Myths, projections, and overextensions: The conceptual landscape of Thomas Szasz

Thomas Szasz ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 124-138
Author(s):  
Jennifer Church
Keyword(s):  
Mental Illness ◽  
Autonomous Agency ◽  
Thomas Szasz ◽  
Focal Concept

This chapter distinguishes among myths, projections, and overextensions as they occur within the practice of psychiatry—adding to the conceptual complexity of Szasz’s own analyses and reflecting on how his focal concept of autonomy may itself fall prey to myth, projection, or overextension. Szasz offers detailed explications of his use of the term “myth,” yet many questions remain regarding his application of that term and its relevance to psychiatry. How is a metaphor “literalized,” and when is this problematic? What terms, in addition to the term “mental illness,” serve to support the myths of psychiatry? How do myths relate to the projections and overextensions that can also be found in the language and practice of psychiatry? With these distinctions in mind, it is appropriate to ask whether Szasz’s own reliance on the notion of autonomous agency might itself qualify as a myth, a projection, or an overextension.

Szasz and the Law: An Alternative View

1976 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 551-558 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee S. Weinberg ◽  
Richard E. Vatz
Keyword(s):  
Mental Illness ◽  
Human Behavior ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Human Freedom ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Alternative View ◽  
Previous Issue ◽  
Medical Models ◽  
Institutional Psychiatry ◽  
Thomas Szasz

In a previous issue C. G. Schoenfeld attempted to disprove Thomas Szasz’ theory that mental illness is a “myth” and to dispute Szasz’ contention that current views of “mental illness” promote violent subjugation of human freedom in institutional and legal settings. This article argues that typical of many who criticize Dr. Szasz, Mr. Schoenfeld misunderstands and misrepresents Szasz’ rich theoretical arguments concerning “mental illness” and the prevalent use in law and institutional psychiatry of medical models for analyzing human behavior. Additionally, the authors urge responsible researchers to further pursue the implications of an accurate understanding of Szasz’ arguments for legal theory and practice.

The Mental Illness Dispute: The Critical Faith Assumptions

1981 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 305-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee S. Weinberg ◽  
Richard E. Vatz
Keyword(s):  
Mental Illness ◽  
Ad Hominem ◽  
The Past ◽  
Critical Issues ◽  
Thomas Szasz

The writings of Thomas Szasz over the past twenty years have produced ardent defenders and vehement critics. Unfortunately, much of the criticism is either of an ad hominem type or is based on misunderstanding(s) of Szasz's arguments. Some recent critiques, however, raise critical issues which reflect the different philosophical starting points or assumptions which distinguish Szasz from his critics. In this article, we delineate the hidden assumptions which underlie much of the debate over the existence of “mental illness” and argue that these critical assumptions are not amenable to confirmation or disconfirmation.

scholarly journals No such thing as mental illness? Critical reflections on the major ideas and legacy of Thomas Szasz

2016 ◽  
Vol 40 (6) ◽  
pp. 292-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony B. Benning
Keyword(s):  
Mental Illness ◽  
Psychiatric Diagnosis ◽  
Individual Responsibility ◽  
The Political ◽  
Thomas Szasz ◽  
Critical Reflections

SummaryEnfant terrible of psychiatry and widely known as one of its most indefatigable as well as iconoclastic critics, Thomas Szasz (1961–2012) had a prolific writing career that extended some 51 years beyond the publication of his first book,The Myth of Mental Illness, in 1961. This editorial identifies and critically discusses three major themes in Szasz's writings: his contention that there is no such thing as mental illness, his contention that individual responsibility is never compromised in those suffering from what is generally considered as mental illness, and his perennial interest in calling attention to the political nature of psychiatric diagnosis.

Schizophrenia and the Theories of Thomas Szasz

1976 ◽  
Vol 129 (4) ◽  
pp. 317-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Roth
Keyword(s):  
Mental Illness ◽  
Mental Disorder ◽  
The Law ◽  
Thomas Szasz

Anyone acquainted with Dr Thomas Szasz's previous writings about mental disorder, the nature of its relationship to the Law and to the problems of drug dependance (Szasz, 1961, 1963, 1970, 1972, 1975) has learned to look in the first instance for the dualism, the poles of which are to be demonstrated as irreconcilable. For, as Glazer (1965) has pointed out, one of Dr Szasz's main conceptual devices is ‘the dichotomy game‘. A phenomenon may belong to category (x) or another category (y) but not to both. As a first step it is as well to examine the definitions of the categories in question. They are liable to prove inconsistent or idiosyncratic or just to be omitted. In other cases, as Professor Stone (1973) has shown in his detailed and telling dissection of the tortuous and confused logic pursued by Dr Szasz in The Myth of Mental Illness, the definitions are incomplete or erroneous and the implied anti-thesis dubious or false. Beginning with the equation that a lie is to a mistake as malingering is to hysteria, Szasz manages, following a maze of tortuous and self-contradictory arguments, to emerge at the conclusion that it would be ‘… more accurate to regard hysteria as a lie than as a mistake‘.

On the Legacy of Thomas Szasz: A Reiteration of The Myth of Mental Illness and Response to Recent Criticism

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 150-160
Author(s):  
Paul Counter ◽  
Robert Spillane
Keyword(s):  
Mental Illness ◽  
British Journal ◽  
50Th Anniversary ◽  
Mental Illnesses ◽  
Recent Criticism ◽  
Anniversary Issue ◽  
Legal Fictions ◽  
Recent Editorial ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Thomas Szasz

In the 50th anniversary issue of The Myth of Mental Illness, Szasz conceded that, conceptually, his argument had been ignored because of the promulgation that mental illnesses are diseases of the brain. Responding to a recent editorial by T. Benning in the British Journal of Psychiatry Bulletin, which is somewhat critical of Szasz’s conceptual arguments, we argue that such criticisms are inaccurate. We highlight how no mental illness stands up to pathological scrutiny, yet treatments can cause iatrogenesis. In addition, we elaborate on how Szasz argued that the false concept of mental illness results in legal fictions. It is therefore important to defend and restate Szasz’s main thesis and conceptual arguments in light of recent criticism.

Philosophical influences on Thomas Szasz

Thomas Szasz ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 20-35
Author(s):  
Eric v.d. Luft
Keyword(s):  
Mental Illness ◽  
Logical Empiricism ◽  
Indirect Communication ◽  
Social Determinism ◽  
Cherry Picking ◽  
The Government ◽  
Systematic Understanding ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Von Mises ◽  
Thomas Szasz

We would naturally expect Szasz, a libertarian conservative, to have been influenced by, for example, Rousseau, Burke, Hayek, von Mises, Thoreau, Socrates, Camus, Sartre, Mill, Mencken, Seneca, Nietzsche, Stirner, and individualism in general. But this is not entirely the case. As somewhat of a philosophical rogue, his influences were subterranean, selective, and so eclectic that we could almost accuse him of cherry-picking. He could not use many philosophers to his advantage since they mostly accepted the reality of mental illness. Yet in Szasz’s works we detect Popper’s rejection of historicism and social determinism, Russell’s linguistic analysis, Reichenbach’s logical empiricism, Bridgman’s operationalism, Langer’s and Cassirer’s systematic understanding of non-linguistic expressions such as symbols, Kierkegaard’s indirect communication, and Hobbes’s idea that government may not legitimately take away any individual’s rights unless the individual has first freely empowered the government to do so.

Thomas Szasz, crazy talk and the myth of mental illness

1993 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard P. Bentall ◽  
David Pilgrim
Keyword(s):  
Mental Illness ◽  
Thomas Szasz

The Myth of Mental Illness: 50 years after publication: What does it mean today?

2010 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brendan D Kelly ◽  
Pat Bracken ◽  
Harry Cavendish ◽  
Niall Crumlish ◽  
Seamus MacSuibhne ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Mental Illness ◽  
Mentally Ill ◽  
50Th Anniversary ◽  
Cartesian Dualism ◽  
Specialist Registrar ◽  
Considerable Controversy ◽  
Human Responsibility ◽  
The Right ◽  
Criminal Conduct ◽  
Thomas Szasz

AbstractIn 1960, Thomas Szasz published The Myth of Mental Illness, arguing that mental illness was a harmful myth without a demonstrated basis in biological pathology and with the potential to damage current conceptions of human responsibility. Szasz's arguments have provoked considerable controversy over the past five decades. This paper marks the 50th anniversary of The Myth of Mental Illness by providing commentaries on its contemporary relevance from the perspectives of a range of stakeholders, including a consultant psychiatrist, psychiatric patient, professor of philosophy and mental health, a specialist registrar in psychiatry, and a lecturer in psychiatry. This paper also includes responses by Professor Thomas Szasz.Szasz's arguments contain echoes of positivism, Cartesian dualism, and Enlightenment philosophy, and point to a genuine complexity at the heart of contemporary psychiatric taxonomy: how is ‘mental illness’ to be defined? And by whom? The basis of Szasz's doubts about the similarities between mental and physical illnesses remain apparent today, but it remains equally apparent that a failure to describe a biological basis for mental illness does not mean there is none (eg. consider the position of epilepsy, prior to the electroencephalogram). Psychiatry would probably be different today if The Myth of Mental Illness had not been written, but possibly not in the ways that Szasz might imagine: does the relentless incarceration of individuals with ‘mental illness’ in the world's prisons represent the logical culmination of Szaszian thought?In response, Professor Szasz emphasises his views that “mental illness” differs fundamentally from physical illness, and that the principal habits the term ‘mental illness’ involves are stigmatisation, deprivation of liberty (civil commitment) and deprivation of the right to trial for alleged criminal conduct (the insanity defence). He links the incarceration of the mentally ill with the policy of de-institutionalisation (which he opposes) and states that, in his view, the only limitation his work imposes on human activities are limitations on practices which are conventionally and conveniently labelled ‘psychiatric abuses’.Clearly, there remains a diversity of views about the merits of Szasz's arguments, but there is little diminution in his ability to provoke an argument.

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