Hedge Fund Governance

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lamia Chourou ◽  
Ashrafee T. Hossain ◽  
Samir Saadi
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Best Interests ◽  
Individual Investors ◽  
Net Worth ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
Governance Challenges ◽  
Fund Governance ◽  
Dramatic Shift

Hedge fund governance has attracted much interest since the financial crisis of 2007–2008 resulting in a dramatic shift in hedge funds’ shareholder composition, from high-net-worth individual investors to active institutional investors. The crisis, coupled with some major scandals, including Bernard Madoff’s multi-billion-dollar Ponzi scheme and the Weavering Capital fraud, uncovered poor governance practices in the hedge fund industry. Fund managers now face serious governance challenges that tend to focus on governance arrangements and independence of fund boards. Maintaining quality governance rules in hedge funds is critical for the industry. Evidence suggests that having sound and transparent governance practices is in the best interests of hedge fund managers. This chapter first addresses the development of corporate governance, followed by an analysis of hedge fund governance. Next the chapter explores the ongoing governance debates facing the industry. The chapter ends by discussing the changing nature of hedge fund governance.

Determinants of Hedge Fund Internal Controls and Fees

2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (6) ◽  
pp. 1887-1919 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gavin Cassar ◽  
Joseph Gerakos
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Short Selling ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Asset Value ◽  
Net Asset Value ◽  
Financial Misstatements ◽  
Financial Misstatement

ABSTRACT: We investigate the determinants of hedge fund internal controls and their association with the fees that funds charge investors. Hedge funds are subject to minimal regulation. Hence, hedge fund managers voluntarily implement internal controls, and managers and investors freely contract on fees. We find that internal controls are stronger in funds with higher potential agency costs. Further, internal controls are stronger in funds domiciled in jurisdictions that provide investors with limited legal redress for fraud and financial misstatements. Short selling funds, however, are more likely to protect information about their investment positions by implementing weaker internal controls. With respect to fees, we find that the percentage of positive profits that the manager receives increases in the strength of the fund’s internal controls. Finally, removing the manager from setting and reporting the fund’s official net asset value, along with reputational incentives and monitoring by leverage providers, are all associated with lower likelihoods of future regulatory investigations of fraud and/or financial misstatement.

Portraits of five hedge fund fraud cases

2008 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Majed R. Muhtaseb ◽  
Chun Chun “Sylvia” Yang
Keyword(s):  
Asset Management ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Investment Fund ◽  
Good Opportunity ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Management Group ◽  
Fund Industry ◽  
Asset Managers

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is two fold: educate investors about hedge fund managers' activities prior to the fraud recognition by the authorities and to help investors and other stakeholders in the hedge fund industry identify red flags before fraud is actually committed.Design/methodology/approachThe paper investigates fraud committed by the Bayou Funds, Beacon Hill Asset Management, Lancer Management Group (LMG), Lipper & Company and Maricopa investment fund. The fraud activities took place during 2000 and 2005.FindingsThe five cases alone cost the hedge fund investors more than $1.5 billion. Investors may have had a good opportunity for avoiding the irrecoverable costs of the fraud had they carefully vetted the backgrounds of the hedge fund managers and/or continuously monitored the funds activities, especially during turbulent market environments.Originality/valueThis is the first research paper to identify and extensively investigate fraud committed by hedge funds. In spite of the size of the hedge fund industry and relatively substantial level and inevitably recurring fraud, academic journals are to yet address this issue. The paper is of great value to hedge funds and their individual and institutional investors, asset managers, financial advisers and regulators.

Style and Skill: Hedge Funds, Mutual Funds, and Momentum

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (12) ◽  
pp. 5505-5531 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Grinblatt ◽  
Gergana Jostova ◽  
Lubomir Petrasek ◽  
Alexander Philipov
Keyword(s):  
Mutual Funds ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Mutual Fund ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Fund Performance ◽  
Short Sales ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Liquidity Provision ◽  
Stock Picking ◽  
Hedge Fund Performance

Classifying mandatory 13F stockholding filings by manager type reveals that hedge fund strategies are mostly contrarian, and mutual fund strategies are largely trend following. The only institutional performers—the two thirds of hedge fund managers that are contrarian—earn alpha of 2.4% per year. Contrarian hedge fund managers tend to trade profitably with all other manager types, especially when purchasing stocks from momentum-oriented hedge and mutual fund managers. Superior contrarian hedge fund performance exhibits persistence and stems from stock-picking ability rather than liquidity provision. Aggregate short sales further support these conclusions about the style and skill of various fund manager types. This paper was accepted by Tyler Shumway, finance.

Are hedge fund returns affected by media coverage of macroeconomic news?

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-439
Author(s):  
Sandip Dutta ◽  
James Thorson
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Media Coverage ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Real Sector ◽  
Macroeconomic News ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
News Announcements ◽  
Hedge Fund Returns ◽  
The Impact

Purpose Extant literature suggests that the difficulty associated with the interpretation of macroeconomic news announcements by the market in general in different economic environments, might be the reason why most studies do not find any significant relationship between real-sector macroeconomic variables and financial asset returns. This paper aims to use a different approach to measure macroeconomic news. The objective is to examine if a different measure of a macroeconomic news variable, constructed from media coverage of the same, significantly affects hedge fund returns. Design/methodology/approach The authors use a news index for unemployment, which is a real-sector variable, constructed from newspaper coverage of unemployment announcements and examine its impact on hedge fund returns. Findings Contrary to the other studies that examine the impact of macroeconomic news on hedge fund returns, the authors find that media coverage of unemployment news announcements significantly affects hedge fund returns. Practical implications Overall, this paper demonstrates that the manner in which the market interprets macroeconomic news announcements in different economic environments is probably a more relevant factor for hedge funds and is more likely to impact hedge fund returns. In conjunction with variables – constructed from media coverage of unemployment news announcements – that factor in the manner of interpretation, it is found that surprises also matter for hedge fund returns. This is an important consideration for hedge fund managers as well. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that examines the impact of media coverage of macroeconomic news announcements on hedge fund returns and finds significantly different results with real-sector macro variables.

Current Hedge Fund Debates and Controversies

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dianna C. Preece
Keyword(s):  
Insider Trading ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Active Management ◽  
Wall Street ◽  
Net Worth ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Alternative Beta

The hedge fund industry has grown to nearly $3 trillion over the last 20 years. High-net-worth individuals and institutional investors expect high returns and low correlation with traditional asset classes in exchange for the fees paid. The standard fee structure is “2 and 20,” 2 percent of assets under management and 20 percent of profits, representing high fees for active management. Hedge funds are largely unregulated and somewhat mysterious. As a result, they are the subject of debates and controversies among market participants and policymakers alike. Debates focus on fee structures, alpha versus alternative beta, weakening returns, activist investors, and leverage. The Securities and Exchange Commission has targeted hedge fund misconduct and malfeasance, pursuing perpetrators of fraud, insider trading, and conflicts of interest in the industry. Several high-ranking Wall Street hedge fund executives have been charged with, and in some cases convicted of, breaking securities laws.

Fraud against hedge funds: implications to operational risk and due diligence

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-77
Author(s):  
Majed R. Muhtaseb
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Operational Risk ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
Law Firm ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Fund Managers

Purpose The loss of an amount in excess of $100m cash deposit can be disruptive to the operations, definitely the liquidity of the hedge fund. Should a hedge fund liquidity position deteriorate, its compromised solvency could impact its vendors, most notably creditors and prime brokers. Large successful hedge funds do make basic mistakes. Lawyer Marc Dreier committed the criminal act of selling fraudulent promissory notes to hedge funds and others. Mr Drier’s success in selling fraudulent promissory notes was facilitated by his accomplices who posed as fake representatives of legitimate institutions. Drier and team presented bogus “audited financial statements” and forged developer’s signatures, and even went as far as using the unsuspecting institutions’ premises for meetings to meet potential notes buyers to further falsely legitimize the scheme. He had the notes buyers send their payments to his law firm account, to secure the money. His actions cost his victims, who include 13 hedge fund managers, other investors and entities, $400m in addition to his law firm’s employees who also suffered when his law firm was dissolved. For his actions, he was sentenced 20 years in federal prison for investment fraud. This study aims to direct hedge fund investors and other stakeholders to thoroughly vet the compliance function, especially controls on cash disbursements, even if the hedge fund is sizable (in excess of $1bn). Investors and even other stakeholders also should place a greater focus on what is usually overlooked issue; most notably the credit quality and authenticity of short-term investments bought by their hedge funds. Design/methodology/approach A thorough investigation of a fraud committed by a lawyer against a number of hedge funds. Several important lessons are identified to professionals who conduct due diligence on hedge funds. Findings The details of the case are very remarkable. This case directs investors’ attention to place greater efforts on certain aspects of operational risk and due diligence on not only hedge funds but also other investment managers. Normally investors conduct operational due diligence on the fund and its operations. Investors also vet fund external parties such as prime brokers, custodians, accountants and fund administrators. Yet, investors normally do not suspect the quality of short-term fund investments. In this case, the short-terms investments were the source of unforeseen yet substantial risk. Research limitations/implications Stakeholders in hedge funds need to carefully investigate the issuer of and the quality of short-term investments that a hedge fund invests in. Future research can investigate the association of hedge fund manager failure with a liquidity position of the fund. Practical implications Investors must thoroughly the entirety of the fund including short-term securities. Originality/value Normally, it is the hedge funds that commit the fraud against investors. In this case, it is the multi-billion hedge funds run by sophisticated fund managers, who are the victims.

Hedge Funds and Herding Behavior

2021 ◽  
pp. 190-214
Author(s):  
Neil M. Kellard
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Industry Structure ◽  
Sociological Perspective ◽  
Herding Behavior ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Trading Patterns ◽  
Potential Market ◽  
Network Risk

This chapter examines whether hedge funds herd, how this herding occurs, and any potential market wide effects. Bringing together the mainstream finance literature and that from a more management and sociological perspective, it is shown that hedge funds herd, although there is some evidence this is less than other large institutional investors. Mechanistically, such consensus trades occur because hedge firms communicate within tight knit clusters of trusted and smart managers, who share and analyze trading positions together. This industry structure is a function of the hyper decision-making environment faced by hedge fund managers, coupled with a desire for legitimization and to maintain reputation. Finally, note that hedge fund herding can have market wide effects either directly via network risk and indirectly, as follower institutional investors amplify hedge fund trading patterns.

Compensation and Incentives in Hedge Funds

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Garrett C. C. Smith ◽  
Gaurav Gupta
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
High Water ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Fee Structure ◽  
Relative Bargaining Power ◽  
Structure Research ◽  
Subsequent Risk

Although hedge funds typically report a 2 and 20 fee structure, some investors want to change this standard practice. Many funds sustained substantial losses as a result of the financial crisis of 2007–2008. Given the strategies used by hedge funds, they were not supposed to incur large losses. Subsequent underperformance to equity during the bull market recovery left many investors questioning the fee structure. Research shows the fee structure is more fluid than typically reported. The reluctance of many hedge fund managers to appear weak perpetuates the reported 2 and 20 fee structure. Fees respond to the relative bargaining power between managers and investors. Some investors speculate that the fee structure encourages managers to undertake high-risk strategies. However, fees and other incentive provisions, such as a high-water mark, provide better opportunities for talented managers to enter the industry, mitigating their subsequent risk-taking.

Hedge Funds and Limited Partnership Agreements

2021 ◽  
pp. 86-110
Author(s):  
Na Dai
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Current Literature ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Fund Performance ◽  
2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
Limited Partnership ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
The 2008 Financial Crisis

Due to the lack of regulations in the hedge fund industry and the great discretion given to hedge fund managers during the daily operations, limited partnership agreements are the most important if not the only tool for investors to incentivize and monitor hedge fund managers and protect their own interests. This chapter reviews the current literature on hedge funds contractual terms and their implications for fund performance and risk taking, before discussing the variation of the contracts conditional on the jurisdiction of the hedge fund. Finally, the development of hedge funds limited partnership agreements is investigated as many jurisdictions have imposed new regulations on hedge funds after the 2008 financial crisis.

Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate M&A Decisions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Szu-Yin (Jennifer) Wu ◽  
Kee H. Chung
Keyword(s):  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Selection Bias ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Operating Performance ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Target Firms ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
Hedge Fund Activism

This paper shows that hedge fund activism is associated with a decrease in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and offer premiums and an increase in stock and operating performance. Activist hedge funds improve target firms’ M&A performance by reducing poor M&A, diversifying M&A, and the M&A of firms with multiple business segments. Activist hedge funds improve target firms’ M&A decisions by influencing their governance practices. We show that our results are unlikely driven by selection bias. Overall, activist hedge funds play an important role in the market for corporate control by increasing the efficiency of target firms’ M&A activities through interventions. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.

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