Epilogue
This chapter poses for future study the question why, after at least initial success of the Soviet-supported Egyptian offensive, the rift between Cairo and Moscow that did not occur, as widely believed, in the summer of 1972 did develop gradually after the Yom Kippur War, with Egypt moving into the US camp in the Cold War. Unlike the present book’s challenge to many conventional assumptions about the 1967-1973 period, here the widespread concept appears to be borne out that once Egyptian President Anwar Sadat opted for peace, he needed US influence with Israel as much as he needed Soviet military support for the military achievement which he required as a precondition. Moscow was involved in the first stages of postwar settlement, such as the reopening of the Suez Canal and the Geneva peace conference. But it was edged out of the subsequent process and did its best to back its remaining allies, mainly Syria and Palestinian groups, in opposing the Israeli-Egyptian peace as far as backing attempts on Sadat’s life.