Sovereign Defaults Before Domestic Courts

Author(s):  
Kupelyants Hayk

The monograph examines sovereign debt litigation before the English and New York courts. English and New York courts are the two main jurisdictions customarily chosen to resolve sovereign debt disputes. The book sets out parties’ litigation choices at various stages of proceedings and provides the legal background against which parties to a sovereign bond may wish to negotiate. The defining characteristic of the monograph is that it examines sovereign debt litigation through the prism of private law. The monograph clearly grounds its analysis in the law as it exists, rather than purely policy-oriented reasoning (albeit it keeps a critical eye on the reasoning of the courts). The monograph concentrates on diverse litigation tactics and arbitrage strategies available to bondholders and sovereign debtors that appear before the English courts. In most cases, private creditors may obtain summary judgments with relative ease. That said, often serious issues arise at the stages of assumption of jurisdiction, determination of the governing law of sovereign bonds or substantive resolution of the claims in English proceedings. Similarly, the enforcement of sovereign bonds against the assets of the sovereign often presents serious obstacles, most significantly the doctrine of State immunity. The book offers an exhaustive account of litigation tactics available to bondholders and sovereign debtors alike. The book is unique in the breadth of its coverage. It examines issues of jurisdiction and choice of law at the preliminary stages of litigation, substantive challenges of various sorts to sovereign debt restructurings and to the repayment of bonds on merits, and enforcement of final judgments against the State and its assets in the post-judgment phase.

Author(s):  
Hayk Kupelyants

The monograph examines sovereign debt litigation before the English and New York courts. English and New York courts are the two main jurisdictions customarily chosen to resolve sovereign debt disputes. The book sets out parties’ litigation choices at various stages of proceedings and provides the legal background against which parties to a sovereign bond may wish to negotiate. The defining characteristic of the monograph is that it examines sovereign debt litigation through the prism of private law. The monograph clearly grounds its analysis in the law as it exists, rather than purely policy-oriented reasoning (albeit it keeps a critical eye on the reasoning of the courts). The monograph concentrates on diverse litigation tactics and arbitrage strategies available to bondholders and sovereign debtors that appear before the English courts. In most cases, private creditors may obtain summary judgments with relative ease. That said, often serious issues arise at the stages of assumption of jurisdiction, determination of the governing law of sovereign bonds or substantive resolution of the claims in English proceedings. Similarly, the enforcement of sovereign bonds against the assets of the sovereign often presents serious obstacles, most significantly the doctrine of State immunity. The book offers an exhaustive account of litigation tactics available to bondholders and sovereign debtors alike. The book is unique in the breadth of its coverage. It examines issues of jurisdiction and choice of law at the preliminary stages of litigation, substantive challenges of various sorts to sovereign debt restructurings and to the repayment of bonds on merits, and enforcement of final judgments against the State and its assets in the post-judgment phase.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Grund

Abstract The European sovereign debt crisis and, more recently, the COVID-19 pandemic have revealed the European Economic and Monetary Union’s fragility, which essentially emanates from the inherent tension between a single monetary policy and decentralized fiscal policies. To cushion economic and financial shocks and sever the sovereign-bank doom loop, different proposals to create a common public debt security have been put forward, although none of them has so far seen the light of day. Building on pertinent economic and finance scholarship, this article reviews four promising safe asset proposals from a legal perspective: Sovereign bond-backed securities (SBBS), E-bonds, Purple bonds, and Coronabonds. Rather than focusing on their feasibility under EU law or national constitutional law, this article compares the proposals from an investor perspective against the backdrop of the following formal and functional legal characteristics that render assets ‘safe’: governing law, dispute settlement forum, investor protection, and investor representation in sovereign debt restructurings. Against this backdrop, targeted recommendations on critical design elements of safe assets, with the aim of reconciling the economic policy objectives with the pertinent legal constraints, are advanced.


2019 ◽  
Vol 19 (138) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Jochen Andritzky ◽  
Julian Schumacher

Sovereign debt restructurings are perceived as inflicting large losses to bondholders. However, many bonds feature high coupons and often exhibit strong post-crisis recoveries. To account for these aspects, we analyze the long-term returns of sovereign bonds during 32 crises since 1998, taking into account losses from bond exchanges as well as profits before and after such events. We show that the average excess return over risk-free rates in crises with debt restructuring is not significantly lower than the return on bonds in crises without restructuring. Returns differ considerably depending on the investment strategy: Investors who sell during crises fare much worse than buy-and-hold investors or investors entering the market upon signs of distress


Author(s):  
Kupelyants Hayk

Chapter 4 examines the law applicable to sovereign domestic bonds in the absence of a choice of law provision. It is commonly believed that the domestic debt is necessarily governed by the law of the sovereign. The chapter challenges that premise by arguing that the law of the creditor should apply instead on the ground that the creditor is the party providing the characteristic performance. The chapter examines the possibility of escaping the governing law in favour of, among others, the law of the sovereign debtor. Lastly, the chapter examines the applicability of mandatory provisions in sovereign debt litigation.


Author(s):  
Hayk Kupelyants

Chapter 4 examines the law applicable to sovereign domestic bonds in the absence of a choice of law provision. It is commonly believed that the domestic debt is necessarily governed by the law of the sovereign. The chapter challenges that premise by arguing that the law of the creditor should apply instead on the ground that the creditor is the party providing the characteristic performance. The chapter examines the possibility of escaping the governing law in favour of, among others, the law of the sovereign debtor. Lastly, the chapter examines the applicability of mandatory provisions in sovereign debt litigation.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (4) ◽  
pp. 711-759 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Waibel

In recent years, sovereign debt crises have received much attention from the perspective of international public policy, but an effective legal solution to sovereign defaults has yet to coalesce within international law. Over the last two decades, private creditors have increasingly resorted to litigation in national courts, though without great success, in an effort to obtain payment on defaulted sovereign debt. Another, emerging option is arbitration —in particular, before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Will ICSID be the new venue of choice for recovering on sovereign bonds? The conclusion reached here is that attempts to take defaulting countries to ICSID arbitration are unlikely to succeed.


2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (1) ◽  
pp. 243-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michiel De Pooter ◽  
Robert F. Martin ◽  
Seth Pruitt

To “ensure depth and liquidity,” the European Central Bank intervened in sovereign debt markets through its Securities Markets Programme (SMP), providing a unique opportunity to estimate the effects of large-scale asset purchases on sovereign bond liquidity premia. From reduced-form estimates, we find robust, economically significant impact and lasting reductions in sovereign bonds’ liquidity premia in response to official purchases. We develop a search-based asset-pricing model to understand our empirical results. The theory implies that bond liquidity premia fall in response to both official purchases and rising sovereign default probabilities, as seen in the data.


Policy Papers ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (53) ◽  
Author(s):  

As part of the Fund’s ongoing work on sovereign debt restructuring, in October 2014 the Executive Board endorsed the inclusion of key features of enhanced pari passu provisions and collective action clauses (CACs) in new international sovereign bonds.1 Specifically, the Executive Board endorsed the use of: (i) a modified pari passu clause that explicitly excludes the obligation to effect ratable payments and (ii) an enhanced CAC with a menu of voting procedures, including a “single-limb” voting procedure that enables bonds to be restructured on the basis of a single vote across all affected instruments, a two-limb aggregated voting procedure and a series-by-series voting procedure.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter G. Dunne

This paper contributes to the debate concerning the benefits and disadvantages of introducing a European Sovereign Bond-Backed Securitisation (SBBS) to address the need for a common safe asset that would break destabilising bank-sovereign linkages. The analysis focuses on assessing the effectiveness of hedges incurred while making markets in individual euro area sovereign bonds by taking offsetting positions in one or more of the SBBS tranches. Tranche yields are estimated using a simulation approach. This involves the generation of sovereign defaults and allocation of the combined credit risk premium of all the sovereigns, at the end of each day, to the SBBS tranches according to the seniority of claims under the proposed securitisation. Optimal hedging with SBBS is found to reduce risk exposures substantially in normal market conditions. In volatile conditions, hedging is not very effective but leaves dealers exposed to mostly idiosyncratic risks. These remaining risks largely disappear if dealers are diversified in providing liquidity across country-specific secondary markets and SBBS tranches. Hedging each of the long positions in a portfolio of individual sovereigns results in a risk exposure as low as that borne by holding the safest individual sovereign bond (the Bund).


2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-47
Author(s):  
K.S. Isakov ◽  

This research is aimed at contributing to the endogenization of default costs. Higher exposure of a banking system to sovereign bonds increases the likelihood of banking panics due to sovereign defaults. Following (Gertler, Kiyotaki, 2015), the research models the possibility of a banking crisis occurring after a sovereign default. While a higher exposure of a banking system is associated with potential losses, this mechanism creates a stronger commitment to honor the sovereign debt. A marginal increase in the sovereign debt raises the ex-post costs of default through a higher likelihood of a banking crisis, thus making a default option less desirable. This mechanism might increase investors’ confidence and resolve the coordination problem of self-fulfilling crises. In part, this may explain the findings of Bocola and Dovis (2019), who claim that non-fundamental risk played only a limited role during the European sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, as opposed to the standard solution of the coordination problem — to issue debt of longer maturity — a government can resolve this problem by forcing its banking system to hold more sovereign bonds.


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