Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Mark Balaguer
Keyword(s):  
Wide Class ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Physical Reality ◽  
Abstract Objects ◽  
Philosophical Argument ◽  
Scientific Question ◽  
Composite Objects ◽  
Metaphysical Question ◽  
Modal Sentence

Chapter 1 provides a synopsis of the entire book. Roughly speaking, the book does two things. First, it introduces a novel kind of non-factualist view and argues that we should endorse views of this kind in connection with a wide class of metaphysical questions—most notably, the question of whether there are any abstract objects and the question of whether there are any composite objects. Second, the book explains how these non-factualist views fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-positivism, and it explains how we could argue that neo-positivism is true. Neo-positivism is (roughly) the view that every metaphysical question decomposes into subquestions, and in connection with each of these subquestions, we can endorse one of the following three anti-metaphysical views: non-factualism, or scientism, or metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism. Non-factualism about a question Q is the view that there’s no fact of the matter about the answer to Q. Scientism about Q is (roughly) the view that Q is an ordinary empirical-scientific question about some aspect of physical reality, and Q can’t be settled with an a priori philosophical argument. And metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism about Q is (roughly) the view that Q asks about the truth value of a modal sentence that’s metaphysically innocent in the sense that it doesn’t say anything about reality and, if it’s true, isn’t made true by reality.

Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Balaguer
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Physical Reality ◽  
Material Objects ◽  
Abstract Objects ◽  
Philosophical Argument ◽  
Abstract Object ◽  
Scientific Question ◽  
Composite Object ◽  
Metaphysical Question ◽  
Modal Sentence

This book does two things. First, it introduces a novel kind of non-factualist view, and it argues that we should endorse views of this kind in connection with a wide class of metaphysical questions, most notably, the abstract-object question and the composite-object question (more specifically, the book argues that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any such things as abstract objects or composite objects—or material objects of any other kind). Second, the book explains how these non-factualist views fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-positivism, and it explains how we could argue that neo-positivism is true. Neo-positivism is (roughly) the view that every metaphysical question decomposes into some subquestions—call them Q1, Q2, Q3, etc.—such that, for each of these subquestions, one of the following three anti-metaphysical views is true of it: non-factualism, or scientism, or metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism. These three views can be defined (very roughly) as follows. Non-factualism about a question Q is the view that there’s no fact of the matter about the answer to Q. Scientism about Q is the view that Q is an ordinary empirical-scientific question about some contingent aspect of physical reality, and Q can’t be settled with an a priori philosophical argument. And metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism about Q is the view that Q asks about the truth value of a modal sentence that’s metaphysically innocent in the sense that it doesn’t say anything about reality and, if it’s true, isn’t made true by reality.

What Is Neo-Positivism and How Could We Argue for It?

2021 ◽  
pp. 201-217
Author(s):  
Mark Balaguer
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Physical Reality ◽  
Philosophical Argument ◽  
Scientific Question ◽  
Metaphysical Question ◽  
Modal Sentence ◽  
Truth Value

Chapter 7 explains how the non-factualist views established in the first part of this book fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-positivism. This chapter formulates neo-positivism, explains why neo-positivism isn’t self-refuting, and explains how we could argue for neo-positivism. Neo-positivism is (roughly) the view is that every metaphysical question decomposes into subquestions, and in connection with each of these subquestions, we can endorse one of the following three anti-metaphysical views: non-factualism, scientism, or metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism. Non-factualism about a question Q is the view that there’s no fact of the matter about the answer to Q. Scientism about Q is (roughly) the view that Q is an ordinary empirical-scientific question about some aspect of physical reality, and Q can’t be settled with an a priori philosophical argument. And metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism about Q is (roughly) the view that Q asks about the truth value of a modal sentence that’s metaphysically innocent in the sense captured by the Chapter-6 view modal nothingism.

How Do We Know that We’re Not Brains in Vats?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith DeRose
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
A Priori ◽  
A Priori Knowledge ◽  
Conservative Approach ◽  
Contingent Fact ◽  
Brains In Vats ◽  
Priori Knowledge

In this chapter the contextualist Moorean account of how we know by ordinary standards that we are not brains in vats (BIVs) utilized in Chapter 1 is developed and defended, and the picture of knowledge and justification that emerges is explained. The account (a) is based on a double-safety picture of knowledge; (b) has it that our knowledge that we’re not BIVs is in an important way a priori; and (c) is knowledge that is easily obtained, without any need for fancy philosophical arguments to the effect that we’re not BIVs; and the account is one that (d) utilizes a conservative approach to epistemic justification. Special attention is devoted to defending the claim that we have a priori knowledge of the deeply contingent fact that we’re not BIVs, and to distinguishing this a prioritist account of this knowledge from the kind of “dogmatist” account prominently championed by James Pryor.

scholarly journals Testing Economic Theory

2018 ◽  
pp. 303-313
Author(s):  
Christopher P. Guzelian
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Number System ◽  
Physical Reality ◽  
Economic Research ◽  
Economic Knowledge ◽  
Fractional Reserve Banking ◽  
Physical Universe ◽  
And Mathematics ◽  
Reserve Banking ◽  
The One

Two years ago, Bob Mulligan and I empirically tested whether the Bank of Amsterdam, a prototypical central bank, had caused a boom-bust cycle in the Amsterdam commodities markets in the 1780s owing to the bank’s sudden initiation of low-fractional-re-serve banking (Guzelian & Mulligan 2015).1 Widespread criticism came quickly after we presented our data findings at that year’s Austrian Economic Research Conference. Walter Block representa-tively responded: «as an Austrian, I maintain you cannot «test» apodictic theories, you can only illustrate them».2 Non-Austrian, so-called «empirical» economists typically have no problem with data-driven, inductive research. But Austrians have always objected strenuously on ontological and epistemolog-ical grounds that such studies do not produce real knowledge (Mises 1998, 113-115; Mises 2007). Camps of economists are talking past each other in respective uses of the words «testing» and «eco-nomic theory». There is a vital distinction between «testing» (1) an economic proposition, praxeologically derived, and (2) the rele-vance of an economic proposition, praxeologically derived. The former is nonsensical; the latter may be necessary to acquire eco-nomic theory and knowledge. Clearing up this confusion is this note’s goal. Rothbard (1951) represents praxeology as the indispensible method for gaining economic knowledge. Starting with a Aristote-lian/Misesian axiom «humans act» or a Hayekian axiom of «humans think», a voluminous collection of logico-deductive eco-nomic propositions («theorems») follows, including theorems as sophisticated and perhaps unintuitive as the one Mulligan and I examined: low-fractional-reserve banking causes economic cycles. There is an ontological and epistemological analog between Austrian praxeology and mathematics. Much like praxeology, we «know» mathematics to be «true» because it is axiomatic and deductive. By starting with Peano Axioms, mathematicians are able by a long process of creative deduction, to establish the real number system, or that for the equation an + bn = cn, there are no integers a, b, c that satisfy the equation for any integer value of n greater than 2 (Fermat’s Last Theorem). But what do mathematicians mean when they then say they have mathematical knowledge, or that they have proven some-thing «true»? Is there an infinite set of rational numbers floating somewhere in the physical universe? Naturally no. Mathemati-cians mean that they have discovered an apodictic truth — some-thing unchangeably true without reference to physical reality because that truth is a priori.

scholarly journals Optimal order yielding discrepancy principle for simplified regularization in Hilbert scales: finite-dimensional realizations

2004 ◽  
Vol 2004 (37) ◽  
pp. 1973-1996 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santhosh George ◽  
M. Thamban Nair
Keyword(s):  
Wide Class ◽  
Noise Level ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Approximate Solutions ◽  
Optimal Order ◽  
Discrepancy Principle ◽  
A Posteriori ◽  
Operator Equations ◽  
Finite Dimensional ◽  
Ill Posed

Simplified regularization using finite-dimensional approximations in the setting of Hilbert scales has been considered for obtaining stable approximate solutions to ill-posed operator equations. The derived error estimates using an a priori and a posteriori choice of parameters in relation to the noise level are shown to be of optimal order with respect to certain natural assumptions on the ill posedness of the equation. The results are shown to be applicable to a wide class of spline approximations in the setting of Sobolev scales.

Cities and Border Control

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avner de Shalit
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Philosophical Argument ◽  
Border Control ◽  
Shrinking Cities ◽  
The City

Should we allow cities to control their borders, and issue permits to settle in the city? Some cities that have become extremely popular among immigrants wish to limit the number of immigrants who can settle in the city; contrariwise, some shrinking cities have asked to be allowed to issue permits to settle in the city even if the state is less open to immigration. Arguments for and against open city borders are analysed in Chapter 1 and it proves difficult either to support or dismiss the idea using a consistent and coherent philosophical argument. The chapter also discusses selective policies of migration to cities. It is claimed that such policies are morally justifiable, provided that they do not dismiss selectively but only encourage selectively.

Adorno and the Uncoercive Gaze

2019 ◽  
pp. 17-38
Author(s):  
Gerhard Richter
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Primary Mode ◽  
The Moment

Chapter 1 develops in detail Adorno’s concept of the uncoercive gaze as the primary mode of reflective engagement with his objects of thinking. Proceeding from an explication of his conviction that the kind of thinking that philosophy performs cannot be performed without also considering its relation to questions of language, this chapter sets the stage for our understanding of the uncoercive gaze. By refusing to submit to the dictates of an obscene and transfixed Hinstarren—a mere staring—at the object, Adorno’s uncoercive gaze eschews the critical violence that attends to the moment in which a thinker or writer works to superimpose onto the object this or that set standard of measurement, premise, agenda, or assumption that, as a priori ossified modes of relating to the object, only ends up by missing a certain critical intimacy with the object—and thus its productive primacy, its critical Vorrang.

The Sum of It All

2019 ◽  
pp. 317-324
Author(s):  
Steven J. Osterlind
Keyword(s):  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
King Lear ◽  
The Other ◽  
Scientific Question ◽  
The Future

This concluding chapter reviews the long road to quantification, drawing especially on ideas introduced in Chapter 1, but also mentioning highlights from the other chapters. It considers two thought experiments, where a thought experiment is defined as an investigation into a scientific question that is carried out only in the imagination. The first is, suppose quantification had not taken place and we had not transformed our worldview to it. The second is, from our current quantified worldview, how we might evolve in the future? The chapter concludes with a quote from Shakespeare’s King Lear is given, describing a state of internal happiness.

scholarly journals Machines, Logic and Quantum Physics

2000 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Deutsch ◽  
Artur Ekert ◽  
Rossella Lupacchini
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Physics ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Physical Reality ◽  
Physical World ◽  
Empirical Science ◽  
Physical Sciences ◽  
Mathematical Structures ◽  
Eugene Wigner ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Modern Status

§1. Mathematics and the physical world. Genuine scientific knowledge cannot be certain, nor can it be justified a priori. Instead, it must be conjectured, and then tested by experiment, and this requires it to be expressed in a language appropriate for making precise, empirically testable predictions. That language is mathematics.This in turn constitutes a statement about what the physical world must be like if science, thus conceived, is to be possible. As Galileo put it, “the universe is written in the language of mathematics”. Galileo's introduction of mathematically formulated, testable theories into physics marked the transition from the Aristotelian conception of physics, resting on supposedly necessary a priori principles, to its modern status as a theoretical, conjectural and empirical science. Instead of seeking an infallible universal mathematical design, Galilean science usesmathematics to express quantitative descriptions of an objective physical reality. Thus mathematics became the language in which we express our knowledge of the physical world — a language that is not only extraordinarily powerful and precise, but also effective in practice. Eugene Wigner referred to “the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the physical sciences”. But is this effectiveness really unreasonable or miraculous?Numbers, sets, groups and algebras have an autonomous reality quite independent of what the laws of physics decree, and the properties of these mathematical structures can be just as objective as Plato believed they were (and as Roger Penrose now advocates).

Apriority, Disputability, and Necessity

2020 ◽  
pp. 144-164
Author(s):  
Robert Audi
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
The Self ◽  
Abstract Objects

This chapter shows how the self-evident and, by extension, a priori propositions in general may plausibly be considered necessary. These propositions are best taken to have, as truthmakers, abstract objects and their interrelations. It is also argued that the a priori may be plausibly taken to extend to certain normative truths and to many propositions that, like some perceptual principles discussed in earlier chapters, belong to philosophy itself. As the case of philosophy well illustrates, when a priori propositions are substantive, there may be widespread rational disagreement on them. This is especially clear if, as argued here, beliefs can be rational even if not sufficiently well-grounded to be justified. This possibility implies that someone may rationally, though unjustifiedly, reject even certain self-evident propositions. How this happens is explained, and the chapter also shows both difficulties in identifying rational disagreements and some prospects for resolving them.

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