Public Policy and Private Schools

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert N. Gross
Keyword(s):  
Private Schools ◽  
Catholic Schools ◽  
School Attendance ◽  
School Administrators ◽  
Public Expenditures ◽  
Parochial School ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
State Laws ◽  
Compulsory Attendance ◽  
Local Officials

Chapter 4 addresses the wave of compulsory attendance legislation, passed in the 1880s, that transformed the relationship between schools and the state. Laws requiring school attendance introduced new dilemmas for school administrators and parochial school authorities. If states required children to attend school, how would public officials define adequate schooling? Ultimately, public officials relied on private schools to achieve public ends, believing that their continued growth was key to limiting public expenditures and attracting Catholic votes. Local officials refused to enforce compulsory attendance laws that would close down Catholic schools and place undue burdens on already overcrowded public school classrooms. When politicians did venture to enact or enforce policies hostile to parochial schools, Catholics mobilized their political power against local and state incumbents, successfully defending private education. As a result of these close ties between public officials and Catholic schools, private schools continued to grow in the early twentieth century.

Creating the Educational Marketplace

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert N. Gross
Keyword(s):  
Private Schools ◽  
School Attendance ◽  
School Administrators ◽  
Catholic School ◽  
Parochial School ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
Education Standards ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Status ◽  
Educational Marketplace

Chapter 5 shows how, by the 1920s, public policies had forged a regulated educational marketplace in American cities. Catholic students frequently transferred between public and private schools. Effectively managing these shifts in school attendance required public officials to establish the standards, rules, and procedures to facilitate parental choice between the two systems. Public regulations standardized the diffuse curriculum and teaching practices of public and private schools. Parents transferred their children from public to private schools with the understanding that the latter fit within the state’s minimal education standards, and that their choice would not result in their child suffering academic or professional harm. New regulations tied public and parochial school governance together in ways unthinkable during the nineteenth century. Catholic school administrators and parents largely embraced these new laws, viewing them as essential for raising the status of Catholic education.

Competing Schools

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert N. Gross
Keyword(s):  
Public Schools ◽  
School Attendance ◽  
Language Instruction ◽  
Rapid Expansion ◽  
Foreign Language Instruction ◽  
Parochial School ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Fierce Competition ◽  
Catholic Schooling

Chapter 2 details how the rapid expansion of private, Catholic schooling in the 1870s and 1880s introduced unforeseen competition that transformed urban education. Newly constructed Catholic parochial schools in cities like Pittsburgh siphoned tens of thousands of Catholic students away from urban public schools. As a result, conflicts over growing parochial school attendance seemed ensured. Public officials initially responded by attempting to adapt to their new competitors. In hopes of attracting Catholic immigrants, for example, school boards in cities such as Cleveland and Chicago adopted foreign-language instruction, or attempted to work out various schemes to fund Catholic schools out of the public treasury. These measures met with varying degrees of success but failed to halt what was becoming a clear, national trend: sharp lines demarcating public and private schools, in often fierce competition with one another in American cities.

Choice and Private Schools: Dynamics of Supply and Demand

1986 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donald A. Erickson
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Public School ◽  
Private Schools ◽  
Private School ◽  
Catholic Schools ◽  
School Attendance ◽  
The United States ◽  
School Enrollment ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Extra Effort

In this chapter an attempt is made, in the light of evidence from the United States and Canada, to explain in general terms the ebb and flow of private school options. Both public and private school growth and decline are affected by demography. Thus, a massive drop in Catholic school enrollment from 1966 to 1981 reflects, in part, a birthrate decline and a migration of Catholics from central cities, where many Catholic schools existed, to suburbs, where there were few Catholic schools. But unlike public school attendance, which rarely involves user fees and is considered normal if not laudatory in the United States and parts of Canada, private school attendance generally occurs when parents decide to depart from normal practice, incurring extra cost, extra effort (many private school patrons must drive their children considerable distances to school), disruption of their children’s friendships (many private school students are not in the schools which most of their neighborhood friends attend), and sometimes social disapproval. To a far greater extent than public school enrollment, then, private school enrollment depends on patron motivations. To return to the Catholic example: Even if the Catholic birthrate were high and Catholic schools were universally accessible, those schools would soon collapse unless many Catholic parents considered them worth extra expense and effort. Also, while public schools are everywhere available, parents often cannot find the private schools they prefer. Some schools exist primarily for certain religious and ethnic groups. Schools of some types are available only in a few major cities. Some schools are beyond the fiscal reach of most people. It is no accident, in this regard, that religious options are more plentiful in private schools than curricular or pedagogical options. Most religiously oriented schools enjoy subsidies from religious groups. Many schools open in the facilities of churches and synagogues, thus avoiding major expense. Sometimes churches and other denominational agencies directly sponsor schools. Even when they do not, they often assist by taking special collections, or their members provide free labor. Many Jewish day schools are subsidized through Jewish community funds.

A Double-Filter Provision for Expanded Red Flag Laws: A Proposal for Balancing Rights and Risks in Preventing Gun Violence

2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (S4) ◽  
pp. 126-132
Author(s):  
Gabriel A. Delaney ◽  
Jacob D. Charles
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Due Process ◽  
School Administrators ◽  
State Laws ◽  
Policy Model ◽  
Extreme Risk ◽  
Life Saving ◽  
Red Flag ◽  
Risk Protection ◽  
Main Component

In response to the continued expansion of “red flag” laws allowing broader classes of people to petition a court for the removal of firearms from individuals who exhibit dangerous conduct, this paper argues that state laws should adopt a double-filter provision that balances individual rights and government public safety interests. The main component of such a provision is a special statutory category — “reporting party” — that enables a broader social network, such as co-workers or school administrators, to request that a law enforcement officer file a petition for an Extreme Risk Protection Order (ERPO). A double-filter provision would not give reporting parties a right to file a court petition directly. Instead, parties would file a request for petition with law enforcement officers (first filter), who must seek an ERPO from the court if they find the reporting party's information credible. That information is then transmitted to the court (second filter) as a sworn affidavit of the reporting party. The goal is to facilitate a balanced policy model that (1) widens the reporting circle in order to feed more potentially life-saving information into the system, (2) mitigates the risk of erroneous deprivation of constitutionally protected due process and Second Amendment rights.

“Planting the Seeds”: The Influence of the Council on Education Policy and Practice

2015 ◽  
Vol 117 (13) ◽  
pp. 189-202
Author(s):  
Melanie Bertrand ◽  
Arlene J. Ford
Keyword(s):  
Education Policy ◽  
Educational Policy ◽  
Racial Inequality ◽  
School Administrators ◽  
Relative Power ◽  
Youth Participatory Action Research ◽  
Participatory Action ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
Policy And Practice ◽  
Inequality In Education

This chapter explores the influence of a youth participatory action research (YPAR) group, viewing the group's efforts as challenges to manifestations of racial inequality in education, such as the inequitable distribution of educational resources. The authors examine how individuals in positions of relative power—teachers, school administrators, and public officials— respond to the group's advocacy efforts. The analysis illustrates the complexity of the group's influence: Some individuals report that the Council sparks meaningful changes, while others have negative reactions. Overall, the chapter sheds light on the ways that YPAR can encourage change in education by incorporating the voices of Black and Latina/o youth into educational policy and practice. “What really stuck with me was this idea of traditional versus organic forms of leadership… and that it's my responsibility to help my students develop as leaders.” – Ms. Bauman1

Corruption accounting and growth: towards a new methodology

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 43-57
Author(s):  
Martin Grandes ◽  
Ariel Coremberg
Keyword(s):  
Endogenous Growth ◽  
Public Works ◽  
Public Expenditures ◽  
National Accounts ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Endogenous Growth Model ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The One

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate empirically that corruption causes significant and sizeable macroeconomic costs to countries in terms of economic activity and economic growth. The authors modeled corruption building on the endogenous growth literature and finally estimated the baseline (bribes paid to public officials) macroeconomic cost of corruption using Argentina 2004-2015 as a case study. Design/methodology/approach The authors laid the foundations of a new methodology to account corruption losses using data from the national accounts and judiciary investigations within the framework of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) non-observed economy (NOE) instead of subjective indicators as in the earlier literature. They also suggested a new method to compute public expenditures overruns, including but not limited to public works. Findings The authors found the costs stand at a minimum accumulated rate of 8 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) or 0.8 per cent yearly. These findings provided a corruption cost floor and were consistent with earlier research on world corruption losses estimated at 5 per cent by the World Economic Forum and with the losses estimated at between a yearly rate of 1.3 and 4 per cent and 2 per cent of GDP by Brazil and Peru’s corruption, respectively. Research limitations/implications The authors would need to extend the application of their new suggested methodology to further countries. They are working on this. They would need to develop the methodology in full to compute the public works overruns input to future econometric work. Originality/value In this paper, the authors make a threefold contribution to the literature on corruption and growth: first, they laid the foundations toward a new methodology to make an accounting of the corruption costs in terms of GDP consistent with the national accounts and executed budgets; on the one hand, and the OECD NOE framework, on the other. The authors named those corruption costs as percentage of GDP the “corruption wedge.” Second, they developed an example taking corruption events and a component of their total costs, namely, the bribes paid to public officials, taking Argentina 2004-2015 as a case study. Finally, they plugged the estimated wedge back into an endogenous growth model and calibrated the growth–corruption path simulating two economies where the total factor productivity was different, at different levels of the corruption wedge.

Crime and Punishment in Ottoman Times: Corruption and Fines

2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 353-376 ◽  
Author(s):  
Metin M. Coşgel ◽  
Boǧaç Ergene ◽  
Haggay Etkes ◽  
Thomas J. Miceli
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Sixteenth Century ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
Crime And Punishment ◽  
Local Taxes ◽  
Local Law Enforcement ◽  
Tax Farming ◽  
Local Officials ◽  
Local Law

Ruling for more than six centuries over lands that spanned three continents, the Ottomans developed a system of law enforcement that initially relied on fines collected by local agents. In the sixteenth century, much of the revenue from these fines went to the local officials in charge of identifying suspects and punishing criminals. To prevent corruption, the personnel responsible for adjudicating criminals were not also responsible for punishing them; public officials were periodically rotated between regions; and law-enforcement agents' compensation derived from criminal fines as well as local taxes. After the seventeenth century, high levels of inflation, imperial decentralization in the provinces, and the institution of long-term tax farming altered the government's relationship with local law-enforcement agents, thereby reducing the effectiveness of mechanisms that previously helped to control corruption. These developments impelled the Ottomans to decrease their reliance on fines for punishment in later periods.

scholarly journals Svetlana Suveică, Loialitate în perioada extremelor: funcționarii publici din Basarabia în perioada celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial (1939-1945) / Loyalties in the Age of Extremes: Local Officials in Bessarabia during World War II (1939–1945)

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-95
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Great Majority ◽  
Low Rank ◽  
Public Employees ◽  
World War ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
Bottom Up ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Local Officials

The article discusses the issue of loyalty in the Southeast European region of Bessarabia (today Republic of Moldova), which during World War II switched its political status from Romania to the USSR and back several times (1940, 1941, and 1944). This bottom-up analysis, drawing on an anextensive documentary basis from different archives, provides a new bottom-up perspective, which focuses on local public institutions and their employees. It reveals that, despite the fact that both regimes acknowledged the role of the bearers of vernacular knowledge about the society and entrusted them with daily administrative issues, the authorities constantly treated local public employees with mistrust and suspected them of “betrayal”. Whereas questioning their loyalty with regard to their activity during the previous regime, no standard criteria of loyalty assessment were applied; it was fragile and had a situational character. When one regime left and another came, the great majority of high-ranking public officials, such as heads of districts and mayors (heads of local Soviets, in the case of the Soviet Union), left Bessarabia together with the army and administration, in order to avoid repression and annihilation. In contrast, the low-rank employees (secretaries, accountants, as well as priests and teachers) stayed in the region, their decision to remain being guided by personal and family interests rather than by political or other convictions.

scholarly journals School Quality and Parental Schooling Decisions for Their Children: Public and Private Schools in Rural Pakistan

2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-202
Author(s):  
Muhammad Jehangir Khan
Keyword(s):  
Private Schools ◽  
Parental Education ◽  
School Quality ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
School Attendance ◽  
Household Survey ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Number Of Children ◽  
Rural Pakistan

This study uses the Pakistan Rural Household Survey 2004-5 (PRHS), a rich set of households and school data, to examine parents’ schooling decision in rural Pakistan. Nested logit regressions are used to quantify the determinants of child school attendance. The analysis confirms that the greater the number of schools (public or private) in the local communities the higher is the attendance. Lower school attendance of boys seems to be the outcome of lower school quality more than it is for girls. A marginal increase in school quality correlates with increased school attendance in government schools more than in private schools. Nearly all school quality variables including control for number of schools in a community stand insignificant for girls. This shows that other factors might be of more importance than school quality of local schools for girl’s low attendance in rural Pakistan. Besides, parental education, especially mother’s education, and household income have strong positive impact on child school attendance. The greater the number of children in the household the lower is the child school attendance. Credit constraint seems not to be problematic as the estimated effect is statistically insignificant. The size of landholding seems to be important only in the case of girls schooling. JEL Classification: I21, I25, D13, C25 Keywords: Demand for Schooling, Public Education, Private Education, Pakistan

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