The Badness of Dying Early

Author(s):  
John Broome

A common intuition suggests that it is less bad for an infant to die than for a young adult to die. This is puzzling because the infant has more life ahead of her than a young adult, so it seems she loses more when she dies. Jeff McMahan supports the common intuition and defends it by means of what he calls the “Time-Relative Interest Account” of the badness of death. I shall describe two possible interpretations of the Time-Relative Interest Account and raise a problem for each. Then I shall offer an alternative defense of the common intuition, which is an extension of the theory in population ethics known as “critical-level utilitarianism.”

Author(s):  
Tim Campbell

According to Jeff McMahan, health care professionals ought to save an individual, A, from dying as a young adult (e.g., at age 30) rather than save some other individual, B, from dying as a newborn, even if the latter intervention would give B twice as many years of full-quality life as the former intervention would give A. Call this claim Young Adults over Newborns. In this chapter, I argue that if we accept Young Adults over Newborns, then we must reject at least one of three other more plausible claims. This constitutes a strong reason to reject Young Adults over Newborns.


1998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Blackorby ◽  
Walter Bossert ◽  
David J. Donaldson

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 100343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Natalie L. James ◽  
Zoran Milijasevic ◽  
Anthony Ujhazy ◽  
Glenn Edwards ◽  
Kieri Jermyn ◽  
...  

Econometrica ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 63 (6) ◽  
pp. 1303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Blackorby ◽  
Walter Bossert ◽  
David Donaldson

2019 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  

The authors report a case of benign thoracic schwannoma developed from the intercostal nerve in a young adult discover during a random chest pain examination, with the common analgesics having no effect on that. The radiographic image shows a parietal mass on the right side. The Schwannoma’s diagnosis must be suspected in front of any subcutaneous tumor of the thorax. The accuracy of the diagnostic is histological. The total resection is the only guarantee of a complete recovery without recurrence.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-283
Author(s):  
Steven Jensen

Students in a college literature class have been formed by conflicting approaches to literary pedagogy. The Common Core Standards deemphasize formative reading in favor of close reading, post-reading analysis of literary elements. A counter-movement, with its own network of publications and workshops, emphasizes formative reading, emotional engagement, and the cultivation of adult reading habits. More grounded in reader-response theory, this approach promotes the emotional engagement and autonomy of student readers, and often makes use of young adult literature. This counter-movement, however, depends upon unspoken pre-conditions that connect it to some ancient regimes of formative reading.


Author(s):  
Terri Suico

A review of Teaching Young Adult Literature Today: Insights, Considerations, and Perspectives for the Classroom Teacher (second edition), Young Adult Nonfiction: Gateway to the Common Core, and Teaching Young Adult Literature: Integrating, Implementing, and ReImagining the Common Core by Judith A. Hayn and Jeffrey S. Kaplan. 


2021 ◽  
Vol 90 ◽  
pp. 253-276
Author(s):  
Thomas Schramme

AbstractI aim to show that the common idea according to which we can assess how bad death is for the person who dies relies on numerous dubious premises. These premises are intuitive from the point of view of dominant views regarding the badness of death. However, unless these premises have been thoroughly justified, we cannot measure the badness of death for the person who dies. In this paper, I will make explicit assumptions that pertain to the alleged level of badness of death. The most important assumption I will address is the assignment of a quantitative value of zero to death, which leads to the conclusion that there are lives not worth living for the affected person. Such a view interprets the idea of a live worth living in quantitative terms. It is in conflict with actual evaluations of relevant people of their lives.


Author(s):  
Samuel J. Kerstein

Carl Tollef Solberg and Espen Gamlund suggest that in allocating scarce, life-saving resources we ought to consider how bad death would be for those who would die if left untreated. We have moral reason, they intimate, to prioritize persons for whom death would be worse, according to the Time-Relative Interest Account of the badness of death. In response, I try to show that an allocation principle that specifies minimizing the badness of death among those vying for a life-saving resource would fail to respect the worth of persons. Solberg and Gamlund mention several other allocation principles. But, I argue, even when these others also come into play, allocations can fail to respect persons’ worth. A principle of respect for the worth (or dignity) of persons should, I contend, be employed in the allocation of scarce, life-saving resources. I sketch and apply a Kantian principle in an effort to allay the common worries that such a principle will be too vague to be useful and implausibly disallow length of future life to be a deciding factor in choosing whom to save.


1997 ◽  
Vol 77 (2) ◽  
pp. 260-284 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Blackorby ◽  
Walter Bossert ◽  
David Donaldson

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