Rawls on Economic Liberty and the Choice of Systems of Social Cooperation

John Rawls ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 109-122
Author(s):  
Alan Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Social Systems ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Market Socialism ◽  
Economic Liberty ◽  
Classical Liberal ◽  
Democratic Control ◽  
Formal Equality ◽  
The Difference

Classical liberals argue Rawls fails to give sufficient weight to economic liberty. This paper argues that these classical liberals are mistaken. We know that Rawls took seriously Marx’s critique that the merely formal equality guaranteed by the basic liberties principle was de facto undermined by the material inequality permitted by the difference principle. As a response to Marx, Rawls believed that his principles could be fully specified in only one of two forms: liberal market socialism or property-owning democracy. Each fully specified system disperses capital so as to bring it under democratic control. Furthermore, within each system, economic liberties are robustly protected in a stable way. The classical liberal critique misfires as it takes only a part of his view to be the whole and neglects the full specification of these principles in one or another of Rawls’s preferred social systems.

scholarly journals Central Banking in Rawls’s Property-Owning Democracy

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (5) ◽  
pp. 674-698 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jens van ’t Klooster
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Federal Reserve ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Central Banking ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
The Us ◽  
Democratic Control ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Government

The dramatic events of the crisis have reignited debates on the independence of central banks and the scope of their mandates. In this article, I contribute to the normative understanding of these developments by discussing John Rawls’s position in debates of the 1950s and 1960s on the independence of the US Federal Reserve. Rawls’s account of the central bank in his property-owning democracy, Democratic Central Banking (DCB), assigns authority over monetary policy directly to the government and prioritizes low unemployment over price stability. I contrast DCB with Central Bank Independence (CBI), which requires that the central bank is independent of the government and pursues low inflation. I evaluate DCB by asking whether justice as fairness requires democratic control of the central bank and argue that it does not. Instead, so I argue, the choice between DCB and CBI should be justified in terms of the difference principle. By reflecting on central banking in a property-owning democracy, I cast new light on the Rawlsian realistic utopia of a just capitalist society, while also investigating democratic objections to today’s independent central banks.

Introduction

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Freeman
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Economic Systems ◽  
Classical Liberalism ◽  
Market Socialism ◽  
Central Values ◽  
Moral Conception ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

This introductory chapter begins with a discussion of liberalism, which is best understood as an expansive, philosophical notion. Liberalism is a collection of political, social, and economic doctrines and institutions that encompasses classical liberalism, left liberalism, liberal market socialism, and certain central values. This chapter then introduces subsequent chapters, which are divided into three parts. Part I, “Liberalism, Libertarianism, and Economic Justice,” clarifies the distinction between classical liberalism and the high liberal tradition and their relation to capitalism, and then argues that libertarianism is not a liberal view. Part II, “Distributive Justice and the Difference Principle,” analyzes and applies John Rawls’s principles of justice to economic systems and private law. Part III, “Liberal Institutions and Distributive Justice,” focuses on the crucial role of liberal institutions and procedures in determinations of distributive justice and addresses why the first principles of a moral conception of justice should presuppose general facts in their justification.

The Difference Principle, Capitalism, and Property-Owning Democracy

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-172
Author(s):  
Andrew Lister
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Main Idea ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Income Growth ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Difference

Abstract Jason Brennan and John Tomasi have argued that if we focus on income alone, the Difference Principle supports welfare-state capitalism over property-owning democracy, because capitalism maximizes long run income growth for the worst off. If so, the defense of property-owning democracy rests on the priority of equal opportunity for political influence and social advancement over raising the income of the worst off, or on integrating workplace control into the Difference Principle’s index of advantage. The thesis of this paper is that even based on income alone, the Difference Principle is not as hostile to property-owning democracy as it may seem, because the Difference Principle should not be interpreted to require maximizing long run income growth. The main idea is that it is unfair to make the present worst off accept inequality that doesn’t benefit them, for the sake of benefitting the future worst off, if the future worst off will be better off than they are anyway.

The Place of the Market in a Rawlsian Economy

2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jahel Queralt
Keyword(s):  
Economic System ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Instrumental Value ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Just Society

AbstractRawls identifies only two arrangements, the liberal socialist regime and the property-owning democracy, as being compatible with justice. Both are market-based economies, suggesting that a just society must include the market. This article questions this idea by looking at three Rawlsian arguments in favour of the market. Two arguments, which link the market to certain basic liberties, are unsound because the market is shown to be nonessential in protecting these liberties. A third argument points at the instrumental value of the market to make the least advantaged as well off as possible. R. is based on an interpretation of the difference principle in which justice requires maximizing the position of the worst off within the most productive economic system. Although commonly accepted, this reading of the principle should be questioned, and thus the third argument is also inconclusive.

Are Special Education Programs Unjust to Nondisabled Children?: Justice, Equality, and the Distribution of Education

1998 ◽  
Vol 180 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Nathanson
Keyword(s):  
Special Education ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Special Needs ◽  
Children With Disabilities ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Education Programs ◽  
Social Consensus ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Philosophical Standpoint ◽  
The Difference

This article deals in depth with perhaps the most troubling education issue of the day—funding and proper distribution of educational resources. How is the money raised and how is its allocation decided? Can the ideals of both justice and equality be served? Is “extra” spending on behalf of children with special needs justified? Stephen Nathanson raises the central questions and, approaching them from a moral-philosophical standpoint, presents and evaluates the arguments of those who defend extra spending for children with disabilities and those who believe that “unequal” spending violates the principle of justice. Nathanson treats various theories of distributive justice—entitlement, utilitarianism, the “difference principle,” and the “decent level” idea. In focusing on the latter, he contends that social consensus developed around “decent level” may be the touchstone, more helpful than any rationale (or rhetoric) in satisfying the claims of justice and equality.

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