Self-Defense

Author(s):  
Mary Ellen O’Connell

Humanity has always recognized that individuals should have the right to defend themselves from violence. In international law this basic normative intuition is codified for states in the Charter of the United Nations, Article 51 (see Randelzhofer 2002, cited under Conditions in Article 51). Article 51 is an exception to the Charter’s general prohibition on the use of force found in Article 2(4). The prohibition on the use of force is at the heart of the Charter, given that the most fundamental aim of the Charter and the UN organization created by the Charter is to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (Preamble). It stands to reason that any right to use force as an exception to the general prohibition on resort to force would be narrow. Article 51 permits a state to act in unilateral or collective self-defense only “if an armed attack occurs.” This article concerns the international law exception to the prohibition on force for self-defense. The commentary on Article 51 is extensive and generally falls into one of two categories: first, scholarship, judicial decisions, and government policies that support Article 51’s plain terms; second, scholarship and government policies that advocate expanding the right to use force beyond Article 51’s provisions. The writers in these two categories have various labels but are most commonly referred to as the “strict” interpreters versus the “broad” interpreters. One author refers to the groups as the “restrictivists” versus the “antirestrictivists.” The divergence of views can be explained to some extent by the differing assessments writers make about the utility of resort to military force. The UN Charter was drafted at the end of World War II, when confidence in military force was certainly low and commitment to ending the use of force was high. Fifty years later, perhaps frustrated by the lack of success with other means, writers (especially in a few militarily powerful states) urged relaxing the rules against force to respond to terrorism, weapons programs, and computer network attacks. Some try to justify force under the principles of necessity and proportionality, rules beyond the UN Charter but equally important in the long history of normative thinking on killing in self-defense.

2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 79
Author(s):  
Pshtiwan Mohammed Qader

The present paper examines the problem of cyber-attacks under existing international law. It takes the view that the (United Nations) UN Charter provisions on the use of force can be extended to cyber-attacks by means of interpretation although the relevant provisions do not explicitly address such issue. This Article argues that cyber-attacks resulting in material damage or destruction to property, death or injury to persons, or severe disruption of the functioning of critical infrastructures can be characterized as use of armed force and therefore violate the prohibition contained in article 2(4) of the Charter. However, cyber-attacks not resulting in the above consequences may be illegal intervention in the internal affairs of other states if such attacks are coercive in nature. In addition, the current study discusses that a cyber-attack which amounts to a use of armed force per se is not sufficient to give the victim state the right to self-defense, unless its scale and effects are equivalent to those of a conventional armed attack. Finally, the study concludes that an international cyber treaty is truly necessary to more effectively address cyber-attacks.


Necessity and proportionality hold a place in the international law governing the use of force by states and in the law of armed conflict (LOAC). However, the precise contours of these two requirements are uncertain and controversial. This book explores in 5 parts how necessity and proportionality manifest under the law governing the use of force and the LOAC. First, the book introduces the reader to how necessity and proportionality factor in the debate about the interaction between morality and law in the use of military force. Second, the book addresses the issue of how proportionality in the law governing the use of force relates to proportionality in the LOAC. Third, the book addresses a number of pressing legal issues including: how proportionality and necessity are linked under international law, the controversial “unwilling and unable” test, drones and targeted killing, their application during civil war, and the need for further transparency in states’ justification for the use of force in self-defense. Fourth, the book analyzes the role of military necessity within the LOAC on the battlefield. This includes discussions about the history and nature of the principle of military necessity, the proper application of the principle of proportionality, how commanders should account for mental harm in calculating proportionality, and the role artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons systems may play in a proportionality analysis. Finally, the book concludes with a discussion on the potential role of proportionality in the law governing post-conflict contexts.


1973 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Franck ◽  
Nigel S. Rodley

In the Bangladesh crisis, two important objectives of international law appeared to be in conflict: that of peace and that of justice. The former objective is set out in the rules of the U.N. Charter against the use of force by states except in self-defense against an armed attack. The second is found in the provisions of the Charter and in various resolutions, declarations, and covenants pertaining to fundamental human rights and self determination.


2006 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 963-972 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Wilmshurst

There are few more controversial questions in international law than the proper limits of the right of self-defence. The rules are being challenged in the light of what are seen as new threats from terrorism and from the possession of weapons of mass destruction. The UN High-level Panel, in its report to the Secretary-General of 2004, concluded that in all cases relating to decisions to use military force ‘we believe that the Charter of the United Nations, properly understood and applied, is equal to the task’.4 The Principles that follow are intended to provide a clear statement of the rules of international law ‘properly understood’ governing the use of force by states in self-defence.


1999 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 389-416 ◽  
Author(s):  

AbstractThe Versailles Treaty sought to protect minorities by giving them their own state. This practice, labelled 'self-determination' has changed guise considerably post World War II. Paramount to the emancipation of colonies, it came to be the concept that legitimated the 'rule of the people' over that of their colonial masters. However post-colonial 'self-determined' states are often manufactured entities forced into the strait-jacket of Westphalian statehood; and unlike the states that emanated from the Westphalian Treaty, were given no time to evolve by themselves. As a result these states often house disparate sets of minorities that go unrepresented within the Statist discourse. Further, these states have attempted to suppress their minorities through the various policies associated with nation-building. Today, with secession an increasingly attainable form of self-determination, the question arises as to whether these minorities have a right to form a separate state. The international law of self-determination suggests that this is a right of all peoples. It however leaves the parameters of this 'peoplehood' undefined. This paper seeks to examine the discourse of minority rights within that of the international right to self determination. It seeks to trace the history of minority rights protection, and to examine the way in which minority rights are protected within current international law. In addition, it examines the parameters of peoplehood and concludes by looking at two cases where disaffected minorities in a post-colonial state sought to form their own state.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 109 ◽  
pp. 266-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ntina Tzouvala

Given the long history of violent encounters between the Global North and the Global South, legal arguments concerning the use of force are a fertile ground for testing the virtues and limits of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) as a theory aspiring to “address the material and ethical concerns of Third World peoples.” This essay examines the usefulness and limits of TWAIL in the context of the “unwilling or unable” doctrine currently promoted by a series of Western scholars and states in order to expand the scope of application of the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Adopting TWAIL’s impulse to historicize, this essay argues that the structure of this doctrine closely replicates the “standard of civilization” that informed international legal theory and practice throughout the nineteenth century. At the same time, widespread resistance to the “unwilling or unable” doctrine indicates that the profound transformation of international law on the use of force after 1945 and the diffusion of sovereignty outside the West put into question certain methodological and political commitments of TWAIL.


This Oxford Handbook is a comprehensive and authoritative study of the modern law on the use of force. Over 50 experts in the field offer a detailed analysis, and to an extent a restatement, of the law in this area. The Handbook reviews the status of the law on the use of force and assesses what changes, if any, have occurred as a result of recent developments. It offers cutting-edge and up-to-date scholarship on all major aspects of the prohibition of the use of force. Part I reviews the history of the subject and its recent challenges, and addresses the major conceptual approaches. Part II covers collective security, in particular the law and practice of the UN organs, and of regional organizations and arrangements. Part III considers the substance of the prohibition of the use of force and the right to self-defence and associated doctrines. Part IV is devoted to armed action undertaken on behalf of peoples and populations, including self-determination conflicts, resistance to armed occupation, and forcible humanitarian and pro-democratic action. The possibility of the revival of classical, expansive justifications for the use of force is addressed in Part V, followed by Part VI which considers new security challenges and the emerging law in relation to them. Part VII ties the key arguments developed in the book into a substantive conclusion. The Handbook is essential reading for scholars and students of international law and the use of force, and legal advisers to both governments and NGOs.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 148-152
Author(s):  
Tom Ruys

In her comment on my piece in the latest issue of the American Journal of International Law (The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus ad Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded from UN Charter Article 2(4)? ), Mary Ellen O’Connell expresses strong objections to the piece’s central thesis, notably that small-scale or “targeted” forcible acts are not as such excluded from the scope of the prohibition on the use of force in UN Charter Article 2(4). What is more, she sees the central thesis and narrative of the piece as a mere veil, behind which hides the true aim of the article, notably to set forth an extensive reading of the right of self-defense—which was allegedly also the point of my book on armed attack of 2010. In other words, an argument pleading for a broad interpretation of the prohibition on the use of force is in reality used as a Trojan horse, to lure the unsuspecting reader into accepting a broader right of states to use force, doing considerable damage to the Charter regime on the use of force.


Author(s):  
Lawrence O. Gostin ◽  
Benjamin Mason Meier

This chapter introduces the foundational importance of human rights for global health, providing a theoretical basis for the edited volume by laying out the role of human rights under international law as a normative basis for public health. By addressing public health harms as human rights violations, international law has offered global standards by which to frame government responsibilities and evaluate health practices, providing legal accountability in global health policy. The authors trace the historical foundations for understanding the development of human rights and the role of human rights in protecting and promoting health since the end of World War II and the birth of the United Nations. Examining the development of human rights under international law, the authors introduce the right to health as an encompassing right to health care and underlying determinants of health, exploring this right alongside other “health-related human rights.”


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