Imre Lakatos

Philosophy ◽  
2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brendan Larvor ◽  
Colin Jakob Rittberg

Imre Lakatos (b. 1922–d. 1974) was a philosopher of mathematics and science. Having left Hungary in 1956, he made his first appearance on the international stage with a series of four papers during 1963 and 1964 in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, later published together posthumously in Proofs and Refutations (1976), in which he discusses the formation of mathematical concepts by proof-analysis. This radical break with classical approaches to the philosophy of mathematics attracted sufficient interest that Kitcher and Aspray deem Lakatos to have started a new and “maverick” tradition in the field (“An Opinionated Introduction,” in History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics, 1988). By 1959, Lakatos had become an assistant lecturer in the Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method at the London School of Economics and Political Science. This department was still under the direction of its founder, Karl Popper, and Lakatos’s evolving and ultimately antagonistic relations with Popper and the Popperians conditioned much of his work. The chief part of this work was a series of influential papers on the philosophy of science. These are included in the two books of his work that two of his former students, John Worrall and Gregory Currie, published after his death (Lakatos 1978a and Lakatos 1978b, cited under Posthumously Published). In 1974, Lakatos died of a heart attack, leaving his projects in philosophy of science and mathematics incomplete.

2022 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Delia Marshall ◽  
Honjiswa Conana

Science disciplines are inherently multimodal, involving written and spoken language, bodily gestures, symbols, diagrams, sketches, simulation and mathematical formalism. Studies have shown that explicit multimodal teaching approaches foster enhanced access to science disciplines. We examine multimodal classroom practices in a physics extended curriculum programme (ECP) through the lens of new materialism. As De Freitas and Sinclair note in their book, Mathematics and the Body, there is growing research interest in embodiment in mathematics (and science) education—that is, the role played by students’ bodies, in terms of gestures, verbalisation, diagrams and their relation to the physical objects with which they interact. Embodiment can be viewed from a range of theoretical perspectives (for example, cognitive, phenomemological, or social semiotic). However, they argue that their new materialist approach, which they term “inclusive materialism”, has the potential for framing more socially just pedagogies. In this article, we discuss a multimodal and new materialist analysis of a lesson vignette from a first-year extended curriculum physics course. The analysis illuminates how an assemblage of bodily-paced steps-gestures-diagrams becomes entangled with mathematical concepts. Here, concepts arise through the interplay of modes of diagrams, gestures and bodily movements. The article explores how multimodal and new materialist perspectives might contribute to reconfiguring pedagogical practices in extended curriculum programmes in physics and mathematics. 


1997 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Congdon

Of those Hungarian intellectuals who fled abroad after the 1956 revolution, the maverick philosopher Imre Lakatos achieved the greatest prominence. In 1959, nearly three years after he reached England's shores and two years before he completed his doctorate at Cambridge, he began a brilliant teaching career at the London School of Economics and Political Science. ‘A lecture by Lakatos was always an occasion’, his colleague John Watkins has recalled, ‘the room crowded, the atmosphere electric, and from time to time a gale of laughter.’1


2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-54
Author(s):  
Vladislav Shaposhnikov

Abstract The study is focused on the relation between theology and mathematics in the situation of increasing secularization. My main concern is nineteenth-century mathematics. Theology was present in modern mathematics not through its objects or methods, but mainly through popular philosophy, which absolutized mathematics. Moreover, modern pure mathematics was treated as a sort of quasi-theology; a long-standing alliance between theology and mathematics made it habitual to view mathematics as a divine knowledge, so when theology was discarded, mathematics naturally took its place at the top of the system of knowledge. It was that cultural expectation aimed at mathematics that was substantially responsible for a great resonance made by set-theoretic paradoxes, and, finally, the whole picture of modern mathematics.


Author(s):  
T.A. Ryckman

A leading mathematician of the twentieth century, Weyl made fundamental contributions to theoretical physics, to philosophy of mathematics, and to philosophy of science. Weyl wrote authoritative works on the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, as well as a classic philosophical examination of mathematics and science. He was briefly a follower of Brouwer’s intuitionism in philosophy of mathematics. Upon moving closer to Hilbert’s finitism, he articulated a conception of mathematics and physics as related species of ‘symbolic construction’.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-89
Author(s):  
Adam InTae Gerard

The goal of this paper is to preserve realism in both ontology and truth for the philosophy of mathematics and science. It begins by arguing that scientific realism can only be attained given mathematical realism due to the indispensable nature of the latter to the prior. Ultimately, the paper argues for a position combining both Ontic Structural Realism and Ante Rem Structuralism, or what the author refers to as Strong Ontic Structural Realism, which has the potential to reconcile realism for both science and mathematics. The paper goes on to claims that this theory does not succumb to the same traditional epistemological problems, which have damaged the credibility of its predecessors.


Author(s):  
Michela Massimi ◽  
Vinicius Carvallho Da Silva ◽  
Ivã Gurgel ◽  
Ronaldo Moraca

Michela Massimi é professora de Filosofia da Ciência no Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade de Edimburgo, onde também é afiliada ao  Higgs Centre for Theoretical Physics. Membro de importantes sociedades filosóficas e científicas, como a Royal Society of Edinburgh, a Royal Astronomical Society, e a Académie Internationale de Philosophie des Sciences (membro correspondente) é presidente eleita da PSA, Philosophy of Science Association, para o biênio 2023-2024. Massimi, com dupla nacionalidade, italiana e britânica, estudou na Sapienza Università di Roma, na London School of Economics, e lecionou História e Filosofia da Ciência na University College London antes de mudar-se para Edimburgo. Massimi trabalha com Filosofia da Ciência em uma abordagem marcada pelo recurso à pesquisa histórica. Seus interesses amplos abarcam a Filosofia da Cosmologia, o realismo científico, os estudos de ciências, as relações entre ciência e sociedade, entre outros tópicos. Tem se destacado por defender o que chama de Perspectival Realism, se afastando tanto do realismo tradicional, quanto do pragmatismo e do relativismo. Nessa entrevista dialogamos com Massimi sobre temas como o valor da ciência, a defesa da ciência em épocas de negacionismo e obscurantismo e as características de sua posição filosófica. 


Author(s):  
Lisa Shabel

The state of modern mathematical practice called for a modern philosopher of mathematics to answer two interrelated questions. Given that mathematical ontology includes quantifiable empirical objects, how to explain the paradigmatic features of pure mathematical reasoning: universality, certainty, necessity. And, without giving up the special status of pure mathematical reasoning, how to explain the ability of pure mathematics to come into contact with and describe the empirically accessible natural world. The first question comes to a demand for apriority: a viable philosophical account of early modern mathematics must explain the apriority of mathematical reasoning. The second question comes to a demand for applicability: a viable philosophical account of early modern mathematics must explain the applicability of mathematical reasoning. This article begins by providing a brief account of a relevant aspect of early modern mathematical practice, in order to situate philosophers in their historical and mathematical context.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document