Dynamics Of Hydropolitics Sustaining Conflict And Catalyzing Cooperation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott M. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Water Resources ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Political Support ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Opportunity Structure ◽  
Political Opportunity ◽  
Opportunity Structure ◽  
Economic Relationships ◽  
Subnational Conflict ◽  
Sectional Identity

As noted in the Introduction, it is far from clear why subnational jurisdictions like states and provinces would choose to fight over water, especially for prolonged periods of time. Enmeshed in deep political, social, and economic relationships, these jurisdictions and the politicians who lead them would seem to have much more to gain from cooperation than conflict. In this chapter, I explain the emer¬gence and persistence of subnational conflict and cooperation over water in terms of two oppositional factors, sectional identity and political opportunity structure. As I describe further in this chapter, persistent interjurisdictional water conflict usually results from the conflation of shared water resources and sectional identity. In particular, subnational political leaders often seek to gain political support from geographically concentrated ethnic, linguistic, or other groups by alleging that neighboring groups are effectively stealing water at their constituents’ expense. Because of the unique economic importance and emotional resonance of water, such allegations are highly effective in mobilizing political support, and successive subnational politicians can find it expedient to engage in confrontational rather than cooperative behavior. Using water as a tool for political mobilization can also help subnational politicians achieve other objectives, including enhancing their autonomy, distracting from other political challenges, and outflanking opposition parties. On the other hand, where the political opportunity structure in a given country enables third parties to form alliances with national political elites, these alliances create a constituency for strong interjurisdictional institutions that can prevent and resolve conflicts over shared water resources. This chapter proceeds in three sections. First, it explains how the conflation of sectional identity and shared water resources sustains interjurisdictional conflict over long periods of time. The desire of subnational politicians and geographically concentrated water user groups to seek broader support for their objectives leads them to link water-sharing issues to sectional identity. The second section describes how, provided they enjoy access to the political process, third parties can help to induce collective action in shared river basins.

How Students on College Campuses Created Opportunities for Workers in Sweatshops

Contention ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-52
Author(s):  
Matthew S. Williams
Keyword(s):  
Social Context ◽  
College Campuses ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Opportunity Structure ◽  
Political Opportunity ◽  
Opportunity Structure ◽  
College Administrators ◽  
Political Opportunities ◽  
Apparel Companies ◽  
A Chain

Political opportunity structure (POS) refers to how the larger social context, such as repression, shapes a social movement’s chances of success. Most work on POS looks at how movements deal with the political opportunities enabling and/or constraining them. This article looks at how one group of social movement actors operating in a more open POS alters the POS for a different group of actors in a more repressive environment through a chain of indirect leverage—how United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) uses the more open POS on college campuses to create new opportunities for workers in sweatshop factories. USAS exerts direct leverage over college administrators through protests, pushing them to exert leverage over major apparel companies through the licensing agreements schools have with these companies.

Political Opportunities for Participation and China’s Leadership Transition

2020 ◽  
pp. 59-86
Author(s):  
Diana Fu ◽  
Greg Distelhorst
Keyword(s):  
Political Participation ◽  
Disruptive Behavior ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Leadership Transition ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Opportunity Structure ◽  
Political Opportunity ◽  
Opportunity Structure ◽  
Political Opportunities ◽  
Institutional Participation

How does China manage political participation? This chapter analyzes changing opportunities for participation in the leadership transition from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping. Contentious political participation—where individuals and independent organizations engage in protest and other disruptive behavior—has been further curtailed under Xi’s leadership. Yet institutional participation by ordinary citizens through quasi-democratic institutions appears unaffected and is even trending up in certain sectors. Manipulation of the political opportunity structure is likely strategic behavior on the part of authoritarian rulers, as they seek to incorporate or appease the discontented. The political opportunity structure in non-democracies is therefore multifaceted: one channel of participation can close as others expand.

Mass Repression and Political Loyalty: Evidence from Stalin’s ‘Terror by Hunger’

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (2) ◽  
pp. 569-583 ◽  
Author(s):  
ARTURAS ROZENAS ◽  
YURI M. ZHUKOV
Keyword(s):  
Political Behavior ◽  
Agricultural Policy ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Opportunity Structure ◽  
Political Opportunity ◽  
Opportunity Structure ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Short And Long Term ◽  
Micro Level

States use repression to enforce obedience, but repression—especially if it is violent, massive, and indiscriminate—often incites opposition. Why does repression have such disparate effects? We address this question by studying the political legacy of Stalin’s coercive agricultural policy and collective punishment campaign in Ukraine, which led to the death by starvation of over three million people in 1932–34. Using rich micro-level data on eight decades of local political behavior, we find that communities exposed to Stalin’s “terror by hunger” behaved more loyally toward Moscow when the regime could credibly threaten retribution in response to opposition. In times when this threat of retribution abated, the famine-ridden communities showed more opposition to Moscow, both short- and long-term. Thus, repression can both deter and inflame opposition, depending on the political opportunity structure in which post-repression behavior unfolds.

Hollow parties and their movement-ization: The populist conundrum

2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (9-10) ◽  
pp. 1084-1105
Author(s):  
Jean L. Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Social Movements ◽  
Political Parties ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Opportunity Structure ◽  
Political Opportunity ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Opportunity Structure ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Western Democracies

This article focuses on the relationship between social movements and political parties in the context of populist challenges to constitutional democracy. There are many reasons for the current plight of democracy but I focus here on one aspect: the decline of mainstream political parties, the emergence of new forms of populist movement parties and the general crisis of political representation in long consolidated Western democracies. This article analyses the specific political logic and dynamics of social movements – the logic of influence, and distinguishes it from that of political parties – the logic of power. It addresses transformations in movements, parties and their relationships. It looks at the shifts in movement and party types that constitute the political opportunity structure for the emergence of new populist movement party forms and relationships, focusing on the hollowing out and movement-ization of political parties. Contemporary populist movement parties are not the cause of the hollowing out or movement-ization of political parties. Rather they are a response to the crisis of political representation exemplified by hollow parties and cartel parties. But it is my thesis that thanks to its specific logic, populism fosters the worst version of movement party relationships, undermining the democratic functions of both.

Nepal: Tarai/Madhesh Movements and Political Elites

2020 ◽  
pp. 002190962095488
Author(s):  
Abi Chamlagai
Keyword(s):  
Social Movements ◽  
Social Movement ◽  
Structure Theory ◽  
Federal State ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Elites ◽  
Political Opportunity Structure ◽  
Political Opportunity ◽  
Opportunity Structure

The purpose of this article is to compare Nepal’s two Tarai/Madhesh Movements using the political opportunity structure theory of social movements. Tarai/Madhesh Movement I launched by the Forum for Madheshi People’s Rights in 2007 became successful as Nepal became a federal state. Tarai/Madhesh Movement II launched by the United Democratic Madheshi Front of the Tarai/Madheshi parties and the Tharuhat Joint Struggle Committee of the Tharu organizations failed as political elites disagreed about the need to create two provinces in the Tarai/Madhesh. While Tarai/Madhesh Movement II confirms that a social movement is more likely to fail when political elites align against it, Tarai/Madhesh Movement II refutes the theoretical proposition. Tarai/Madhesh Movement I suggests that the sucess of a social movement is more likely despite the alignment of political elites against it if its central demand consistently sustains the support of its constituents.

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