Tracing Reasoning Processes

Author(s):  
Stephanie Dornschneider

This chapter presents the computational model developed to analyze the data constructed by the textual analysis. The model formalizes belief systems as Boolean circuits to systematically trace reasoning processes that connect various types of beliefs to decisions about participating in the Arab Spring (belief → belief → . . . → decision). The model permits the systematic analysis of the data to identify key beliefs and inferences related to decisions. The author first discusses how this model contributes to existing studies of belief systems and then describes the model in detail. The chapter thus sets the stage for the next chapter, which presents the results.

Author(s):  
Stephanie Dornschneider

This chapter describes the research design—a double-paired comparison of protestors and non-protestors from Egypt and Morocco—and discusses how this design serves the investigation of mobilization for the Arab Spring. The chapter introduces the two case studies, Egypt and Morocco, and the research sample of 121 individuals, which was obtained from ethnographic interviews during field research in the Middle East, and a textual analysis of Facebook posts (in Arabic and French). The author observes that although Egypt and Morocco have similar features, they experienced opposite outcomes of the Arab Spring. Both were authoritarian, elaborated mobilization structures, and were suffering from economic hardship. Yet only Egypt experienced protests leading to the fall of its head of state.


Author(s):  
Andrey Korotayev ◽  
Ilya Medvedev ◽  
Elena Slinko ◽  
Sergey Shulgin

The article provides a systematic review of the main, existing methodologies of the global monitoring and forecasting of socio-political destabilization. A systematic analysis of the correlation between the forecasts of destabilization generated by these systems and the actual levels of destabilization observed in the respective countries has been carried out. The analysis shows that the forecast, based on the assumption that the level of destabilization in each country in the following year will be proportional to the actual level of destabilization of the current year, turns out, in all cases, to be more predictive than the forecasts made on the basis of any of the considered indices of the risk of destabilization (at least for all cases when the relevant forecasts were published). At the same time, it is shown that, before the Arab Spring, the indices we considered still performed some useful function, allowing us to identify not so much countries with a high risk of destabilization as those countries with particularly low risks of this kind. However, in 2010–2011, all destabilization risk indices had a very serious failure. High index values not only turned out to be not-very-good predictors of a high degree of the actual destabilization in 2011, but also low index values turned out to be bad predictors of a low degree of actual destabilization. As a result, all destabilization risk indices in 2010/2011 showed extremely low statistically-insignificant correlations between the expected and observed levels of destabilization, which can be attributed to the anomalous wave of 2011 launched by the events of the Arab Spring. As we have shown in several ways, the predictive ability of indices had been restored to some extent, again becoming statistically significant after 2011, but it has not returned to the level observed before the Arab Spring. This confirms the conclusions of our previous work that the Arab Spring in 2011 acted as a trigger for the global phase transition, resulting in the World System changing into a qualitatively new state in which we observe some new patterns that were not taken into account by the systems developed before the Arab Spring. Thus, the existing systems of forecasting the risks of socio-political destabilization have lost the last “competitive advantages” over the method of simple extrapolation. There are grounds to believe that the pandemic of the coronavirus infection COVID-19 may lead to an additional decrease in the prognostic ability of the indices we have examined. All this, of course, suggests the need to develop a new generation of systems for forecasting the risks of socio-political destabilization.


Author(s):  
Stephanie Dornschneider

This chapter introduces the main research puzzle and the analytical framework of the book. To determine what motivated people to mobilize for the Arab Spring, the analysis applies belief systems and traces the reasoning processes of protesters and non-protesters. The chapter discusses what this application adds to the psychology literature on reasoning as well as the political science literature on contentious politics. The chapter outlines the main argument presented by the analysis—that mobilization for the uprisings was hot, meaning people decided to join the Arab Spring based on reasoning processes including emotions, whereas non-participation was cool, meaning people decided to refrain from joining the protests based on reasoning processes not including emotions.


Author(s):  
Efstratia Arampatzi ◽  
Martijn Burger ◽  
Elena Ianchovichina ◽  
Tina Röhricht ◽  
Ruut Veenhoven
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (6) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Muhannad Al Janabi Al Janabi

Since late 2010 and early 2011, the Arab region has witnessed mass protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Bahrain and other countries that have been referred to in the political, media and other literature as the Arab Spring. These movements have had a profound effect on the stability of the regimes Which took place against it, as leaders took off and contributed to radical reforms in party structures and public freedoms and the transfer of power, but it also contributed to the occurrence of many countries in an internal spiral, which led to the erosion of the state from the inside until it became a prominent feature of the Arab) as is the case in Syria, Libya, Yemen and Iraq.


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