Introduction

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.

Universal banks arose in the U.S. during two periods in the past century—the 1920s and the late 1990s. On both occasions, universal banks in the U.S. and Europe promoted intense boom-and-bust cycles that led to global calamities—the Great Depression of the early 1930s and the Great Recession of 2007–09. Universal banks received extensive bailouts on both sides of the Atlantic during both crises. Three core features of universal banks cause them to generate destructive boom-and-bust cycles. First, pervasive conflicts of interest prevent them from acting as objective lenders or as impartial investment advisers. Second, bonus-driven cultures encourage their insiders to take speculative risks to produce short-term profits. Third, their ability to convert loans into asset-backed securities allows them to package risky loans into securities sold as purportedly “safe” investments to poorly informed investors. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 broke up universal banks and established structural buffers that prevented spillovers of risk between the banking system and other financial sectors. The U.S. avoided systemic financial crises after World War II until Glass-Steagall was undermined by regulators and ultimately repealed by Congress. Congress failed to adopt similar structural reforms after the Great Recession. As a result, universal banks continue to dominate our financial markets and pose unacceptable systemic dangers. We urgently need a new Glass-Steagall Act to break up universal banks again and restore a more stable and resilient financial system.

Author(s):  
Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.

This book demonstrates that universal banks—which accept deposits, make loans, and engage in securities activities—played central roles in precipitating the Great Depression of the early 1930s and the Great Recession of 2007–09. Universal banks promoted a dangerous credit boom and a hazardous stock market bubble in the U.S. during the 1920s, which led to the Great Depression. Congress responded by passing the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which separated banks from the securities markets and prohibited nonbanks from accepting deposits. Glass-Steagall’s structural separation of the banking, securities, and insurance sectors prevented financial panics from spreading across the U.S. financial system for more than four decades. Despite Glass-Steagall’s success, large U.S. banks pursued a twenty-year campaign to remove the statute’s prudential buffers. Regulators opened loopholes in Glass-Steagall during the 1980s and 1990s, and Congress repealed Glass-Steagall in 1999. The United Kingdom and the European Union adopted similar deregulatory measures, thereby allowing universal banks to dominate financial markets on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition, large U.S. securities firms became “shadow banks” as regulators allowed them to issue short-term deposit substitutes to finance long-term loans and investments. Universal banks and shadow banks fueled a toxic subprime credit boom in the U.S., U.K., and Europe during the 2000s, which led to the Great Recession. Limited reforms after the Great Recession have not broken up universal banks and shadow banks, thereby leaving in place a financial system that is prone to excessive risk-taking and vulnerable to contagious panics. A new Glass-Steagall Act is urgently needed to restore a financial system that is less risky, more stable and resilient, and better able to serve the needs of our economy and society.


Author(s):  
Gustavo S. Cortes ◽  
Renato L. Marcondes

This chapter analyzes the origins and development of the Brazilian banking system from colonial times to the present day. It begins with a description of the first credit relationships before the existence of banks in colonial Brazil, followed by a discussion of the difficulties faced by the first banks established in the imperial period. It then presents a detailed discussion of domestic and foreign banks during the First Republican, and the key institutional changes that occurred during the Great Depression of the 1930s and the military regime after 1964. Later, it covers banking activities in the hyperinflation period up to the country’s stabilization in 1994. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the recent period and how the banking system endured the Great Recession of 2008–2010 and the recent Brazilian fiscal crisis that began in 2014.


10.28945/3947 ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 001-019

What triggered the crash of the U.S. housing market? This analysis looks at the economic and industry forces that led to an economic downturn that put as many as half of all U.S. residential builders out of business. Since the Great Depression, the U.S. housing market has significantly influenced economic production and employment levels. Direct and indirect investments in the housing industry, along with the induced economic activities such as real estate transactions and construction as well as other factors, accounted for an estimated 15-20% of GDP during boom years (CBPP, 2012). The burst of the $8 trillion housing bubble in 2007 and the subsequent collapse of the financial markets in 2008 created massive disarray in homebuilding (Bivens, 2011). As many as 50% of homebuilders closed their doors, either voluntarily or through bankruptcy filings (Quint, 2015). Concurrently, from 2006 through 2012, the Great Recession resulted in the loss of over $7 trillion of home equity (Gould Ellen, 2012). Over 24 percent of home mortgages went “underwater” with balances exceeding home values (Carter & Gottschalck, n.d.). For some homeowners, the unfortunate thought of losing their homes through foreclosure and incurring disruption to family life became a reality. The stress from threats of the loss of a home, unemployment, and depletion of savings exacted a great toll on many. Not since the Great Depression has the U.S. economy faced forces so devastating to the housing market and personal wealth.


2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 95-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasco M Carvalho ◽  
Alberto Martin ◽  
Jaume Ventura

Over the last two decades US aggregate wealth has fluctuated substantially. Against the backdrop of the Great Recession, the effects of these boom-and-bust cycles have come to dominate academic and policy discussions. How can we explain these fluctuations in wealth? Why are these fluctuations associated with changes in consumption, investment and output? In this note, we argue that answers to these questions entail the addition of two ingredients to existent macroeconomic models: rational bubbles and financial frictions. We explain why each of these building blocks is crucial to understand recent events and how they can be seamlessly integrated in standard models.


Author(s):  
Youssef Cassis ◽  
Giuseppe Telesca

Why were elite bankers and financiers demoted from ‘masters’ to ‘servants’ of society after the Great Depression, a crisis to which they contributed only marginally? Why do they seem to have got away with the recent crisis, in spite of their palpable responsibilities in triggering the Great Recession? This chapter provides an analysis of the differences between the bankers of the Great Depression and their colleagues of the late twentieth/early twenty-first century—regarding their position within, and attitude towards the firm, work culture, mental models, and codes of conduct—complemented with a scrutiny of the public discourse on bankers and financiers before and after the two crises. The authors argue that the (relative) mildness of the Great Recession, compared to the Great Depression, has contributed to preserve elite bankers’ and financiers’ status, income, wealth, and influence. Yet, the long-term consequences of their loss of reputational capital are difficult to assess.


2015 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophia Lazaretou

AbstractThe past Greek crisis experience is more or less terra incognita. In all historical empirical studies Greece is systematically neglected or included only sporadically in their cross-country samples. In the national literature too there is little on this topic. In this paper we use the 1930s crisis as a useful testing ground to compare the two crises episodes, ‘then’ and ‘now’; to detect differences and similarities and discuss the policy facts with the ultimate aim to draw some ‘policy lessons’ from history. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to study the Greek crisis experience across the two historical episodes. Comparisons with the interwar period show that the recent economic downturn was faster, larger and more severe than during the early 1930s. More importantly, analysing the determinants of the two crises, we conclude that Greece’s problems arose from its inability to credibly adhere to a nominal anchor.


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