Epilogue

Author(s):  
Isabella Ginor ◽  
Gideon Remez

This chapter poses for future study the question why, after at least initial success of the Soviet-supported Egyptian offensive, the rift between Cairo and Moscow that did not occur, as widely believed, in the summer of 1972 did develop gradually after the Yom Kippur War, with Egypt moving into the US camp in the Cold War. Unlike the present book’s challenge to many conventional assumptions about the 1967-1973 period, here the widespread concept appears to be borne out that once Egyptian President Anwar Sadat opted for peace, he needed US influence with Israel as much as he needed Soviet military support for the military achievement which he required as a precondition. Moscow was involved in the first stages of postwar settlement, such as the reopening of the Suez Canal and the Geneva peace conference. But it was edged out of the subsequent process and did its best to back its remaining allies, mainly Syria and Palestinian groups, in opposing the Israeli-Egyptian peace as far as backing attempts on Sadat’s life.

Author(s):  
Vladimir Kontorovich

The academic study of the Soviet economy in the US was created to help fight the Cold War, part of a broader mobilization of the social sciences for national security needs. The Soviet strategic challenge rested on the ability of its economy to produce large numbers of sophisticated weapons. The military sector was the dominant part of the economy, and the most successful one. However, a comprehensive survey of scholarship on the Soviet economy from 1948-1991 shows that it paid little attention to the military sector, compared to other less important parts of the economy. Soviet secrecy does not explain this pattern of neglect. Western scholars developed strained civilian interpretations for several aspects of the economy which the Soviets themselves acknowledged to have military significance. A close reading of the economic literature, combined with insights from other disciplines, suggest three complementary explanations for civilianization of the Soviet economy. Soviet studies was a peripheral field in economics, and its practitioners sought recognition by pursuing the agenda of the mainstream discipline, however ill-fitting their subject. The Soviet economy was supposed to be about socialism, and the military sector appeared to be unrelated to that. By stressing the militarization, one risked being viewed as a Cold War monger. The conflict identified in this book between the incentives of academia and the demands of policy makers (to say nothing of accurate analysis) has broad relevance for national security uses of social science.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 12-47
Author(s):  
Yinan Li

The development of the PRC’s armed forces included three phases when their modernization was carried out through an active introduction of foreign weapons and technologies. The first and the last of these phases (from 1949 to 1961, and from 1992 till present) received wide attention in both Chinese and Western academic literature, whereas the second one — from 1978 to 1989 —when the PRC actively purchased weapons and technologies from the Western countries remains somewhat understudied. This paper is intended to partially fill this gap. The author examines the logic of the military-technical cooperation between the PRC and the United States in the context of complex interactions within the United States — the USSR — China strategic triangle in the last years of the Cold War. The first section covers early contacts between the PRC and the United States in the security field — from the visit of R. Nixon to China till the inauguration of R. Reagan. The author shows that during this period Washington clearly subordinated the US-Chinese cooperation to the development of the US-Soviet relations out of fear to damage the fragile process of detente. The second section focuses on the evolution of the R. Reagan administration’s approaches regarding arms sales to China in the context of a new round of the Cold War. The Soviet factor significantly influenced the development of the US-Chinese military-technical cooperation during that period, which for both parties acquired not only practical, but, most importantly, political importance. It was their mutual desire to undermine strategic positions of the USSR that allowed these two countries to overcome successfully tensions over the US arms sales to Taiwan. However, this dependence of the US-China military-technical cooperation on the Soviet factor had its downside. As the third section shows, with the Soviet threat fading away, the main incentives for the military-technical cooperation between the PRC and the United States also disappeared. As a result, after the Tiananmen Square protests, this cooperation completely ceased. Thus, the author concludes that the US arms sales to China from the very beginning were conditioned by the dynamics of the Soviet-American relations and Beijing’s willingness to play an active role in the policy of containment. In that regard, the very fact of the US arms sales to China was more important than its practical effect, i.e. this cooperation was of political nature, rather than military one.


Author(s):  
Isabella Ginor ◽  
Gideon Remez

This chapter continues description of the disinformation campaign mounted by Egypt and the USSR to implant the deceptive impression that all Soviet advisers were expelled by President Anwar Sadat in July 1972 as part of a rift with Moscow and a shift to the US camp in the Cold War. The advisers were recalled en masse to Cairo, which had to be noticed by foreign observers, but soon were unobtrusively reposted to Egyptian formations where they continued preparations for an anti-Israeli offensive and induction of offensive weapons such as long-range bombers which supposedly had been refused by the Soviets. Among other components of this deception, supposed Israeli spy Ashraf Marwan is documented as falsely advising an MI6 agent that all Soviets were gone and Egypt would revert to procurement of British weapons – which reinforces evidence that he was actually an Egyptian double agent. US statesman Henry Kissinger assisted the ruse by feigning surprise at Sadat’s move, which had actually been coordinated with him at the Moscow Summit, and concealing this from others in the administration as well as from Israel.


Author(s):  
Barry Buzan ◽  
Lene Hansen

International security studies (ISS) has significantly evolved from its founding core of “golden age” strategic studies. From the onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s through to the 1970s, strategic studies virtually was ISS, and remains a very large part of it. The fact that it continues to stand as the “mainstream” attacked by widening/deepening approaches further speaks to its status as a “core.” This core consists of those literatures whose principal concern is external military threats to the state, and the whole agenda of the use of force which arises from that. This core was originally focused on nuclear weapons and the military-political rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union, but has since adapted its focus to changes in the salience and nature of military threats caused by the end of the Cold War and 9/11. It includes literatures on deterrence, arms racing, arms control and disarmament, grand strategy, wars (and “new wars”), the use of force, nuclear proliferation, military technology, and terrorism. Debates within ISS are structured, either implicitly or explicitly, by five questions: (1) which referent object to adopt, (2) whether to understand security as internally or externally driven, (3) whether to limit it to the military sector or to expand it, (4) what fundamental thinking about (international) politics to adopt, and (5) which epistemology and methodology to choose.


2005 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
VASSILIS K. FOUSKAS

Scholarly research to date has analysed the Cyprus issue from the perspective of Greek–Turkish relations, suggesting that the United States was attempting to strike a balance between them in order to safeguard the cohesion of NATO's southern flank during the cold war. This article, without undermining the validity of previous historical findings on the issue, nevertheless constitutes an attempt to move towards a differing research agenda: it locates Cyprus in the Middle Eastern theatre and suggests that the Yom Kippur war of October 1973 may have more linkages to the Cyprus crisis of summer 1974 than one may at first sight discern.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Dan Stone

Abstract After the Second World War, the International Tracing Service's Child Search Branch (CSB) responded to inquiries for missing children and, until 1950 when funding was stopped, searched for children ‘in the field’. As the Cold War set in, the US military authorities restricted the opportunities for such children, mostly Eastern European, to be removed from their German foster parents and returned to their countries of origin. In the spring of 1948, when tensions between the CSB fieldworkers and the military authorities were at their height, ITS appointed an experienced fieldworker, Charlotte Babinski, to investigate cases of children in German foster homes with a view to streamlining policy regarding child removal. Despite her findings, as monetary and geopolitical pressures increased, the CSB had to accept that many children of Eastern European origin would remain in Germany. Children were thus a battleground in the early Cold War, in which politics triumphed over ethics.


1999 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 721-725 ◽  
Author(s):  
JASON RALPH

Alan Collins is to be congratulated for highlighting the role Gorbachev’s strategy of Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction (GRIT) played in ending the military conflict between East and West. By offering an alternative view to the conservative opinion that America’s material strength forced the Soviets into submission, it suggests that statesmen caught in security dilemmas have real options and are not simply forced to compete for power. As a policy that fostered transparency which assisted the creation of security regimes, GRIT undoubtedly played a role in the way the military conflict ended. Yet the Cold War was not simply about the military balance. Collins’ account of this period is restricted by his bias towards state-centric and rationalist explanations of state behaviour. He underestimates the role ideology played in ending the Cold War and as such only offers half a Cold War story. The influence of the US during this period, as a cautious agent of liberal individualism, is completely ignored, yet, as this reply demonstrates, it is crucial to understanding the way the US reciprocated Soviet policies. Moreover, if ‘debate over what the Cold War was is part of the politics of deciding what the post-Cold War is’, the significance of this criticism is not merely academic. The implication of Collins’ unwritten assumption that state’s identities are egoistic is that a security community based on a common identity is impossible. The lesson that the Cold War, as opposed to the military conflict, only ended when a common identity based on liberal individualism was instituted, suggests that a transatlantic security community including Russia was and still is a possibility.


2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Butler

Abstract. The polities of Canada and the United States are purportedly engaged in the process of value convergence; however, with regard to the legitimacy of foreign military intervention, divergence seems a more apt characterization. This research explores whether the current discord between Canada and the US reflects an aberration, or a realization of entrenched normative differences, over what justifies the use of military force. A series of regression models tests the hypothesis that justice considerations prompted the military interventions of both the US and Canada during the Cold War. The results herein fail to confirm this hypothesis, and in the process highlight the ways in which each country employed ‘justice’ selectively in the service of broader foreign policy objectives.Résumé. Les constitutions politiques des États-Unis et du Canada sont supposées tendre vers des valeurs communes; cependant, en ce qui concerne la reconnaissance de la légitimité des interventions militaires à l'étranger, la divergence semble être une caractérisation plus juste. Cette recherche explore si le désaccord actuel entre les États-Unis et le Canada reflète une certaine aberration ou la réalisation de différences profondément ancrées, concernant la justification de l'utilisation de la force militaire. Une série de modèles régressifs teste l'hypothèse selon laquelle des considérations de justice ont provoqué les interventions militaires des États-Unis et du Canada durant la guerre froide. Les résultats infirment cette hypothèse, et soulignent, en même temps, les façons dont chacun des deux pays a employé la “ justice ” de manière sélective pour servir des objectifs plus vastes de politique extérieure.


2008 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sharad Chari ◽  
Katherine Verdery

Lenin spoke at the Second Congress of 1920 to multiple audiences. In continuity with the First International, he spoke in the utopian language of Bolshevism, of the successful revolutionary proletariat that had taken the state and was making its place in history without the intercession of bourgeois class rule. Recognizing the limits of socialism in one country surrounded by the military and economic might of “World imperialism,” however, Lenin also pressed for a broader, ongoing world-historic anti-imperialism in alliance with the oppressed of the East, who, it seemed, were neither sufficiently proletarianized, nor, as yet, subjects of history. There are many ways to situate this particular moment in Lenin's thought. One can see the budding conceits of Marxist social history, or “history from below,” in which millions in the East could become historical subjects under the sign of “anti-imperialism.” One can also see this gesture to those outside the pale as a flourish of the emergent Soviet empire, and as a projection of anxieties about Bolshevik control over a vast and varied Russian countryside with its own internal enemies. But Lenin also spoke to audiences who would make up the next, Third International, like the Indian Marxist M. N. Roy, who saw imperialism dividing the world into oppressed and oppressor nations. For this Third Worldist audience, looking increasingly to the new Soviet Union for material and military support for “national self-determination,” Lenin extends the historic mission of a future world socialism.


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