The Chatham House Principles of International Law on the Use of Force in Self-Defence

2006 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 963-972 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Wilmshurst

There are few more controversial questions in international law than the proper limits of the right of self-defence. The rules are being challenged in the light of what are seen as new threats from terrorism and from the possession of weapons of mass destruction. The UN High-level Panel, in its report to the Secretary-General of 2004, concluded that in all cases relating to decisions to use military force ‘we believe that the Charter of the United Nations, properly understood and applied, is equal to the task’.4 The Principles that follow are intended to provide a clear statement of the rules of international law ‘properly understood’ governing the use of force by states in self-defence.

Author(s):  
Daniel Joyner

This chapter examines the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) between states and non-state actors and its implications for international law governing the use of force. It considers whether WMD proliferation and changes in security realities have brought a crisis in international law on the use of force and discusses the use of pre-emptive force for preventing states and non-state actors ‘of concern’ from developing and using WMD. It analyses the shift in the policy positions of the US and other relatively powerful states, from more multilateral and diplomacy-based ‘non-proliferation’ to increased emphasis on proactive and often unilateral or small-coalition-based ‘counterproliferation’. It looks at concerns that several states will be emboldened to apply the doctrine of counterproliferation-oriented pre-emption to their regional conflicts. Finally, it evaluates proposals to reform the provisions and procedures of the UN Charter system for regulating the use of force, including the law on self-defence.


Author(s):  
Chris O'Meara

States invariably justify using force extraterritorially by reference to their inherent right of self-defence. In so doing, they accept that the exercise of such right is conditioned by the customary international law requirements of necessity and proportionality. To date, these requirements have received little attention. They are notorious for being normatively indeterminate and operationally complex. As a breach of either requirement renders ostensibly defensive action unlawful, increased determinacy regarding their scope and content is crucial to how international law constrains military force. This book examines the conceptual meaning, substance and practical application of necessity and proportionality as they relate to the right of self-defence following the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945. It provides a coherent and up-to-date description of the applicable contemporary international law and proposes an analytical framework to guide its operation and appraisal. This book contends that necessity and proportionality are conceptually distinct and must be applied in the foregoing order to avoid an insufficient ‘catch-all’ description of (il)legality. Necessity determines whether defensive force may be used to respond to an armed attack and where it must be directed. Proportionality governs how much total force is permissible and prohibits excessive responses. Both requirements are shown to apply on an ongoing basis throughout the duration of an armed conflict prompted by self-defence. Compliance with necessity and proportionality ensures that the purposes of self-defence are met (and nothing more) and that defensive force is not unduly disruptive to third-party interests and to international peace and security.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Łukasz Kułaga

The Use of Drones in Combating International Terrorism from the Perspective of ‘ius ad bellum’Summary The increasing practice of using armed unmanned aerial vehicles (military UAVs, commonly known as drones) by some countries to eliminate suspected terrorists raises a number of controversies from the perspective of international law. These controversies are also related to the specific features of military UAVs, which make it possible to kill targeted individuals without risk to the military personnel of the country concerned, and thereby may encourage the abusive interpretation of the applicable legal regulations. This article discusses these issues from the perspective of ius ad bellum, in particular the right to self-defence. It shows the main controversial points on the scope of invoking the right to self-defence in such cases, in particular the possibility of invoking the right to self-defence in response to an attack by a non-state entity, the question of pre-emptive self-defence, the importance of the severity of the force used as a condition allowing for the use of force in self-defence, and the relevance of the principles of proportionality and necessity. The article also presents an outline of the vast and highly controversial issues associated with the definition of terrorism from the point of view of international law.


Author(s):  
Bill Gilmore

This chapter examines the doctrine of ‘hot pursuit’ used by the state to exercise its coercive powers beyond national territory for law enforcement purposes. It discusses hot pursuit by sea, land, and air in the context of international law, particularly with respect to self-defence and reprisal. Whilst hot pursuit is well recognized in the customary international law of the sea, it has yet to achieve that form of normative recognition in relation to pursuit on land or by air. The chapter considers the debate over hot pursuit as a legal justification for cross-border military incursions independent of the right of self-defence and describes the concept of extended constructive presence before concluding with an analysis of hot pursuit in a use of force context.


2005 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 441-493
Author(s):  
Jean Raby

The legality of a forceful intervention by a state to protect its nationals has been the subject of a continuing controversy over the past 15 years. Many see it as an unlawful use of force prohibited by the Charter of the United Nations, others see it as a lawful exercice of a self-standing right recognized under contemporary international law, some finally claim it falls under the scope of self-defence. The author proposes not to restate that debate, but more to reassess it, examining and challenging some of the arguments raised on both sides of the question. Within that debate, it will be concluded that the international legal order does indeed recognize the validity of the use of force for such a purpose : if the avenue of self-defence is rejected, for conceptual as well as practical reasons, the right of intervention to protect nationals is indeed, for the author, part of the comtemporary international legal order. Then, the author wishes to broaden the debate and proposes another option, which has not been explored by scholars and publicists but which is found more satisfactory than any other approach : intervention to protect nationals can be justified under international law because of the existence, in a particular case, of a "state of necessity" as defined by the International Law Commission.


Author(s):  
Tamar Meisels ◽  
Jeremy Waldron

In this “for and against” book, Jeremy Waldron and Tamar Meisels defend competing positions on the legitimacy of targeted killing. The volume begins with a joint introduction, briefly setting out the terms of discussion, and presenting a short historical overview of the practice—i.e. what is targeted killing, and how has it been used in which conflicts and by whom. The debate opens with Meisels’ defense of targeted killing as a legitimate and desirable defensive anti-terrorism strategy, in keeping with both just war theory and international law. Meisels unreservedly defends the named killing of irregular combatants, most notably terrorists, during armed conflict. Additionally, she offers a possible moral justification for rare instances of assassination outside that framework, specifically with reference to recent cases of nuclear scientists developing weapons of mass destruction for the Iranian and Syrian governments. The debate continues with Waldron’s arguments focusing on the dangers and the inherent wrongness of governments’ having the right to maintain death lists—lists of named individuals who are to be hunted down and killed. Waldron notes the many differences between individualized targeting and ordinary combat, and he resists the attempt to assimilate targeted killing to killings in combat. Waldron also cautions us to consider carefully what a world of targeted killings will be like, the many abuses it is liable to, and why we should be very cautious, morally and strategically, in our thinking about it.


Author(s):  
Mary Ellen O’Connell

Humanity has always recognized that individuals should have the right to defend themselves from violence. In international law this basic normative intuition is codified for states in the Charter of the United Nations, Article 51 (see Randelzhofer 2002, cited under Conditions in Article 51). Article 51 is an exception to the Charter’s general prohibition on the use of force found in Article 2(4). The prohibition on the use of force is at the heart of the Charter, given that the most fundamental aim of the Charter and the UN organization created by the Charter is to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” (Preamble). It stands to reason that any right to use force as an exception to the general prohibition on resort to force would be narrow. Article 51 permits a state to act in unilateral or collective self-defense only “if an armed attack occurs.” This article concerns the international law exception to the prohibition on force for self-defense. The commentary on Article 51 is extensive and generally falls into one of two categories: first, scholarship, judicial decisions, and government policies that support Article 51’s plain terms; second, scholarship and government policies that advocate expanding the right to use force beyond Article 51’s provisions. The writers in these two categories have various labels but are most commonly referred to as the “strict” interpreters versus the “broad” interpreters. One author refers to the groups as the “restrictivists” versus the “antirestrictivists.” The divergence of views can be explained to some extent by the differing assessments writers make about the utility of resort to military force. The UN Charter was drafted at the end of World War II, when confidence in military force was certainly low and commitment to ending the use of force was high. Fifty years later, perhaps frustrated by the lack of success with other means, writers (especially in a few militarily powerful states) urged relaxing the rules against force to respond to terrorism, weapons programs, and computer network attacks. Some try to justify force under the principles of necessity and proportionality, rules beyond the UN Charter but equally important in the long history of normative thinking on killing in self-defense.


2018 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 01008
Author(s):  
V. Upeniece

The Charter of the United Nations wasthought to establish a normative order, maintain international peace and security. According to the Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs”[1]. However the Article 51 doesnot propose a legal definition of the conduct which is considered as an armed attack or the commencement of such an attack. It does not propose strict criterions for the use of force for self-defence. As a result different interpretations of this norm have been arising and continuing to change in response to new situations and threats.


Author(s):  
Ashley Deeks

This chapter examines one of the most contentious issues in the jus ad bellum: whether and when international law permits a state to use force unilaterally before it suffers an armed attack. More specifically, it considers whether pre-emption needs to be tamed. The discussion begins by sorting through the terminology used by states and scholars with respect to acts of self-defence in advance of an attack, with particular reference to three different terms: anticipatory self-defence, pre-emptive self-defence, and preventive self-defence. The chapter then outlines the basic positions in the historical debate about the legality of such self-defence before turning to three geopolitical and technological factors that put pressure on the doctrine of pre-attack self-defence: weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and cyber attacks. Finally, it evaluates the future of pre-emption, with emphasis on changes in the timing of a state’s right to use force in self-defence.


Author(s):  
Noam Lubell

This chapter deals with the concept of imminence within the context of anticipatory self-defence under international law. It examines the meaning of imminence, its interpretation, what it might justify and/or exclude, and whether it can be upheld as a criterion to face modern challenges. It outlines the requirement of imminence in relation to the debatable right to anticipatory self-defence, paying particular attention to the development of state practice and the opinions of commentators. It considers the specific context of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and examines the reasons that these are sometimes seen as necessitating a new conception of imminence. The chapter provides an analysis of what new approaches might mean, and whether they can be contained within an understanding of imminence. In so doing, the chapter analyses the notion of certainty, the need for evidence, and the effect of the scale of threat on the decision-making process.


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