Innovation Is a Knowledge Problem

2019 ◽  
pp. 57-72
Author(s):  
Jason Potts
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Social Process ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Cultural Foundations ◽  
Economics Of Innovation ◽  
Knowledge Problem ◽  
Use Of Knowledge

This chapter furnishes a new theoretical foundation for thinking about the economics of innovation and the innovation problem as a knowledge problem, and a collective action problem, and therefore a governance problem. The theory of the innovation commons is therefore based in new institutional economics. It builds on the analytic frameworks of four key theorists: Deirdre McCloskey on the moral and cultural foundations under which innovation can occur as an evolutionary social process; Friedrich Hayek on “use of knowledge in society,” on cultural evolution, on the ideas of both distributed knowledge and group selection; Oliver Williamson on the coordination problem of idiosyncratic investment under uncertainty and the hazards that contains; and Elinor Ostrom, who resolves the Hayek and Williamson knowledge conditions with a general solution to the collective action problem of knowledge discovery by pooling knowledge through institutional evolution.

The Innovation Problem

2019 ◽  
pp. 27-56
Author(s):  
Jason Potts
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Economic Problem ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Allocation Problems ◽  
Knowledge Problem ◽  
Definition Of

Explains the nature of the innovation problem as an economic problem in the context of economic trade and long-run growth. Distinguishes between a market failure definition of the innovation problem as an allocation problems and the innovation problem as a collective action problem of coordination and discovery. Defines the innovation commons as the zeroth phase of the innovation trajectory. Introduces the concept of discovery failure and discovery costs. This locates the argument of the book in the broader context of Schumpeterian, evolutionary, and Austrian “mainline economics” with a contextualization of the innovation problem simultaneously as both a knowledge problem and a coordination problem, and therefore as a governance problem solved with institutions.

Wissensteilung: Thünen- Vorlesung bei der Jahrestagung 2000 des Vereins für Socialpolitik, Berlin 20. September 2000

2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 445-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst Helmstädter
Keyword(s):  
Division Of Labor ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Implicit Knowledge ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Interactive Process ◽  
Important Resource ◽  
Central Notion ◽  
Knowledge Problem ◽  
The Individual

AbstractFriedrich A. Hayek’s notion of division of knowledge arouses new interest in an economy for which knowledge represents the most important resource. Hayek’s problem was how to use the knowledge scattered in society efficiently. In Hayek’s solution the prices emerging by competition play the crucial role. They indicate to the individual agents what they can do expediently for their own advantage and also for society, even though they dispose only of limited (implicit) knowledge. But which conditions must be fulfilled in order that the agents are prepared to engage in an interactive process of division of knowledge? - New Institutional Economics does not yet answer this question. It is only interested in questions of interactions in view of a division of labor. Its central notion of transaction is not appropriate for the analysis of the interactive process of division of knowledge, where sharing of knowledge matters. The contribution of the article mainly consists in the attempt to provide a New Institutional Economics basis to the division of knowledge problem. ß

scholarly journals Experiments as a Tool of Verifying Efficiency of Implicitly Agreed-Upon Market Organizations

Ekonomika ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafał M. Jakubowski ◽  
Paweł Kuśmierczyk
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Market Institutions ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Potential Market ◽  
Institutional Structures ◽  
Pareto Efficient ◽  
Market Organization

We analyse the possibility of an experimental study of the efficiency of market institutional structures. In the paper “On the new institutionalism of markets: the market as an organization” by R. Richter, the implicitly agreed upon market organization is regarded as a Nash equilibrium of a game between potential market participants. The solution of such coordination problem is not necessarily Pareto-efficient but could be efficient given assumptions of New Institutional Economics (i. e. could be NIE-efficient). This framework can be very helpful as a descriptive tool used to explain the persistence or transition of market institutions, but in can be difficult to be verified empirically.Economic experiments have been successfully applied to analyse market institutions and to compare their efficiency. In the paper, we demonstrate how this methodology could be used to analyse the “spontaneous” market organizations reached as a tacit agreement in a coordination problem. We also advocate that economic experiments can be a very useful tool to verify the efficiency of such institutions.

scholarly journals Institutional approach to assessing the transition to a circular economy: the case of the Kaliningrad region

Baltic Region ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-47
Author(s):  
Shastitko Andrey E. ◽  
Karina A. Ionkina ◽  
Olga A. Markova ◽  
Anton N. Morozov
Keyword(s):  
Circular Economy ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Incentive Schemes ◽  
Social Resistance ◽  
Msw Management ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Kaliningrad Region ◽  
Voluntary Basis

The article discusses possible reasons for the failure of Russia’s waste management industry reform and highlights the ownership blurring as a factor that may hinder the transition to a circular economy, which has been proposed as one of the outcomes of the reform. This study aims to address possible obstacles to transitioning to a circular economy in the Kaliningrad region. Methodologically, the study uses instruments of new institutional economics: by comparing discrete institutional alternatives for municipal solid waste (MSW) management, the authors propose incentive schemes that will likely stimulate the transition to a circular economy in the region. It is shown that, in Russia, the identification of the holder of the property right to waste is complicated. This can be a hindrance to effective MSW management. Moreover, objects handled by MSW management services may fall into different types, but at the same time, it is possible to transfer objects from one type to another. One of the ways to improve the exclusion of services of MSW utilization is the introduction of incentive tariffs. Low-rise housing in the Kaliningrad region makes it an ideal region for the introduction of such a scheme. When calculating the unsorted waste transport fee, a multiplier can be used to reduce the payment for waste-separating households. This can serve as an additional incentive for overcoming collective action problem in MSW collecting and sorting. To prevent social resistance to such a policy, incentive schemes should be implemented on a voluntary basis.

scholarly journals MODAL SOSIAL DALAM DINAMIKA PERKEMBANGAN SENTRA INDUSTRI LOGAM WARU SIDOARJO

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 266
Author(s):  
Mit Witjaksono
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Paradigm Case ◽  
Interpretive Paradigm ◽  
Analytical Reconstruction ◽  
Narrative Interviewing ◽  
Five Phases

The new institutional economics paradigm, qualitative-interpretive paradigm, case study strategy, and narrative interviewing were applied in this research in reconstructing conceptually and theoretically how the existence and roles of social capital within the context of the dynamics of SILOW (Sentra Industri Logam Waru) development since its beginning through the development of ASPILOW (Asosiasi Pengusaha Industri Logam Waru). Four distinct social capital perspectives and MBCA (Mutually Beneficial Collective Action are used as two proxies in reconstructing the existence and roles of social capital on the dynamics of SILOW development. Based on analytical reconstruction found that structurally and cognitively the existence and roles of social capital contribute significantly to the industry development of SILOW in five phases: the embryo of blacksmith center, the blacksmith center, the metal works center (SILOW), the SILOW-Synergy I, and the SILOW-Synergy II.

The Conceptual Framework: Collective Action, Trust, Culture, and Ideas

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Lorenzo Capussela
Keyword(s):  
Social Capital ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Social Order ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Personal Trust

This chapter completes the theoretical framework of the book by juxtaposing institutional economics with the literature on the collective action problem, social norms, culture, and ideas. It discusses the foundations of the collective action problem and the role of institutions—formal (laws) and informal (social norms)—in overcoming it. It links these studies with those on social capital, civicness, and the origins of generalized inter-personal trust. It criticizes the view—frequent in analyses of Italy—that a society’s culture is an independent obstacle to its development, and argues conversely that institutions, civicness, trust, and culture are part of the extant social order, and co-evolve. It ends with a discussion of the role of ideas, which are freer from the grip of the extant equilibrium and can lead elites, distributional coalitions, and ordinary citizens and firms to revise their assessment of their own interests and support efficiency-enhancing reforms.

Vertical Restrictions: Development of Theory, Antitrust Legislation and Enforcement

2010 ◽  
pp. 110-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva ◽  
N. Dzagurova
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Hierarchical Organization ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
New Institutional Theory ◽  
Antitrust Laws ◽  
Antitrust Legislation ◽  
Market Organization

The article examines the interpretation of vertical restraints in Chicago, post-Chicago and New Institutional Economics approaches, as well as the reflection of these approaches in the application of antitrust laws. The main difference between neoclassical and new institutional analysis of vertical restraints is that the former compares the results of their use with market organization outcomes, and assesses mainly horizontal effects, while the latter focuses on the analysis of vertical effects, comparing the results of vertical restraints application with hierarchical organization. Accordingly, the evaluation of vertical restraints impact on competition differs radically. The approach of the New Institutional Theory of the firm seems fruitful for Russian markets.

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