The Great Depression and the Great Recession in Interwar Greece and Today: A comparison

2015 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophia Lazaretou

AbstractThe past Greek crisis experience is more or less terra incognita. In all historical empirical studies Greece is systematically neglected or included only sporadically in their cross-country samples. In the national literature too there is little on this topic. In this paper we use the 1930s crisis as a useful testing ground to compare the two crises episodes, ‘then’ and ‘now’; to detect differences and similarities and discuss the policy facts with the ultimate aim to draw some ‘policy lessons’ from history. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to study the Greek crisis experience across the two historical episodes. Comparisons with the interwar period show that the recent economic downturn was faster, larger and more severe than during the early 1930s. More importantly, analysing the determinants of the two crises, we conclude that Greece’s problems arose from its inability to credibly adhere to a nominal anchor.

10.28945/3947 ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 001-019

What triggered the crash of the U.S. housing market? This analysis looks at the economic and industry forces that led to an economic downturn that put as many as half of all U.S. residential builders out of business. Since the Great Depression, the U.S. housing market has significantly influenced economic production and employment levels. Direct and indirect investments in the housing industry, along with the induced economic activities such as real estate transactions and construction as well as other factors, accounted for an estimated 15-20% of GDP during boom years (CBPP, 2012). The burst of the $8 trillion housing bubble in 2007 and the subsequent collapse of the financial markets in 2008 created massive disarray in homebuilding (Bivens, 2011). As many as 50% of homebuilders closed their doors, either voluntarily or through bankruptcy filings (Quint, 2015). Concurrently, from 2006 through 2012, the Great Recession resulted in the loss of over $7 trillion of home equity (Gould Ellen, 2012). Over 24 percent of home mortgages went “underwater” with balances exceeding home values (Carter & Gottschalck, n.d.). For some homeowners, the unfortunate thought of losing their homes through foreclosure and incurring disruption to family life became a reality. The stress from threats of the loss of a home, unemployment, and depletion of savings exacted a great toll on many. Not since the Great Depression has the U.S. economy faced forces so devastating to the housing market and personal wealth.


AERA Open ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 233285841987743 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Shores ◽  
Matthew P. Steinberg

The Great Recession was the most severe economic downturn in the United States since the Great Depression. Using data from the Stanford Education Data Archive (SEDA), we describe the patterns of math and English language arts (ELA) achievement for students attending schools in communities differentially affected by recession-induced employment shocks. Employing a difference-in-differences strategy that leverages both cross-county variation in the economic shock of the recession and within-county, cross-cohort variation in school-age years of exposure to the recession, we find that declines in student math and ELA achievement were greater for cohorts of students attending school during the Great Recession in communities most adversely affected by recession-induced employment shocks, relative to cohorts of students that entered school after the recession had officially ended. Moreover, declines in student achievement were larger in school districts serving more economically disadvantaged and minority students. We conclude by discussing potential policy responses.


2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 38-41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark A. Green

The Great Recession of 2007–2008 saw the largest period of economic downturn since the Second World War or the Great Depression of the 1930s. Recessions, however, tend not to have a significant impact on population health. Rather it is how society and governments respond to a recession that has a larger impact on their populations. The dominant political response to the Great Recession was the introduction of austerity programmes aimed at reducing the size of the state. In this Commentary, I briefly review the state of evidence on the changes in population health during austerity. Although the negative impact of austerity on overall population health has been well documented across Europe, there remains a paucity of evidence on within-country differences in health. The slowing down of improvements in life expectancy, correlated to the level of austerity, raises uncomfortable questions as to whether we are beginning to transition from the era of consistently improving population health to a new age characterised by an instability in population health largely dictated by the social and political determinants of health.


Author(s):  
Scott Shane

Between December 2007 and June 2009, the United States suffered its biggest economic downturn since the Great Depression. Dubbed the Great Recession, this economic contraction saw gross domestic product decline 4 percent and the unemployment rate more than double from 4.9 percent to 10.1 percent.


Author(s):  
Youssef Cassis ◽  
Giuseppe Telesca

Why were elite bankers and financiers demoted from ‘masters’ to ‘servants’ of society after the Great Depression, a crisis to which they contributed only marginally? Why do they seem to have got away with the recent crisis, in spite of their palpable responsibilities in triggering the Great Recession? This chapter provides an analysis of the differences between the bankers of the Great Depression and their colleagues of the late twentieth/early twenty-first century—regarding their position within, and attitude towards the firm, work culture, mental models, and codes of conduct—complemented with a scrutiny of the public discourse on bankers and financiers before and after the two crises. The authors argue that the (relative) mildness of the Great Recession, compared to the Great Depression, has contributed to preserve elite bankers’ and financiers’ status, income, wealth, and influence. Yet, the long-term consequences of their loss of reputational capital are difficult to assess.


Author(s):  
Louçã Francisco ◽  
Ash Michael

Chapter 11 assesses the growth prospects of the world economy. The history of global economic doomsaying is traced briefly, a frequently reasonable position that has not done well with the facts for the past hundred years. Capitalism has been adept at escaping from the pit and pendulum. A set of global imbalances is then reviewed that are seen as posing a severe threat to global economic stability and certainly to the prospects for sustainable and equitable growth. The Great Recession following the Crash of 2007–8 might be “different this time.” Historical and contemporary fears of “secular stagnation” are discussed but the speculative nature of stagnationist assessments is acknowledged.


2020 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Tobias Arnold ◽  
Sean Mueller ◽  
Adrian Vatter

Abstract Over the past decades, decentralization has become the new paradigm in how states should organize power territorially. Carefully planned institutional re-designs are the most visible expression thereof. Yet the Great Recession of 2007–2009 has pushed governments into the opposite direction, i.e., towards centralization, to better weather the fiscal drought. Given these contradictory developments, this article compares the effects of twenty-three separate state reforms with the impact of the Great Recession on fiscal centralization in twenty-nine countries over more than two decades. In the main, our analyses attribute a larger effect to design, i.e., pro-active policy making through reforms, than reactive crisis management after a great shock. However, this difference is only apparent once we consider a state’s institutional structure, that is whether a political system is unitary or federal. Our findings thus highlight the need for a multidimensional approach to better understand the drivers of fiscal de/centralization.


2012 ◽  
Vol 33 (01) ◽  
pp. 19-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Charles Merrill

The Great Financial Crisis that broke in 2008 and the Great Recession that followed has led many to question the very structure of contemporary economies. Some argue that the economic model of the past forty years is now broken. Criticism has also been directed at the orthodoxies of economics. For example, neoclassical equilibrium economics, the mainstream economics of the day, is accused of failing to understand some of the most basic aspects of the modern economy (debt and money), of supporting policies that have led to the economic breakdown (deregulation), and of failing to see the crisis coming (Bezemer 2012, Keen 2011). Consequently, heterodox thinking in economics is getting a hearing as never before. Heterodox economics offers itself as the requisite radical reconstruction of the science of economics and also proposes policies for the radical reconstruction of the major economics.Yet to talk of the reconstruction of the modern market economy is at the same time to raise the ethical question: what shape ought the market economy to take? Heterodox economics may acutely analyse the inadequacies of real economies and propose plausible reforms, but as an essentially descriptive science there will be limits on its ability to state what ought to be. Rather, what is required seems to be a systematic prescriptive ethics. In other words, recent events in the world of economics have provided an opening for what ethical philosophy should be best at providing. Determining whether a specific ethical philosophy, to be identified shortly, has the capacity to address the questions raised by heterodox economics is the task of this paper.


2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (Supplement) ◽  
pp. 36-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Albrecht Ritschl

AbstractThe Great Recession of 2008 hit the international economy harder than any other peacetime recession since the Great Contraction after 1929. Soon enough, analogies with the Great Depression were presented, and conclusions were drawn regarding the political response to the slump. This paper is an attempt to sort out real and false analogies and to present conclusions for policy. Its main hypothesis is that the Great Recession resembles the final phase of the Great Contraction between 1931 and 1933, characterized by a fast spreading global financial crisis and the breakdown of the international Gold Standard. The same is also true of the political responses to the banking problems occurring in both crises. The analogy seems less robust for the initial phase of the Great Depression after 1929. The monetary policy response to the Great Recession largely seems to be informed by the monetary interpretation of the Great Depression, but less so by the lessons from the interwar financial crises. As in the Great Depression, policy appears to be on a learning curve, moving away from a mostly monetary response toward mitigating counterpart risk and minimizing interbank contagion.


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