scholarly journals A new look at historical monetary policy (and the great inflation) through the lens of a persistence-dependent policy rule

2020 ◽  
Vol 72 (3) ◽  
pp. 672-691 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Ashley ◽  
Kwok Ping Tsang ◽  
Randal Verbrugge

Abstract The origins of the Great Inflation, a central 20th-century U.S. macroeconomic event, remain contested. Prominent explanations are poor inflation forecasts or inaccurate output gap measurement. An alternative view is that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was unwilling to fight inflation, perhaps due to political pressures. Here, we sort this out via a novel econometric approach, disaggregating the real-time unemployment and inflation time series entering the FOMC historical policy reaction-function into persistence components, using one-sided Fourier filtering; this implicitly estimates the unemployment gap in actual use. We find compelling evidence for (economically interpretable) persistence-dependence in both variables. Furthermore, our results support the “unwilling to fight” view: the FOMC’s unemployment gap responses were essentially unchanged pre- and post-Volcker, while its inflation responses sharpened markedly starting with Volcker.

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (089) ◽  
pp. 1-56
Author(s):  
Andrew C. Chang ◽  
◽  
Trace J. Levinson ◽  

We introduce a new dataset of real gross domestic product (GDP) growth and core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation forecasts produced by the staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. In contrast to the eight Greenbook forecasts a year the staff produces for Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, our dataset has roughly weekly forecasts. We use these new data to study whether the staff forecasts efficiently and whether efficiency, or lack thereof, is time-varying. Prespecified regressions of forecast errors on forecast revisions show that the staff's GDP forecast errors correlate with its GDP forecast revisions, particularly for forecasts made more than two weeks from the start of a FOMC meeting, implying GDP forecasts exhibit time-varying inefficiency between FOMC meetings. We find some weaker evidence for inefficient inflation forecasts.


FEDS Notes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2899) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Fuentes-Albero ◽  
◽  
John M. Roberts ◽  

In August 2020, the Federal Open Market Committee approved a revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy (FOMC, 2020) and in the subsequent FOMC meetings, the Committee made material changes to its forward guidance to bring it in line with the new framework. Clarida (2021) characterizes the new framework as comprising a number of key features.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 354-371
Author(s):  
Nicholas Apergis ◽  
Chi Keung Marco Lau

Purpose This paper aims to provide fresh empirical evidence on how Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) monetary policy decisions from a benchmark monetary policy rule affect the profitability of US banking institutions. Design/methodology/approach It thereby provides a link between the literature on central bank monetary policy implementation through monetary rules and banks’ profitability. It uses a novel data set from 11,894 US banks, spanning the period 1990 to 2013. Findings The empirical findings show that deviations of FOMC monetary policy decisions from a number of benchmark linear and non-linear monetary (Taylor type) rules exert a negative and statistically significant impact on banks’ profitability. Originality/value The results are expected to have substantial implications for the capacity of banking institutions to more readily interpret monetary policy information and accordingly to reshape and hedge their lending behaviour. This would make the monetary policy decision process less noisy and, thus, enhance their capability to attach the correct weight to this information.


1970 ◽  
Vol 26 (6) ◽  
pp. 105-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
William P. Yohe ◽  
Louis C. Gasper

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anis Jarboui ◽  
Emna Mnif

Purpose After the COVID-19 outbreak, the Federal Reserve has undertaken several monetary policies to alleviate the pandemic consequences on the markets. This paper aims to evaluate the effects of the Federal Reserve monetary policy on the cryptocurrency dynamics during the COVID19 pandemic. Design/methodology/approach We examine the response and feedback effects via an event study methodology. For this purpose, abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the first FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) announcement related to the COVID-19 pandemic for the top five cryptocurrencies are explored. We, further investigate the effect of the eight FOMC statement announcements during the COVID19 pandemic on these cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethereum, Tether, Litecoin, and Ripple). In the above-mentioned crypto-currency markets, we investigate the presence of bubbles by using the PSY test. We then examine the concordance of the dates of these bubbles with the dates of the FOMC announcements. Findings The empirical results show that the first FOMC event has a negative significant effect after 4 days of the announcement date for all studied cryptocurrencies except Tether. The results also indicate that cumulative abnormal returns are significant during the event windows of (−3,8), (−3,9), and (−3,10). Besides, we find that Bitcoin, Ethereum and, Litecoin lived short bubbles lasting for a few days. However, Ripple and Tether markets present no bubbles and no explosive periods. Research limitations/implications This paper presents trained proof that FOMC announcements have a positive effect on volatility's predictive capacity. This work therefore promotes the study of the data quality of volatility in future research as well. Practical implications The justified effect of the FOMC announcements on cryptocurrency as a speculative asset has practical implications for investors in building their trading strategies in anticipation of the next FOMC announcement. Therefore, this study implies that the FOMC announcements contain very relevant information for investors in the cryptocurrency market. This research may not only encourage a better understanding of the evolution of the expectations of policymakers, but also facilitate a better understanding of how these expectations are developed. Originality/value The COVID-19 pandemic has disturbed the stability of financial markets, inciting the Fed to take some monetary regulations. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first one that analyses the response of five major cryptocurrencies to FOMC announcements during COVID 19 pandemic and associates these dates with bubble occurrences.


2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (5) ◽  
pp. 921-932
Author(s):  
Carlos Madeira ◽  
João Madeira

This paper shows that since votes of members of the Federal Open Market Committee have been included in press statements, stock prices increase after the announcement when votes are unanimous but fall when dissent (which typically is due to preference for higher interest rates) occurs. This pattern started prior to the 2007–2008 financial crisis. The differences in stock market reaction between unanimity and dissent remain, even controlling for the stance of monetary policy and consecutive dissent. Statement semantics also do not seem to explain the documented effect. We find no differences between unanimity and dissent with respect to impact on market risk and Treasury securities.


2017 ◽  
Vol 82 (5) ◽  
pp. 879-909 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Fligstein ◽  
Jonah Stuart Brundage ◽  
Michael Schultz

One of the puzzles about the financial crisis of 2008 is why regulators, particularly the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), were so slow to recognize the impending collapse of the financial system and its broader consequences for the economy. We use theory from the literature on culture, cognition, and framing to explain this puzzle. Consistent with recent work on “positive asymmetry,” we show how the FOMC generally interpreted discomforting facts in a positive light, marginalizing and normalizing anomalous information. We argue that all frames limit what can be understood, but the content of frames matters for how facts are identified and explained. We provide evidence that the Federal Reserve’s primary frame for making sense of the economy was macroeconomic theory. The content of macroeconomics made it difficult for the FOMC to connect events into a narrative reflecting the links between foreclosures in the housing market, the financial instruments used to package the mortgages into securities, and the threats to the larger economy. We conclude with implications for the sociological literatures on framing and cognition and for decision-making in future crises.


1970 ◽  
Vol 52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albert E. Burger ◽  
Charlotte E. Ruebling

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