of the atrocities committed by the German fascists and their allies in the mid-twentieth century. The article also refers to compelling, if preliminary, evidence of the widespread cross-cultural acceptance of the moral and legal right of self-defense, suggesting a basis for the worldwide comprehensibility and appeal of human-rights language.


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