scholarly journals Organizacyjne i personalne ramy „globalnej wojny z terroryzmem” w świetle orzecznictwa sądów amerykańskich

Poliarchia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (9) ◽  
pp. 51-95
Author(s):  
Dariusz Stolicki

The Organizational and Personal Framework of the “Global War on Terror” in the Light of the Decisions of the United States Courts The article analyses the law of military detention applicable to the ongoing conflict with Al‑Qaeda and associated forces, to the extent that that law emerges from the jurisprudence of U.S. federal courts, and particularly of the D.C. Circuit. It discusses four major issues: the types of organizations against which military force can be used in accordance with the Congressional authorization, the range of persons subject to military detention in connection with such use of force (in terms of both legal categories and factual predicates), the scope of the battlefield on which the use of force is authorized, and the extent to which American citizens or foreigners lawfully present in the U.S. territory enjoy special immunity from military detention. The article concludes that the impact of the D.C. Circuit decisions on those questions extends beyond the issue of military detention, and provides the general legal framework applicable to other military operations directed against terrorist organizations in the Middle East, such as target strikes or the campagin against the self‑styled Islamic State.

2016 ◽  
Vol 110 (4) ◽  
pp. 628-645 ◽  
Author(s):  
Curtis A. Bradley ◽  
Jack L. Goldsmith

In the fifteen years since the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) was enacted on September 18, 2001, the Taliban has been removed from power but not eliminated; Osama Bin Laden has been killed and the senior leaders of Al Qaeda as of 9/11 have been captured, killed, or driven underground, although Al Qaeda remains a threat; numerous Al Qaeda affiliates have sprung up around the globe, most notably in Iraq, Yemen, Syria, and Somalia; and most ominously, the Islamic State has arisen from the ashes of Al Qaeda in Iraq to become what the Director of National Intelligence has described as “the preeminent terrorist threat” against the United States “because of its self-described caliphate in Syria and Iraq, its branches and emerging branches in other countries, and its increasing ability to direct and inspire attacks against a wide range of targets around the world.”Despite massive changes in the geographical scope of the conflict that began on 9/11, the strategy and tactics employed, and the identity of the enemy, the AUMF remains the principal legal foundation under U.S. domestic law for the president to use force against and detain members of terrorist organizations. The AUMF is already the longest operative congressional authorization of military force in U.S. history, and, as of fall 2016, there was no immediate prospect that Congress would move to repeal or update it. With the continued vibrancy of Al Qaeda, its associates, and the Taliban, and with the 2014 presidential extension of the AUMF to cover military operations against the Islamic State, the AUMF is likely to be the primary legal basis for American uses of force for the foreseeable future.


Author(s):  
David P. Oakley

Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Department of Defense (DoD) have operated together in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere during counterterrorism operations. Although the global war on terrorism provided a common purpose, it was actions taken in the late 1980s and 1990s that set the foundation for their current relationship. Driven by the post–Cold War environment and lessons learned, policy makers made military support the Intelligence Community’s top priority. In response, the CIA and DoD instituted changes that altered their relationship. While congressional debates over the Intelligence Community’s future were occurring, the CIA and DoD were expanding their relationship during operations. By the late 1990s, some policy makers and national security professionals became concerned that intelligence support to military operations had gone too far, weakening long-term analysis. Despite concerns, no major changes to intelligence organization or priorities were implemented. These concerns were forgotten after 9/11, as the United States fought two wars and policy makers fixated on terrorism. The DoD/CIA operational relationship has led to successes, but the CIA’s counterterrorism and military support requirements place a significant burden on the organization. As the sole independent US intelligence organization, the CIA was conceived to separate intelligence collection from the institutions that develop and execute policy. Its increased focus on support to military operations weakens this separation, reduces its focus on strategic issues, and risks subordination to the DoD. The CIA and DoD are the ones affected by this evolving relationship, but policy makers’ preference for military force and the militarization of foreign policy has led both organizations down this path.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Michael A. Hansen ◽  
Jennifer L. Clemens ◽  
Kathleen Dolan

Abstract This article explores the gender gap in attitudes toward the use of military force in the United States. Given that the United States has been continuously engaged in war for the last 17 years, we revisit the topic and explore whether a gender gap in attitudes persists by utilizing Cooperative Congressional Election Study data for 2006–16. In addition, given the primacy of partisanship to issue attitudes, we go beyond examining the gender gap to explore the impact of partisanship on these attitudes. We find that women are less likely than men to support the use of force in most circumstances. We also find gender gaps in the Democratic and Republican parties and acknowledge the diversity among women and among men in these attitudes because of partisan identity. Finally, we identify points of cross-pressure on individuals whose gender and partisan identities pull them in different directions, namely, Republican women and Democratic men.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Azis Rahmani

The development of information technology in the world in the last few decades has made the United States (US) develop military doctrine based on information technology called "warfare network centric". When the US invades Afghanistan as part of the global war against terrorism the doctrine of "network centric warfare" is tested to overcome the conditions of asymmetrical warfare in Afghanistan with the ability to superior information and the use of force in use that can compensate for Taliban fighting and Al-Qaeda is organized by not being hierarchically structured. In conditions of balanced strategic interaction in the conditions of asymmetrical warfare, the US should be able to neutralize Al-Qaeda and the Taliban easily and quickly but the disparities that occur in asymmetric warfare in Afghanistan not only in military strength but also in status, ideological and structural disparities the aim of military operations in Afghanistan has not been fully achieved by the US and has made the war last long.


Author(s):  
Dorle Hellmuth

This chapter assesses the strategic and doctrinal responses of Western Europe’s major powers and their armed forces to terrorism after the cold war. The chapter focuses on Europe’s ‘big three’, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, and examines the means, ends, and ways of military counterterrorism strategies and operations in these three countries. Select examples of medium and lesser powers include Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark. Critical of the central role military force played in the US global war on terror after the 9/11 attacks, many European powers called for the need to utilize alternative instruments of statecraft. Over time, they adapted their counterterrorism approaches to reflect the new realities at home and abroad. This shift became particularly apparent after the emergence of the Islamic State inspired violent attacks in various European countries, drawing a more military-centric response from Europe’s great, medium, and lesser powers.


1995 ◽  
Vol 89 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Phillip R. Trimble

The United States intervention in Haiti concludes another chapter in the development of the constitutional common law of presidential power. The Haiti experience further confirms the constitutional authority of the President to deploy armed forces into hostile foreign environments, and to initiate the use of force without prior, specific congressional authorization. The facts of the situation limit the “precedent” to small-scale interventions where the risk of major military engagements, either initially or upon escalation, is negligible. The cases of largescale hostilities, like Korea, Vietnam and Iraq, are quite different in fact and perhaps also in law. But the Haiti “precedent,” coupled with the recent interventions in Grenada and Panama and innumerable examples earlier in history, strongly supports an unqualified presidential power to carry out small-scale military operations in support of foreign policy goals.


Author(s):  
Lee Marsden

This chapter examines the influence of religion on US foreign policy. It first considers how religion affected American policy during the Cold War, from the time of Harry S. Truman to George H. W. Bush, before discussing the bilateral relationship between Israel and the United States. It then looks at the rise of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), a US-based interest group, and how its work has been complemented by conservative evangelicals and fundamentalists who ascribe to Christian Zionism. It also explores the ways in which religion has intersected with the global war on terror and US foreign policy, how the US resorted to faith-based diplomacy, the issue of religious freedom, and George W. Bush’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in Africa. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the Office of Religion and Global Affairs (ORGA), created by Barack Obama.


2002 ◽  
Vol 96 (4) ◽  
pp. 779-793 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Gelpi ◽  
Peter D. Feaver

Other research has shown (1) that civilians and the military differ in their views about when and how to use military force; (2) that the opinions of veterans track more closely with military officers than with civilians who never served in the military; and (3) that U.S. civil–military relations shaped Cold War policy debates. We assess whether this opinion gap “matters” for the actual conduct of American foreign policy. We examine the impact of the presence of veterans in the U.S. political elite on the propensity to initiate and escalate militarized interstate disputes between 1816 and 1992. As the percentage of veterans serving in the executive branch and the legislature increases, the probability that the United States will initiate militarized disputes declines. Once a dispute has been initiated, however, the higher the proportion of veterans, the greater the level of force the United States will use in the dispute.


2018 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophia Luiza Zaia

This paper examines Brazilian Foreign Policy during Lula’s administration and how the concept of autonomy has shaped Brazil’s stance on alleged terrorist activities within its borders. By using the Neoclassical Realist approach, this article explores how autonomy has allowed for Brazil to oppose the pressures of the United States’ led Global War on Terror between 2003-2010. Autonomy has worked as an intervening variable that allowed for Brazilian Foreign Policy, to some extent, to take its own direction in matters of security. 


Subject Effect of Libya on North Africa Significance The inability to produce a peace agreement in Libya and the prospect of a foreign intervention to counter the spread of Islamic State group (ISG) in the country raises questions on the impact this could have on Libya's North African neighbours. Impacts Military pressure on ISG in Libya will motivate the group to strike targets abroad to demonstrate its capabilities. ISG could use more sophisticated weapons against potential Western airstrikes and military operations. Insecurity in Libya will force its neighbours to maintain high levels of military spending at a time of lower government revenues. An influx of refugees into Tunisian and Algerian border areas could strain local resources.


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