How to Be a Fictionalist About Material Constitution (and Just About Anything Else)
This chapter develops a general strategy for constructing error-theoretic fictionalist (ETF) views of controversial objects (e.g., abstract objects, composite objects, etc.). According to ETF-ist views, (1) ordinary sentences about objects of the relevant controversial kind are not literally true (despite the fact that they seem true to us) because objects of the relevant kind don’t really exist; but (2) these sentences are still “correct” in a certain objective sense; and (3) we can use the “correctness” of these sentences to explain why they seem so obvious to us, why they’re so useful to us in science and everyday life, and why it’s not harmful to our purposes that these sentences aren’t literally true. Second, having laid out the general recipe for constructing ETF-ist views, the author goes on to develop and motivate an ETF-ist view of our discourse about coincident objects and material constitution.