Elites, Civil Society, and Inclusive Institution-Building in the Republic of France

The Republic of France is in many ways the archetype of the centralized, unitary state, and its political institutions contrast sharply with those of the federations of India and the United States. Following the Revolution of 1789, the new republic undertook a series of political reforms intended to strip power from the landed nobility and vest it instead with a new set of egalitarian institutions, the basis of which was both centralization and uniformity. The revolutionaries believed that “justice requires the republic to be one and indivisible” (Berger 1974, 8). Inherent to this new model was a concentration of political authority, as well as political, legislative, and judicial powers, in the hands of the central government. In contrast to more decentralized and federal political systems, the French system is intended to tightly bind officials at both central and local levels and to minimize conflicts between them. Consequently, a defining feature of French political institutions is the relative cohesion of elite decision-making. According to one prominent observer, France “provides the prime example of a highly coherent administration, whereas the United States and Switzerland constitute the typical cases of lack of such coherence” (Kriesi 1995, 171). However, during the past thirty years even the French state has become more decentralized, and powers and responsibilities for some policy areas, including water resource management, have been devolved to regional governments. In comparative perspective, the outstanding feature of the French political system is in fact the presence of strong regional governance organizations, including several organized around river basin boundaries, that are among the world’s most successful interjurisdictional management institutions. France’s system of river basin governance organizations, called “water agencies” (agences de l’eau), is by many accounts the most collaborative and participatory in the world. A global survey of river basin governance institutions concludes, for example, that the French system “is remarkable for its longevity, in how it tries to formalize representation . . . and perhaps most important, how it has attempted local and decentralized water management within the centralist state tradition in France” (Delli Priscoli 2007, 17).

Over Water

The preceding chapters have emphasized the often unappreciated extent to which subnational jurisdictions engage in behaviors that resemble those of sovereign nation-states with respect to shared water resources. The United States, the world’s first modern federation, provides perhaps the clearest illustration of how institutional arrangements create the conditions for such behavior to be exercised. Even in comparison to other federal systems, the U.S. Constitution grants an unusual degree of power to state governments. This asymmetry is codified in the Constitution’s Tenth Amendment, which assigns all powers not specifically granted to the federal government to the states instead. The greater power of American states, even relative to their counterparts in other federal systems, is also reflected in the fact that they maintain not only independent executive and legislative bodies but also judiciaries, a feature that has resulted in the uniquely complicated American legal system wherein different states recognize different bodies of law, especially in the case of water rights (Watts 2008). Despite this fundamental asymmetry, the power of the federal government relative to the states has grown over time, especially following the expansion of federal authority during the New Deal era (Sharansky 1970; Elazar 1984; Zimmerman 2011). The United States also lacks several of the mechanisms that ensure a greater degree of coordination and cooperation between states in other federal systems. In particular, the United States lacks the prominent intergovernmental organizations, like the Council of Australian Governments, that are a feature of many other federal systems and that help to address interjurisdictional issues like water resource management. Hydropolitics in the United States presents a twofold puzzle. First, unlike the other countries examined in this book, the United States features a notable diversity of institutional models for governing its river basins. While many American river basins, including the Colorado, are governed either by a patchwork of institutions or by none at all, organizations like the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC) represent some of the most powerful river basin governance institutions in the world (Delli Priscoli 2007).

Dynamics Of Hydropolitics Sustaining Conflict And Catalyzing Cooperation

As noted in the Introduction, it is far from clear why subnational jurisdictions like states and provinces would choose to fight over water, especially for prolonged periods of time. Enmeshed in deep political, social, and economic relationships, these jurisdictions and the politicians who lead them would seem to have much more to gain from cooperation than conflict. In this chapter, I explain the emer¬gence and persistence of subnational conflict and cooperation over water in terms of two oppositional factors, sectional identity and political opportunity structure. As I describe further in this chapter, persistent interjurisdictional water conflict usually results from the conflation of shared water resources and sectional identity. In particular, subnational political leaders often seek to gain political support from geographically concentrated ethnic, linguistic, or other groups by alleging that neighboring groups are effectively stealing water at their constituents’ expense. Because of the unique economic importance and emotional resonance of water, such allegations are highly effective in mobilizing political support, and successive subnational politicians can find it expedient to engage in confrontational rather than cooperative behavior. Using water as a tool for political mobilization can also help subnational politicians achieve other objectives, including enhancing their autonomy, distracting from other political challenges, and outflanking opposition parties. On the other hand, where the political opportunity structure in a given country enables third parties to form alliances with national political elites, these alliances create a constituency for strong interjurisdictional institutions that can prevent and resolve conflicts over shared water resources. This chapter proceeds in three sections. First, it explains how the conflation of sectional identity and shared water resources sustains interjurisdictional conflict over long periods of time. The desire of subnational politicians and geographically concentrated water user groups to seek broader support for their objectives leads them to link water-sharing issues to sectional identity. The second section describes how, provided they enjoy access to the political process, third parties can help to induce collective action in shared river basins.

Deconstructing the State: Subnational Conflict and Cooperation over Water

The concept of hydropolitics outlined in the Introduction defines conflict and cooperation over water as part of a set of interactions that occur at both international and subnational levels. On this definition, conflicts between states, provinces, or municipalities differ in degree from those that occur between countries but not necessarily in kind. Indeed, as this chapter details, there are many more similarities than differences between international and subnational hydropolitics. But reconceptualizing hydropolitics as a continuum rather than a dichotomy between international and subnational levels requires considerable elaboration, which this chapter attempts in three sections. The first seeks to better define subnational hydropolitics by comparing and contrasting it with its international equivalent, noting in particular a long-term trend toward greater institutionalized cooperation at the international, but not necessarily the subnational, level. The second explains this divergence by exploring the many constraints that central governments face in attempting to manage water resources, especially when political power is decentralized. As this section demonstrates, contrary to popular belief, shared water resources can be difficult to manage even when they are contained within the same country. Finally, the third builds on this conceptual foundation by adding an empirical survey of subnational hydropolitics in ten countries, in the process sketching its three basic dimensions: interjurisdictional, intergovernmental, and state–society relationships. In reconceptualizing hydropolitics along these lines, this chapter attempts to address the first of the key questions raised in the Introduction, namely why interjurisdictional collective action in shared river basins can be equally or even more difficult at the subnational than the international level. The answer has much to do with the often unappreciated limits of the state in managing shared water resources—and the likewise unrecognized role that subnational political elites can play in hindering its involvement. But states are not without their advantages: as Chapter 3 details, they can offer third parties opportunities to support cooperation instead of conflict.

conclusion

Arizona governor B.B. Moeur’s 1934 declaration of martial law to prevent construction of a dam to supply California with water now belongs to history. The open political conflict that characterized the early relationship between the states of the Colorado River basin has given way to extensive cooperation, even as water scarcity poses an ever–greater challenge for management of the basin’s water resources. Yet halfway around the world, in India, history threatens to repeat itself. In April 2013, the Indian press reported a most unusual case of espionage: the police in Kerala, a southern state engaged in a long–running river basin dispute with the adjacent state of Tamil Nadu, announced that they had uncovered a spy working on behalf of their neighbor, who they charged had “developed a wide network with officials and ministers to source vital info regarding Kerala’s stand on interstate water issues” (Express News Service 2013). Both the 1934 invocation of martial law and the more recent 2013 allegation of espionage are poignant examples of behavior common to countries but not to subnational states. Though fortunately rare, they attest to the gravity of conflict over water that occurs within countries, rather than between them. These subnational hydropolitics are both surprisingly common and conceptually puzzling, for they occur despite the existence of relationships and institutions, ranging from water ministries to political party structures, that may be expected to prevent them. This book helps to explain why water so often proves to be a focal point for political conflict within nations as well as among them. This conclusion first reprises the argument of the book and its implications, then discusses directions for future research. Finally, it offers some policy recommendations for countries like India where sustainable water resource management is undermined by extensive subnational political conflict over water. In a world where water needs are growing rapidly even as water supply variability increases due to climate change, it is critical to understand the politics of water at subnational as well as international levels—and how this understanding can be leveraged to improve water resource management.

Central Control, Localized Interests, and Interprovincial Conflict in the People’s Republic of China

From a comparative perspective, the People’s Republic of China represents perhaps the world’s most distinctive combination of political centralization and fiscal and administrative decentralization. The basic unity of the state, referred to as Dayitong (大一统), has long been seen as the organizing principle of governance in mainland China and underpins the modern system whereby decision- making is tightly concentrated at the central government level (Wang 2009). At the same time, however, the practical challenges of governing a large and diverse territory have historically led Chinese officials to delegate substantial administrative powers to subnational levels of government. Moreover, in economic terms China is one of the most decentralized countries in the world, with revenue and expenditure powers largely in the hands of local officials (Dziobek, Mangas, and Kufa 2011). Chinese officials are thus caught in an institutional matrix known as tiao-kuai (条- 块), in which they are responsible both to line control by functional bureaucracies, such as the various central government ministries, as well as to territorial government leaders, including mayors and provincial governors, and to equivalent officials within the parallel Chinese Communist Party (CCP) structure. The CCP effectively controls all important political appointments, creating a potent mechanism to ensure the coherence of central and local policy objectives (Mertha 2008). This matrix is intended to ensure that subnational officials pursue priorities set by the central government but also to provide them with the flexibility to implement these policies according to individual local circumstances. In practical terms, this flexibility also translates into autonomy in a wide range of policy areas, including water resource management. Like their counterparts in more politically decentralized countries, China’s subnational officials therefore also confront the dilemma of autonomy, and they sometimes attempt to resolve it through conflict with neighboring jurisdictions (Moore 2014a).

Ethnolinguistic Cleavages and Interstate River Disputes in the Union of India

India is one of the world’s most centralized federal systems, and its Constitution grants the federal government unusually broad powers to control the actions of state-level political leaders. At the same time, however, India’s state- level politics are highly acrimonious, particularly after the emergence of state- based ethnic political parties since the 1960s (Diksit 1975). These fractious subnational politics are mirrored in numerous interstate river disputes which the center has, despite its considerable constitutional and political powers, proven unable to resolve. As John Wood remarks, “One would think that these powers would be adequate to enable the central government to play an active mediating role in an interstate river water disputes. . . . But the central government’s maneuverability is often no greater than that of the states” (Wood 2007, 40). Indeed, the country’s interstate disputes are so acute that the former head of India’s water resource engineering agency, the Central Water Commission, warned in an opinion-editorial that “hydro-politics is threatening the very fabric of federalism” (Menon 2003). Virtually all of India’s major river basins play host to long-running interstate water disputes, primarily related to water quantity allocation. Notable disputes include most of the principal peninsular rivers, including the Mhadei, the Kaveri (Cauvery), and the Krishna basins, which predate independence. Other sites of interstate conflict include the Narmada, racked by construction of a large dam; the relatively water-rich Mahanadi; and the Sutlej–amuna Link Canal, which supplies much of New Delhi’s drinking water. Unfortunately, few of these disputes show signs of resolution in the near term. Yet as India’s economy has grown and the demands on its major rivers have multiplied, these disputes increasingly constrain the development of large sections of the country. The central puzzle of the Indian case is why interstate river disputes are both so numerous and so persistent, especially given the central government’s constitutional authority to resolve them.

Introduction: Subnational Hydropolitics

One of the lesser-known insurrections in American history occurred in 1934, when Arizona Governor B. B. Moeur declared martial law and deployed National Guardsmen armed with machine guns to prevent construction of Parker Dam, a project supported by both Congress and the Roosevelt administration. Arizona’s troops ashore were accompanied by a specially assembled group of small boats, quickly termed the “Arizona Navy,” that patrolled the waters of the Colorado River near the proposed dam’s construction site. The threat posed by the dam appeared to be crystal clear to Moeur and his fellow rebels: if Parker Dam was to be completed, California, Arizona’s downstream neighbor on the Colorado River, might secure in perpetuity preferential rights to the river’s waters, leaving too little for Arizona to satisfy its own growing needs. Moeur’s rebellion is one of the more dramatic illustrations of conflict over water that occurs within countries instead of between them. Most writing and thinking about water conflict concerns the prospect of warfare between nation-states. But while the difficulties of securing cooperation on international transboundary rivers are relatively well known and understood, Moeur’s rebellion highlights the distinctly different problem of preventing conflict on rivers shared by multiple subnational political jurisdictions, including states, provinces, prefectures, and governorates. Indeed, the problem of subnational cooperation is even more pervasive than that of international cooperation, for while many rivers are shared between countries, nearly all are shared between multiple subnational units. At the same time, even as scholars and policymakers devote growing attention to improving cooperation between countries that share common water resources, many waterways remain mired in protracted, acrimonious disputes between lower-level jurisdictions. This state of contention, which I call “subnational hydropolitics,” is often thought of as an isolated phenomenon—the result of unique historical tensions between the states of the Colorado or Murray-Darling River basin, for example. But it is in fact a systemic challenge for waterways across the globe, with common sources of conflict—as well as common solutions.

Constrained Collective Action Decentralization, Autonomy, and Institutionalized Cooperation in Shared River Basins

As noted in the Introduction, it is frequently assumed that the costs of collective action between political jurisdictions are lower when they are part of the same country. A web of shared institutions and relationships, the thinking goes, helps to lower these costs relative to the international level, where cooperation is likely to be rarer and costlier. But, as this chapter explains, where political power is extensively decentralized, considerable constraints are placed on interjurisdictional collective action. In particular, because it distributes power between different levels of government, decentralization exacerbates the interjurisdictional and intersectoral coordination problems that are inherent to water resource management. This chapter explains how existing institutions often fail to prevent and resolve interjurisdictional water conflicts. It proceeds in three sections. The first section sets the stage for this discussion by exploring in greater detail the relationship between shared institutions and conflict potential, particularly in relation to other proposed sources of water conflict like geography and scarcity. The second section explains why decentralization creates specific barriers to interjurisdictional collective action, especially at the river basin scale. In particular, bureaucratic fragmentation, electoral incentives, and information asymmetries often create disincentives to establish institutional structures for river basin management. The third section, finally, explains why, as a result, collective action in shared river basins is often ad hoc and confined to relatively simple issues like point-source pollution control, rather than more complex and contentious issues like allocation. In combination, these challenges explain why existing institutional mechanisms so often fail to prevent interjurisdictional water conflicts from arising and to resolve them once they begin. This primary purpose of this chapter is to explore the institutional dimensions of subnational hydropolitics and in particular the role of decentralization. Doing so requires first understanding how institutions influence conflict and cooperation over shared water resources, especially in contrast to factors like geography and scarcity. This section accordingly discusses the two primary theoretical traditions concerning the causes of water conflict.