Piracy

Author(s):  
Monique Cormier ◽  
Gerry Simpson

International law, it might be argued, is a legal system directed toward the defeat or suppression of a category of violators known as “enemies of mankind,” or hosti humanis generis. Sometimes these are war criminals, sometimes they are terrorists or slave traders. The original enemy of mankind was the “pirate.” Piracy gave rise to a highly specialized form of international jurisdiction known as universal jurisdiction. Because pirates were a threat to the global order (particularly global sea trade), or because they committed particularly heinous acts, or because their acts were committed in a place beyond the territorial jurisdiction or sovereignty of any state (different reasons have been adduced at different times), they were subject to the jurisdiction of any state that happened to identify them, engage with them, and capture them. Thus, a pirate could be prosecuted in every state’s courts. The contemporary law of piracy, embodied in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, has defined piracy as an act of violence or depredation committed on the high seas by a private actor acting for private ends. This distinguishes piracy from naval warfare or recognized belligerency on the high seas, but it has complicated efforts to apply the law of piracy to terrorists (who, after all, act for political ends, and most commonly in the territory of sovereign states) and it has meant that acts of piracy committed in the territorial waters of states are not subject to the international law of piracy (and the expansive forms of jurisdiction that accompany it). Therefore, attempts to assimilate terrorism to piracy have fallen foul of the technical rules governing traditional piracy. Likewise, these same rules frustrated initial efforts to confront the growing problem of traditional piracy carried out in places other than the high seas. The “international terrorist” and the Somali pirate, then, pose different problems for international law. In the case of terrorists, states have adopted ad hoc and controversial methods comparable to those used against pirates on the high seas. In the case of Somalia, the UN Security Council has authorized an international naval response to pirate attacks that permits foreign naval vessels to use force against pirates within Somali territorial waters.

Author(s):  
Enzo Cannizzaro

The chapter discusses the philosophical foundations of the current regulation of the use of force. The chapter argues that, in correspondence with the emergence of a sphere of substantive rules protecting common interests of humankind, international law is also gradually developing a system of protection against egregious breaches of these interests. This conclusion is reached through an analysis of the law and practice governing the action of the UN Security Council as well as the law of state responsibility concerning individual and collective reactions to serious breaches of common interests. This system is based on positive obligations imposed upon individual states as well as UN organs, and it appears to be still rudimentary and inefficient. However, the chapter suggests that the mere existence of this system, these shortcomings notwithstanding, has the effect of promoting the further development of the law in search for more appropriate mechanisms of protection.


1994 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 248-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Dunn

There are at Least Three Possible Types of View about the justifiability of the use of force by states or private individuals on behalf of other private individuals or groups who are the victims of brutal and gratuitous coercion by another state. The first type of view is that no human being, and a fortiori no state, can be justified in using force under any circumstances and for any purpose, because (and only because) force is an intrinsic evil. This unflinchingly deontological view is generous but practically absurd. The second type of view is that states (or even private individuals) can be, and often arc, justified in using force against the brutally coercive actions of another state when, but only when, the latter is acting outside its own territorial jurisdiction. At least in the case of states what grounds that justification is their entitlement to defend themselves against foreign (as against domestic) aggression, and to defend also any other states with whom they have linked themselves either by standing alliances or by solemn common undertakings to secure each other's safety and sovereignty within the bounds of international law. In the case of private individuals, the corresponding justification would lie in their several personal entitlements to defend themselves as best they can against aggression.


2019 ◽  
pp. 468-493
Author(s):  
Gleider Hernández

This chapter explores the law of the sea. The ‘law of the sea’ is a blanket term, describing the law relating to all bodies of water, irrespective of whether they are subject to the jurisdiction of a State. Naturally, the seas are tremendously important globally; the seas are a crucial means of communication and trade, allowing for the transport of persons and goods around the world. The seas and their subsoil are also a valuable economic resource. However, the law of the sea is not also important for its significant contributions to public international law. The law of the sea governs a series of overlapping sovereign interests and projections of jurisdiction. The basic concept is that the sea is divided into two broad categories: territorial sea and high seas. The exact line between these two has been at the heart of more than four centuries of legal developments and disputes.


2007 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 613-636 ◽  
Author(s):  
GUIDO ACQUAVIVA

The UN Security Council, as ‘parent body’ of the two ad hoc Tribunals, never introduced explicit rules on how to compensate accused persons for violations of their rights imputable to the Tribunals' organs. Notwithstanding the absence of such rules, a series of decisions by ICTYand ICTR chambers show the willingness of these institutions to address such violations when they occur. In doing so, the Tribunals appear to have followed some of the same principles on responsibility of international organizations as are being elaborated by the International Law Commission (ILC). By analysing these parallel processes, the author suggests that the elaboration of rules by the ad hoc Tribunals in the field of human rights violations and the codification by the ILC of rules on international responsibility, although distinct in aim and scope, might mutually benefit each other andshed some light on the difficulties of applying such principles in practice.


Author(s):  
Ben Saul

International law has struggled to regulate terrorism for over a century, beginning with efforts to cooperate in the extradition and prosecution of suspects, including through unsuccessful League of Nations efforts to define and criminalize terrorism as such. Until 2001 most international attention focused on transnational criminal cooperation against terrorism, through the development of method-specific “prosecute or extradite” treaties (concerning, for instance, violence against aircraft or ships, hostage taking, or attacks on diplomats) but without defining terrorism as a general concept or crime. It may, however, be possible to qualify some terrorist acts as war crimes or crimes against humanity. Since the 1970s, there were ambivalent efforts through the UN General Assembly to develop normative frameworks to confront terrorism per se, which often came unstuck on the controversial issues of “state terrorism” and liberation movement violence. Greater consensus was achieved by 1994 with the General Assembly’s adoption of a declaration against terrorism. There appears to exist an international consensus that terrorism per se is wrongful, even if disagreement remains about identifying precisely what constitutes terrorism. The effort to deal with terrorism as such suggests that the international community views terrorism as more than its underlying physical parts, which are already crimes in most national legal systems and under certain transnational treaties. The special wrongfulness of terrorism is perhaps signified by its intimidation of civilian populations, its coercion of governments or international organizations, and its political, religious, or ideological aspect. Terrorist violence has also sometimes raised certain problems under the law of armed conflict and the law on the use of force, as well as occasionally attracted sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council. Terrorism was generally dealt with, however, through the application of general legal norms rather than through the emergence of terrorism-specific rules. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, sharper international focus was brought to bear on the legal challenges presented by terrorism and counter-terrorism in numerous specialized branches of international law (particularly in the law of state responsibility, the law on the use of force, and international humanitarian law), as well as in the institutional practices of the UN Security Council and the impacts of counter-terrorism measures on international human rights law. By 2011 the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon even declared the existence of an international customary law crime of transnational terrorism, although that decision has proven highly controversial as not supported by state practice. Efforts to negotiate a comprehensive international convention against terrorism have continued since 2000, with disagreement remaining over the scope of exceptions. There is also now increasing debate about whether a field of international anti-terrorism law is emerging.


1997 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan E. Boyle

The entry into force of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), on 16 November 1994, is probably the most important development in the settlement of international disputes since the adoption of the UN Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Not only does the Convention create a new international court, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (“ITLOS”), it also makes extensive provision for compulsory dispute-settlement procedures involving States, the International Seabed Authority (“ISBA”), seabed mining contractors and, potentially, a range of other entities. Implementation of the Convention has spawned a number of inter-State disputes to add to the cases already before the International Court. The initiation of the ITLOS not only opens up new possibilities for settling these disputes but it also has implications for the future role of the International Court and ad hoc arbitration in the law of the sea and more generally. It contributes to the proliferation of international tribunals and adds to the potential for fragmentation both of the substantive law and of the procedures available for settling disputes. Judges Oda and Guillaume have argued that the ITLOS is a futile institution, that the UNCLOS negotiators were misguided in depriving the International Court of its central role in ocean disputes and that creation of a specialised tribunal may destroy the unity of international law. The law of the sea, both judges argue, is an essential part of international law and any dispute concerning the application and interpretation of that law should be seen as subject to settlement by the International Court.


Author(s):  
A. P. Glazova

INTRODUCTION. Currently, states can apply a whole range of law enforcement measures at sea in order to prevent such unlawful phenomena as piracy, slave trade, drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, etc. However, the problem of the exercise of jurisdiction by states within various maritime areas is the main sticking point during the implementation of these measures. In an attempt to exercise the law enforcement function at sea, the state can't ignore the fact that its ability to create legal norms and ensure their effective implementation depends not only on its will as a sovereign, but also on the restrictions imposed by international law. Therefore, maintaining a balance between limiting the “territorialization” of maritime areas and the need to carry out a law enforcement function logically entails the need to determine the nature and content of the concept of “jurisdiction of the state” within different maritime areas, as well as to identify specific features of this legal category. The present article focuses on this and other related issues.MATERIALS AND METHODS. Historical and comparative analysis along with dogmatic research approach were used in the research process and the entire research is well grounded in focusing on the norms of international treaty law and customary law. In addition to that this research focuses on the norms of national law governing issues related to the application of law enforcement measurement at the sea. Apart from those given material and methodical inputs, the doctrinal works of the relevant jurists have been used in this research.RESEARCH RELULTS. The author comes to an alternative conclusion that territorial jurisdiction within the maritime territory is not absolute, which is due, apparently, the principle of freedom of the high seas which have a longer support by the international community. The definition of jurisdiction as extraterritorial is not self-sufficient, since in case of conflict of jurisdictions, additional legal criteria are required to resolve such a conflict. The classification of extraterritorial jurisdiction depending on the principles on which it is based also does not solve the problem, since some principles, such as protective or universal, in turn, require additional criteria in order to become a self-sufficient tool to overcome legal uncertainty. The author notes that the ability to exercise territorial jurisdiction within maritime areas, as a rule, determines the ability to exercise legislative and executive jurisdiction, which are also not absolute. The exercise of extraterritorial legislative or executive jurisdiction at sea is potentially permissible only on the basis of international law to solve a specific function, for example, law enforcement.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION. The main problem of the varieties of jurisdiction proposed by in- ternational legal science is that each of them only supplements each other, describing a possible choice, but not explaining why a particular choice should be preferred in case of conflict. It is obvious that current uncertainty has created some severe impacts upon the institution of law enforcement measures at sea as a result of the absence of standards for enforcement measures that could make a balance to the mechanism. Hence the law enforcer has to be cautious with a number of factors in deciding the implementation of law enforcement measures within the sea.


1976 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shabtai Rosenne

This article is divided into four parts. The first aims to place the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in its historical context. The second describes some aspects of the first three sessions of that Conference (1973–1975). In the third an account of major specific interests and conflicts which have appeared in this Conference is given. Finally, some tentative conclusions are drawn—tentative, because the Conference has not yet completed its labours.During its first session (1949) the newly established International Law Commission, set up by the General Assembly in accordance with the provision of Article 13 of the Charter relating to the codification and progressive development of international law, included the topics of the régime of the high seas and the régime of territorial waters in its provisional list of fourteen topics selected for codification. It placed the régime of the high seas on its priority list, and appointed Professor J.P.A. François (The Netherlands) as special rapporteur. At the recommendation of the General Assembly in resolution 374 (IV) of 6 December 1949 the Commission in 1950 included the régime of territorial waters on its priority list, and in 1951 it initiated work on that topic, for which Professor François was also designated special rapporteur. The Commission was heavily occupied with both these topics until 1956.


Author(s):  
Talitha Ramphal

Abstract Activities to tackle marine debris are conducted on the high seas by The Ocean Cleanup. The high seas are open to all States and may be used as long this is consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) and other rules of international law. This article argues that the LOSC provides for the freedom to use the high seas to protect and preserve the marine environment, including tackling marine debris, when interpreting Article 87 of the LOSC in light of present day needs.


2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 195-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosa Theofanis

AbstractRes judicata is well-settled as a general principle of international law. But the rules of res judicata in international criminal procedure are undeveloped. Recent cases from the ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have added to the understanding of res judicata in international law - demonstrating the risk that new rules of res judicata will implicitly incorporate either a common-law or civil-law definition of what the "law" is. Analysis of issues considered in recent Tribunal jurisprudence - particularly the questions of review and reconsideration - locates potential hazards in the development of the law and provides guidance for the application of the ICC statute.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document