Philosophy of Linguistics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Égré
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Paradigm Shift ◽  
Generative Grammar ◽  
Philosophy Of Linguistics ◽  
Structural Linguistics

This chapter is an enquiry into the goals and methods of linguistics, with the aim of understanding both the specifics of the discipline and the relationships between linguists’ take on the methodology of their field and general principles of philosophy of science. The first part highlights linguistics as an inquiry into language, as opposed to languages. The second part describes the shift from structural linguistics to generative grammar as a paradigm shift, involving major changes in both what is studied and how it is studied. The next section focuses on the empirical import of contemporary linguistics, discussing standards of explanation and prediction, as well as confirmation and refutation of linguistic hypotheses. The last part introduces linguistic universals, what they are and how they may be identified and explained, thus making explicit the connection with the goal of understanding not only the variety of languages but the faculty of language.

scholarly journals FILSAFAT ILMU KARL R. POPPER DAN THOMAS S. KUHN SERTA IMPLIKASINYA DALAM PENGAJARAN ILMU

HUMANIKA ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 39
Author(s):  
Slamet Subekti
Keyword(s):  
Science Education ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Paradigm Shift ◽  
Role Models ◽  
Teaching And Learning ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Puzzle Solving ◽  
Similarities And Differences ◽  
Practice Of Science

This article discusses about philosophy of science according to Karl R. Popper and Thomas S. Kuhn. There are similarities and differences between their views about how progress and what function of science.Apparently both Popper and Kuhn agree that science does not proceed by induction. However Kuhn disagrees with the view that science progresses by falsifiability through conjectures and refutations, but occurance by paradigm shift. Popper and Kuhn’s disagreement amounted to a distinction between two functions within the practice of science, one of criticism (Popper) and one of puzzle solving (Kuhn).Science education implies the teaching and learning of science interesting and fruitful in one hand, and teachers should be role models to students in the other hand

Generative Grammar, Structural Linguistics, and Language Teaching

Hispania ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 524
Author(s):  
Michael H. Gertner ◽  
Karl Conrad Diller
Keyword(s):  
Language Teaching ◽  
Generative Grammar ◽  
Structural Linguistics

Generative Grammar, Structural Linguistics, and Language Teaching

1973 ◽  
Vol 57 (1/2) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
David William Foster ◽  
Karl Conrad Diller
Keyword(s):  
Language Teaching ◽  
Generative Grammar ◽  
Structural Linguistics

Generative Grammar, Structural Linguistics and Language Teaching

1974 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 91
Author(s):  
James W. Ney ◽  
Karl Conrad Diller
Keyword(s):  
Language Teaching ◽  
Generative Grammar ◽  
Structural Linguistics

Generative Grammar, Structural Linguistics, and Language Teaching

1973 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 134
Author(s):  
James R. Shawl ◽  
Karl Conrad Diller
Keyword(s):  
Language Teaching ◽  
Generative Grammar ◽  
Structural Linguistics

Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962)

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 405-413
Author(s):  
Lorraine Daston
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Paradigm Shift ◽  
Everyday Language ◽  
Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Structure Of Scientific Revolutions ◽  
Single Structure ◽  
Mental Worlds ◽  
First Time

Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) is the bestselling and most-cited book ever published in the history and philosophy of science. Yet very few scholars in those fields would now endorse the book’s main claims, and many are critical of its central premise: namely, that major changes in different disciplines and diverse historical contexts conform to a single “structure.” Key Kuhnian concepts such as “paradigm shift” have become part of everyday language but all but disappeared from specialist publications. Nonetheless, the book still galvanizes readers encountering it for the first time—or even scholars who haven’t reread it since their own student days. Kuhn’s description of allencompassing and incommensurable mental worlds inhabited by scientists who practice in different paradigms resonates with the experience of readers who have experienced seismic changes in moral and political intuitions.

Aristotle and Hume on the Idea of Natural Necessity

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-227
Author(s):  
David Botting ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
First Principles ◽  
Paradigm Shift ◽  
First Principle ◽  
Proper Understanding ◽  
Posterior Analytics ◽  
Alternative Approaches ◽  
Natural Necessity

There is a tension in scholarship about Aristotle’s philosophy, especially his philosophy of science, between empiricist readings and rationalist readings. A prime site of conflict is Posterior Analytics II.19 where Aristotle, after having said that we know the first principles by induction suddenly says that we know them by nous. Those taking the rationalist side find in nous something like a faculty of “intuition” and are led to the conclusion that by “induction” Aristotle has some kind of idea of “intuitive induction”. Those taking the empiricist side resist this temptation but then struggle to explain how we can know first principles by induction and usually end by relegating induction to a mere subsidiary role; well-known problems of induction, with which Aristotle shows some familiarity, militate against taking anything we learn from induction to be a first principle or even certain. I am on the side of the empiricists, and would like to adopt as a methodological assumption that no concept of intuition occurs in any of Aristotle’s works. That is a far more ambitious project than I am attempting here, however. Here, I want to defend a non-intuitive, enumerative kind of induction against a raft of criticisms raised against it in the collection Shifting the Paradigm: Alternative Approaches to Induction (Biondi & Groarke 2014). I want to defend the position that Hume and Aristotle have basically the same conception of induction and of what it can and cannot do. What it cannot do, for both, is prove natural necessities. A paradigm shift is neither necessary nor desirable for a proper understanding of Aristotle’s philosophy of science. Aristotle is still the empiricist philosopher we all thought he was before reading Posterior Analytics II.19

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document