Chain-Connnection, Close-knitness, and the Difference Principle

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hun Chung
Keyword(s):  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Difference

The Difference Principle, Capitalism, and Property-Owning Democracy

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-172
Author(s):  
Andrew Lister
Keyword(s):  
Welfare State ◽  
Equal Opportunity ◽  
Main Idea ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Income Growth ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
State Capitalism ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Difference

Abstract Jason Brennan and John Tomasi have argued that if we focus on income alone, the Difference Principle supports welfare-state capitalism over property-owning democracy, because capitalism maximizes long run income growth for the worst off. If so, the defense of property-owning democracy rests on the priority of equal opportunity for political influence and social advancement over raising the income of the worst off, or on integrating workplace control into the Difference Principle’s index of advantage. The thesis of this paper is that even based on income alone, the Difference Principle is not as hostile to property-owning democracy as it may seem, because the Difference Principle should not be interpreted to require maximizing long run income growth. The main idea is that it is unfair to make the present worst off accept inequality that doesn’t benefit them, for the sake of benefitting the future worst off, if the future worst off will be better off than they are anyway.

The Place of the Market in a Rawlsian Economy

2013 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jahel Queralt
Keyword(s):  
Economic System ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Instrumental Value ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Just Society

AbstractRawls identifies only two arrangements, the liberal socialist regime and the property-owning democracy, as being compatible with justice. Both are market-based economies, suggesting that a just society must include the market. This article questions this idea by looking at three Rawlsian arguments in favour of the market. Two arguments, which link the market to certain basic liberties, are unsound because the market is shown to be nonessential in protecting these liberties. A third argument points at the instrumental value of the market to make the least advantaged as well off as possible. R. is based on an interpretation of the difference principle in which justice requires maximizing the position of the worst off within the most productive economic system. Although commonly accepted, this reading of the principle should be questioned, and thus the third argument is also inconclusive.

Are Special Education Programs Unjust to Nondisabled Children?: Justice, Equality, and the Distribution of Education

1998 ◽  
Vol 180 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Nathanson
Keyword(s):  
Special Education ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Special Needs ◽  
Children With Disabilities ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Education Programs ◽  
Social Consensus ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Philosophical Standpoint ◽  
The Difference

This article deals in depth with perhaps the most troubling education issue of the day—funding and proper distribution of educational resources. How is the money raised and how is its allocation decided? Can the ideals of both justice and equality be served? Is “extra” spending on behalf of children with special needs justified? Stephen Nathanson raises the central questions and, approaching them from a moral-philosophical standpoint, presents and evaluates the arguments of those who defend extra spending for children with disabilities and those who believe that “unequal” spending violates the principle of justice. Nathanson treats various theories of distributive justice—entitlement, utilitarianism, the “difference principle,” and the “decent level” idea. In focusing on the latter, he contends that social consensus developed around “decent level” may be the touchstone, more helpful than any rationale (or rhetoric) in satisfying the claims of justice and equality.

Rawls on Economic Liberty and the Choice of Systems of Social Cooperation

John Rawls ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 109-122
Author(s):  
Alan Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Social Systems ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Market Socialism ◽  
Economic Liberty ◽  
Classical Liberal ◽  
Democratic Control ◽  
Formal Equality ◽  
The Difference

Classical liberals argue Rawls fails to give sufficient weight to economic liberty. This paper argues that these classical liberals are mistaken. We know that Rawls took seriously Marx’s critique that the merely formal equality guaranteed by the basic liberties principle was de facto undermined by the material inequality permitted by the difference principle. As a response to Marx, Rawls believed that his principles could be fully specified in only one of two forms: liberal market socialism or property-owning democracy. Each fully specified system disperses capital so as to bring it under democratic control. Furthermore, within each system, economic liberties are robustly protected in a stable way. The classical liberal critique misfires as it takes only a part of his view to be the whole and neglects the full specification of these principles in one or another of Rawls’s preferred social systems.

Justice in a Market Economy

2006 ◽  
pp. 60-76
Author(s):  
Robert A. Schultz
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principle Of Justice ◽  
Fair Equality Of Opportunity ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Principles Of Justice

As we saw from the last two chapters, the ethical IT professional is embedded in contexts of management, organization, and society. Ethical behavior for the IT professional is, therefore, impacted by the ethics of people and institutions in his or her environment. The primary term for ethical institutions is justice.1 In the next three chapters, we will examine the justice of institutions impacting the IT professional. The framework used will be that provided by the works of John Rawls (1999, 2001). Rawls’ work is based on the idea of a social contract, that a justly ordered society is one to which individuals can freely decide to obligate themselves. But our decision will very likely be biased if we base it on our current situation. So Rawls’ major addition is to say that the decision must be made prior to being in society, without knowledge of what our position will be in society, and it will be a decision we will be obligated to stick to and expect others to make and stick to as well. The basic principles for society chosen in this position (which Rawls calls the original position) will be the Principles of Justice. According to Rawls (1999, 2001), there will be two: 1. The First Principle of Justice or Greatest Equal Liberty: Society is to be arranged so that all members have the greatest equal liberty possible for all, including fair equality of opportunity. Each individual has basic liberties which are not to be compromised or traded off for other benefits. Besides the basic freedoms such as freedom of speech, assembly, religion, and so on, it includes equality of opportunity. Thus society’s rules are not biased against anyone in it and allow all to pursue their interests and realize their abilities. 2. The Second Principle of Justice or the Difference Principle: Economic inequalities in society are justified insofar as they make members of the least advantaged social class, better off than if there were no inequality. The social contract basis for this principle is straightforward: If you are entering a society with no knowledge of your specific place in that society, the Difference Principle guarantees that you will be no worse off than you need to be to keep the society functioning.

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