Emergence and Complexity

2021 ◽  
pp. 166-194
Author(s):  
Marco Bernini
Keyword(s):  
Complex System ◽  
System Theory ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Sense Of Self ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Dynamics ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

The chapter argues that Beckett’s exploration of the mind is not just complicated, but targets non-linear, interacting, networking dynamics in cognition that, according to contemporary theories of complexity, classify the mind as a proper complex system. Within contemporary cognitive science and philosophy of mind, it is increasingly suggested that the brain should be regarded as a complex system (see, e.g., Gazzaniga 2012): as the physical site of decentralized interactions and distributed, looping causality among its neurons. Within this complex account of human cognition, also the mind and its mental properties, including consciousness and a sense of self, have been interpreted through the conceptual lenses of complex system theory. Theories of complexity in cognition, therefore, can help us thread together, and collectively reconsider, all the cognitive dynamics, patterns of emersions, and laws of the mind that Beckett has modeled when exploring consciousness and subjective experience. An emergentist reappraisal of prior chapters should give us a more complex, more global interpretation of Beckett’s early call for a formal access to (as a modeling exploration of) the “recondite relations of emergal” (D, 16) within human cognition. Also, it should support an interpretive shift from a view of Beckett as a complicated author to an account of him as an explorer of the mind’s complexity. The chapter begins by addressing the kind of problems complexity poses to modeling in general, and to narrative modeling in particular.

scholarly journals Tearing the Fabric: a Critique of Materialism

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-65
Author(s):  
Passia Pandora
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
David Chalmers ◽  
Mental Experience ◽  
Reduction Problem ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Ned Block

One of the long-standing questions in the field of philosophy of mind is called the mind-body problem.The problem is this: given that minds and mental properties appear to be vastly different thanphysical objects and physical properties, how can the mind and body relate to and interact with eachother? Materialism is the currently preferred response to philosophy’s classic mind-body problem.Most contemporary philosophers of mind accept a materialist perspective with respect to the natureof reality. They believe that there is one reality and it is physical. One of the primary problemswith materialism has to do with the issue of physical reduction, that is, if everything is physical,how does the mental reduce to the physical? I argue that the materialistic model is problematicbecause it cannot sufficiently explain the reduction problem. Specifically, the materialist model doesnot account for our subjective experience, including qualia. I also consider the question of why thematerialist stance is so entrenched, given all the problems with the reduction problem that havebeen raised. I argue that the paradigmatic influence of materialism explains the puzzling conclusionsdrawn by philosophers. In closing, I argue that the failure of materialist perspectives to explainreduction is our invitation to take a fresh look at the alternatives. In support of my position, I will consider the reduction problem in two sections. In the first section I will present some contemporary arguments put forth by Jaegwon Kim, Ned Block, Thomas Nagel, John Searle, David Chalmers, Frank Jackson and Roger Penrose. These contemporary arguments address four different reduction problems. Although the arguments presented by Kim, Block, Searle, Nagel, Chalmers, Jackson and Penrose are compelling, I will argue that their arguments have not succeeded in altering the mainstream materialist viewpoint. In the second section of this paper, I will address three of my concerns regarding the reduction issue, i.e., 1) concerns regarding unresolved issues with respect to the reduction problem, 2) concerns that materialism cannot account for common characteristics of our mental experience 3) concerns regarding the validity of the materialist stance in general. In closing, I will argue that the failure of materialist perspectives to conclusively explain mind and consciousness is our invitation to take a fresh look at the alternatives. mind-body problem; materialism; physical reduction; qualia; point-of-view

Еnactivist Criticism of the Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness

2021 ◽  
pp. 76-80
Author(s):  
Anastasia O. Shabalina ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Science Methods ◽  
Neural Processes ◽  
Neural Substrate ◽  
Critical Revision ◽  
Concept Of Information ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Person Experience

The article considers the main arguments against the neurobiological theory of consciousness from the point of view of the enactivist approach within the philosophy of mind. The neurobiological theory of consciousness, which reduces consciousness to neural activity, is currently the dominant approach to the mind-body problem. The neurobiological theory emerged as a result of advances in research on the phenomena of consciousness and through the development of technologies for visualizing the internal processes of mind. However, at the very heart of this theory, there is a number of logical contradictions. The non-reductive enactivist approach to consciousness, introduced in this article, contributes to the existing argumentation against the reduction of consciousness to neural processes with remonstrations that take into account the modern neuroscientific data. The article analyzes the argumentation of the sensorimotor enactivism developed by A. Noe and offers the account of the teleosemantic approach to the concept of information provided by R. Cao. The key problems of the neurobiological theory of consciousness are highlighted, and the objections emerging within the framework of the enactivist approach are analyzed. Since the main concepts on which the neural theory is based are the concepts of neural substrate, cognition as representation, and information as a unit of cognition, the author of the article presents three key enactivist ideas that oppose them. First, the enactivist concept of cognition as action allows us to consider the first-person experience as a mode of action, and not as a state of the brain substrate. Second, the article deals with the “explanatory externalism” argument proposed by Noe, who refutes the image of cognition as a representation in the brain. Finally, in order to critically revise the concept of information as a unit of cognition, the author analyzes Cao’s idea, which represents a teleosemantic approach, but is in line with the general enactivist argumentation. Cao shows that the application of the concept “information” to neural processes is problematic: no naturalized information is found in the brain as a physical substrate. A critical revision of beliefs associated with the neural theory of consciousness leads us to recognize that there are not enough grounds for reducing consciousness to processes that take place in the brain. That is why Noe calls expectations that the visualization of processes taking place in the brain with the help of the modern equipment will be able to depict the experience of consciousness the “new phrenology”, thus indicating the naive character of neural reduction. The article concludes that natural science methods are insufficient for the study of consciousness.

scholarly journals Direct cortical stimulation of human posteromedial cortex

Neurology ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 88 (7) ◽  
pp. 685-691 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brett L. Foster ◽  
Josef Parvizi
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Intracranial Eeg ◽  
Autobiographical Recall ◽  
Electric Brain Stimulation ◽  
Intracranial Electrodes ◽  
Intracranial Recordings ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Epilepsy Monitoring ◽  
Human Awareness

Background:The posteromedial cortex (PMC) is a collective term for an anatomically heterogeneous area of the brain constituting a core node of the human default mode network (DMN), which is engaged during internally focused subjective cognition such as autobiographical memory.Methods:We explored the effects of causal perturbations of PMC with direct electric brain stimulation (EBS) during presurgical epilepsy monitoring with intracranial EEG electrodes.Results:Data were collected from 885 stimulations in 25 patients implanted with intracranial electrodes across the PMC. While EBS of regions immediately dorsal or ventral to the PMC reliably produced somatomotor or visual effects, respectively, we found no observable behavioral or subjectively reported effects when sites within the boundaries of PMC were electrically perturbed. In each patient, null effects of PMC stimulation were observed for sites in which intracranial recordings had clearly demonstrated electrophysiologic responses during autobiographical recall.Conclusions:Direct electric modulation of the human PMC produced null effects when standard functional mapping methods were used. More sophisticated stimulation paradigms (e.g., EBS during experimental cognitive tests) will be required for testing the causal contribution of PMC to human cognition and subjective experience. Nonetheless, our findings suggest that some extant theories of PMC and DMN contribution to human awareness and subjective conscious states require cautious re-examination.

Materialism in the philosophy of mind

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Main Difficulty ◽  
Ordinary Sense ◽  
Causal Dependence ◽  
Physical Relation ◽  
The Third ◽  
Almost All ◽  
The Mind

Materialism – which, for almost all purposes, is the same as physicalism – is the theory that everything that exists is material. Natural science shows that most things are intelligible in material terms, but mind presents problems in at least two ways. The first is consciousness, as found in the ‘raw feel’ of subjective experience. The second is the intentionality of thought, which is the property of being about something beyond itself; ‘aboutness’ seems not to be a physical relation in the ordinary sense. There have been three ways of approaching these problems. The hardest is eliminativism, according to which there are no ‘raw feels’, no intentionality and, in general, no mental states: the mind and all its furniture are part of an outdated science that we now see to be false. Next is reductionism, which seeks to give an account of our experience and of intentionality in terms which are acceptable to a physical science: this means, in practice, analysing the mind in terms of its role in producing behaviour. Finally, the materialist may accept the reality and irreducibility of mind, but claim that it depends on matter in such an intimate way – more intimate than mere causal dependence – that materialism is not threatened by the irreducibility of mind. The first two approaches can be called ‘hard materialism’, the third ‘soft materialism’. The problem for eliminativism is that we find it difficult to credit that any belief that we think and feel is a theoretical speculation. Reductionism’s main difficulty is that there seems to be more to consciousness than its contribution to behaviour: a robotic machine could behave as we do without thinking or feeling. The soft materialist has to explain supervenience in a way that makes the mind not epiphenomenal without falling into the problems of interactionism.

Realization

Philosophy ◽  
2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Umut Baysan
Keyword(s):  
Physical Properties ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Relevant Literature ◽  
Biological Properties ◽  
Dependence Relation ◽  
Functional Roles ◽  
Special Sciences ◽  
Painful Sensation ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
The Mind

“Realization” is a technical term used by philosophers of mind, philosophers of science, and metaphysicians to denote some dependence relation that is thought to exist between higher-level properties or states and lower-level properties or states. Some philosophers of mind hold that mental properties, such as believing that it is raining, having a painful sensation, and so on, are realized by physical properties. Understood this way, the term was introduced to philosophy of mind literature with the thesis that mental properties are multiply realizable by physical properties. Since different physical properties could realize the same mental property, it is thought that the phenomenon of multiple realization shows that the identity theory, namely the view that mental properties are identical with physical properties, is false. For similar reasons, some philosophers of the special sciences think that higher-level properties, such as biological properties, are realized by properties that are invoked in lower-level sciences such as physics. Some metaphysicians suggest that determinable properties, such as color properties (e.g., being red) are realized by their determinate properties (e.g., being crimson, being scarlet). Some argue that dispositional properties, such as being fragile, are realized by non-dispositional, categorical microstructural properties. It has been customary to think that functional properties, such as being a carburetor, are realized by first-order properties that play the specified functional roles. Due to the widely different usages of “realization,” it is difficult to determine if there should be one relation or several relations that this term denotes. Any relation that is denoted by this term can be seen as a realization relation. This article is about such relations. Whereas some theories explicitly formulate realization relations, some tangential theories that concern related issues (e.g., the mind-body problem) make crucial claims as to what counts as a case of realization. This article introduces the central questions about realization and clarifies the main issues and concepts that are invoked in the relevant literature.

The Myth of the Thinking Brain

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-209
Author(s):  
Michel Le Du
Keyword(s):  
Mental Abilities ◽  
Mental Properties ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

AbstractThe idea that the brain has mental properties is widely accepted among psychologists and cognitive scientists. Nevertheless, mental properties are usually attributed to persons. This paper aims at elucidating the reasons why, in various contexts, attributing psychological properties to the brain seems the natural thing to do. It also insists that the very idea of locating thoughts is pointless: expressions such as thinking in the head, calculating in the head should not be understood as mentioning locations. Furthermore, the paper tries to show that many proposed solutions to the mind/brain problem are misguided by the belief that the brain thinks and suggests a different answer to this problem, inspired by several remarks by Wittgenstein and by Kenny’s distinction between mental abilities and their vehicle. In many respects, this answer is more a dissolution than a solution to the problem.

Semiotic Systems, Computers, and the Mind

2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 32-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
William J. Rapaport
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Machines ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Semiotic Systems ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

In this reply to James H. Fetzer’s “Minds and Machines: Limits to Simulations of Thought and Action”, the author argues that computationalism should not be the view that (human) cognition is computation, but that it should be the view that cognition (simpliciter) is computable. It follows that computationalism can be true even if (human) cognition is not the result of computations in the brain. The author also argues that, if semiotic systems are systems that interpret signs, then both humans and computers are semiotic systems. Finally, the author suggests that minds can be considered as virtual machines implemented in certain semiotic systems, primarily the brain, but also AI computers. In doing so, the author takes issue with Fetzer’s arguments to the contrary.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF CULTUROLOGICAL DIMENSION

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-40
Author(s):  
D. A. Funtova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Scientific Data ◽  
Knowledge Based ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Brain

High technologies have stimulated a rapidly growing knowledge-based paradigm. Therewith particular sciences seem to have separated from each other. Respectively, it brought to a certain misunderstanding about knowledge being differently directed and unreliable. Take, for instance, artificial intelligence, which is often discussed today by science and mass media. This phenomenon serves as a good example of a knowledge-based paradigm in action: it combines chemistry, computer science, engineering, linguistics, medicine, physics, philosophy and psychology. Culturology, as the broadest of the sciences, allows to comprehend artificial intelligence and opportunities it grants. Theoretically, a complete decoding of the brain cognitive processes will allow to predict the actions of the individual, to imitate and prototype him, as well as to create a model of artificial intelligence based on human intelligence. However, the modern science has not yet produced the method of such a decoding. The article considers the key differences between artificial intelligence and the human mind in accordance with relevant scientific data. The philosophy of mind and sensual subjective experience (qualia) are discussed, with the latter’s impact on culture and on individual’s life (a case study of the author’s experience of smell loss and its transformation) being analyzed. The article specifies how artificial intelligence shapes the axiological dimension of culture.

Beckett and the Cognitive Method

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Bernini
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Sense Of Self ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Scientific Debate ◽  
Modeling Technology ◽  
Dialogic Interaction ◽  
The Mind

How can literature enhance, parallel or reassess the scientific study of the mind? Or is literature instead limited to the ancillary role of representing cognitive processes? Beckett and the Cognitive Method argues that Beckett’s narrative work, rather than just expressing or rendering cognition and mental states, inaugurates an exploratory use of narrative as an introspective modeling technology (defined as “introspection by simulation”). Through a detailed analysis of Beckett’s entire corpus and published volumes of letters, the book argues that Beckett pioneered a new method of writing to construct (in a mode analogous to scientific inquiry) “models” for the exploration of core laws, processes, and dynamics in the human mind. Marco Bernini integrates models, problems, and interpretive frameworks from contemporary narrative theory, cognitive sciences, phenomenology, and philosophy of mind to make a case for Beckett’s modeling practice of a vast array of processes including: the (narrative) illusion of a sense of self, the hallucinatory quality of inner speech, the dialogic interaction with memories and felt presences, the synesthetic nature of inner experience and mental imagery, the developmental cooperation of language and locomotion, the role of moods and emotions as cognitive drives, the layered complexity of the mind, and the emergent quality of consciousness. Beckett and the Cognitive Method also reflects on how Beckett’s “fictional cognitive models” are transformed into reading, auditory, or spectatorial experiences generating through narrative devices insights on which the sciences can only discursively or descriptively report. As such, the study advocates for their relevance to the contemporary scientific debate toward an interdisciplinary co-modeling of cognition.

Psychiatric Consultation in Medico-Surgical Settings

2009 ◽  
Vol 24 (S1) ◽  
pp. 1-1
Author(s):  
F. Sirois
Keyword(s):  
Brief Intervention ◽  
Basic Assumption ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Psychiatric Symptoms ◽  
Medical Procedures ◽  
External Reality ◽  
Clinical Episode ◽  
The Mind ◽  
And Coping ◽  
The Brain

The author resents a frame for evaluating patients in various medical contexts and discusses principles of brief intervention. the frame relies on a basic assumption differentiating the approach of the mind from that of the brain whereby the subjective experience of the patient is compared with the reality process of medical procedures. In that specific context, psychiatric symptoms are seen as elaboration of the gap between the subjective experience of the patients and the objective medical assessment. Psychiatric evaluatiion is therefore subjected to that context where assessment of anxiety and coping mechanisms is paramount to search for the central psychic position from which the patient experiences the clinical episode. Principles of brief intervention are based on the interplay of psychic and external reality. Such principles are spelled out in ten different items along the clinical course of patients as to follow a short, stepwise path to help patients move from accommodating the external reality to their subjective experience to the other way around.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document