scholarly journals How deviations from FOMC’s monetary policy decisions from a benchmark monetary policy rule affect bank profitability: evidence from U.S. banks

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 354-371
Author(s):  
Nicholas Apergis ◽  
Chi Keung Marco Lau
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Policy Decision ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Policy Decisions ◽  
Policy Rule ◽  
Federal Open Market Committee ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Monetary Policy Rule ◽  
Banking Institutions

Purpose This paper aims to provide fresh empirical evidence on how Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) monetary policy decisions from a benchmark monetary policy rule affect the profitability of US banking institutions. Design/methodology/approach It thereby provides a link between the literature on central bank monetary policy implementation through monetary rules and banks’ profitability. It uses a novel data set from 11,894 US banks, spanning the period 1990 to 2013. Findings The empirical findings show that deviations of FOMC monetary policy decisions from a number of benchmark linear and non-linear monetary (Taylor type) rules exert a negative and statistically significant impact on banks’ profitability. Originality/value The results are expected to have substantial implications for the capacity of banking institutions to more readily interpret monetary policy information and accordingly to reshape and hedge their lending behaviour. This would make the monetary policy decision process less noisy and, thus, enhance their capability to attach the correct weight to this information.

Does Deliberation Matter in FOMC Monetary Policymaking? The Volcker Revolution of 1979

2008 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 404-427 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Bailey ◽  
Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Policy Decision ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Credible Commitment ◽  
Federal Open Market Committee ◽  
Automated Content Analysis ◽  
High Inflation ◽  
The Face ◽  
Policy Shift

In monetary policy, decision makers seek to influence the expectations of agents in ways that can avoid making abrupt, dramatic, and unexpected decisions. Yet in October 1979, Chairman Paul Volcker led the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) unanimously to shift its course in managing U.S. monetary policy, which in turn eventually brought the era of high inflation to an end. Although some analysts argue that “the presence and influence of one individual”—namely, Volcker—is sufficient to explain the policy shift, this overlooks an important feature of monetary policymaking. FOMC chairmen—however, omnipotent they may appear—do not act alone. They require the agreement of other committee members, and in the 1979 revolution, the decision was unanimous. How, then, did Chairman Volcker manage to bring a previously divided committee to a consensus in October 1979, and moreover, how did he retain the support of the committee throughout the following year in the face of mounting political and economic pressure against the Fed? We use automated content analysis to examine the discourse of the FOMC (with this discourse recorded in the verbatim transcripts of meetings). In applying this methodology, we assess the force of the arguments used by Chairman Volcker and find that deliberation in the FOMC did indeed “matter” both in 1979 and 1980. Specifically, Volcker led his colleagues in coming to understand and apply the idea of credible commitment in U.S. monetary policymaking.

Inflation Thresholds and Policy-Rule Inertia: Some Simulation Results

FEDS Notes ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2899) ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Fuentes-Albero ◽  
◽  
John M. Roberts ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Policy Rule ◽  
Federal Open Market Committee ◽  
Policy Strategy ◽  
Forward Guidance ◽  
Key Features ◽  
Simulation Results ◽  
New Framework

In August 2020, the Federal Open Market Committee approved a revised Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy (FOMC, 2020) and in the subsequent FOMC meetings, the Committee made material changes to its forward guidance to bring it in line with the new framework. Clarida (2021) characterizes the new framework as comprising a number of key features.

Cryptocurrency bubble risk and the FOMC announcements during COVID-19 black swan event

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anis Jarboui ◽  
Emna Mnif
Keyword(s):  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Abnormal Returns ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Predictive Capacity ◽  
Federal Open Market Committee ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Cumulative Abnormal Returns ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose After the COVID-19 outbreak, the Federal Reserve has undertaken several monetary policies to alleviate the pandemic consequences on the markets. This paper aims to evaluate the effects of the Federal Reserve monetary policy on the cryptocurrency dynamics during the COVID19 pandemic. Design/methodology/approach We examine the response and feedback effects via an event study methodology. For this purpose, abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the first FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) announcement related to the COVID-19 pandemic for the top five cryptocurrencies are explored. We, further investigate the effect of the eight FOMC statement announcements during the COVID19 pandemic on these cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethereum, Tether, Litecoin, and Ripple). In the above-mentioned crypto-currency markets, we investigate the presence of bubbles by using the PSY test. We then examine the concordance of the dates of these bubbles with the dates of the FOMC announcements. Findings The empirical results show that the first FOMC event has a negative significant effect after 4 days of the announcement date for all studied cryptocurrencies except Tether. The results also indicate that cumulative abnormal returns are significant during the event windows of (−3,8), (−3,9), and (−3,10). Besides, we find that Bitcoin, Ethereum and, Litecoin lived short bubbles lasting for a few days. However, Ripple and Tether markets present no bubbles and no explosive periods. Research limitations/implications This paper presents trained proof that FOMC announcements have a positive effect on volatility's predictive capacity. This work therefore promotes the study of the data quality of volatility in future research as well. Practical implications The justified effect of the FOMC announcements on cryptocurrency as a speculative asset has practical implications for investors in building their trading strategies in anticipation of the next FOMC announcement. Therefore, this study implies that the FOMC announcements contain very relevant information for investors in the cryptocurrency market. This research may not only encourage a better understanding of the evolution of the expectations of policymakers, but also facilitate a better understanding of how these expectations are developed. Originality/value The COVID-19 pandemic has disturbed the stability of financial markets, inciting the Fed to take some monetary regulations. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first one that analyses the response of five major cryptocurrencies to FOMC announcements during COVID 19 pandemic and associates these dates with bubble occurrences.

scholarly journals The Effect of FOMC Votes on Financial Markets

2019 ◽  
Vol 101 (5) ◽  
pp. 921-932
Author(s):  
Carlos Madeira ◽  
João Madeira
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Open Market ◽  
Federal Open Market Committee ◽  
2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
Treasury Securities ◽  
Stock Market Reaction

This paper shows that since votes of members of the Federal Open Market Committee have been included in press statements, stock prices increase after the announcement when votes are unanimous but fall when dissent (which typically is due to preference for higher interest rates) occurs. This pattern started prior to the 2007–2008 financial crisis. The differences in stock market reaction between unanimity and dissent remain, even controlling for the stance of monetary policy and consecutive dissent. Statement semantics also do not seem to explain the documented effect. We find no differences between unanimity and dissent with respect to impact on market risk and Treasury securities.

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