The Concept of Norm-Governed Productivity
The chapter subjects the Chicago school to critique. It starts by reviewing the different views of Coasian thought that were reviewed in Part I. This chapter offers a third approach, which brings Coase’s overlooked views about moral psychology to bear on the question of the corporation. In this view, it is the cultivation of cooperative social norms, not the contractual allocation of governing rights, that allows firms to economize on market failures. This idea is referred to as “norm-governed productivity.” According to this view, firms are not “privately owned markets,” nor do they merely alter people’s decision-making through coercion or incentives; instead, firms work by altering preferences in order to foster cooperative relationships. This conception of corporate efficiency invites the moral question as to whether the relationships being cultivated are good or bad, a question that cannot be short-circuited by the economist’s recourse to choice and preference.