Wissensteilung: Thünen- Vorlesung bei der Jahrestagung 2000 des Vereins für Socialpolitik, Berlin 20. September 2000

2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 445-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst Helmstädter
Keyword(s):  
Division Of Labor ◽  
Crucial Role ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Implicit Knowledge ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Interactive Process ◽  
Important Resource ◽  
Central Notion ◽  
Knowledge Problem ◽  
The Individual

AbstractFriedrich A. Hayek’s notion of division of knowledge arouses new interest in an economy for which knowledge represents the most important resource. Hayek’s problem was how to use the knowledge scattered in society efficiently. In Hayek’s solution the prices emerging by competition play the crucial role. They indicate to the individual agents what they can do expediently for their own advantage and also for society, even though they dispose only of limited (implicit) knowledge. But which conditions must be fulfilled in order that the agents are prepared to engage in an interactive process of division of knowledge? - New Institutional Economics does not yet answer this question. It is only interested in questions of interactions in view of a division of labor. Its central notion of transaction is not appropriate for the analysis of the interactive process of division of knowledge, where sharing of knowledge matters. The contribution of the article mainly consists in the attempt to provide a New Institutional Economics basis to the division of knowledge problem. ß

scholarly journals Bringing Institutional Economics to Bear in Understanding Ghana’s Performance on Multi-Stakeholder Interventions

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (9) ◽  
pp. 157
Author(s):  
Kafui Afi Ocloo ◽  
Charles Yaw Oduro ◽  
Ronald Adamtey
Keyword(s):  
Development Strategy ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Local Level ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Planning System ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Endogenous Development ◽  
Case Study Methodology ◽  
The Individual

Existing literature on Ghana’s performance on the decentralized planning system hardly explores the role of individual rationality and organizational rationality in explaining performance on development efforts. This article examines whether the proposition of the New Institutional Economics (NIE) that decisions that individuals make constitute trans-actions in which costs and debts are incurred has a bearing on the performance of institutions involved in endogenous development processes at the local level. The case study methodology was employed using two purposively selected water supply schemes in Ghana. In-depth interviews and questionnaires were used to collect primary data. Secondary data was obtained from project reports. The findings indicated that even during the pursuit of an endogenous development strategy at the local level, the performance of the local stakeholders was determined by the state of intra-stakeholder structures. This in turn, was a sum of the decisions and actions of the individual members of the entities that were the main actors (i.e. the stakeholders). The NIE’s proposition that trans-action cost is key basis for individuals’ decisions and action was clearly evident in the decisions and actions of individuals (i.e. staff of the main actors), but it also was evident in the decisions and actions of the main actors (the entities that were the stakeholders). The study recommends that key development actors and the Ministry of Water Resources Works and Housing devote more attention to researching into how internal organizational conditions affect and shape the performance of stakeholders on the systems and how the existing intra and inter-stakeholder mechanisms can be improved to foster the success of development efforts at the local level.

Technology

2010 ◽  
pp. 123-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Blaine G. Robbins ◽  
Maria S. Grigoryeva
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Civic Culture ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Formal Institutions ◽  
Generalized Trust ◽  
Country Level ◽  
The World ◽  
Trust Measure ◽  
The Individual

The country-level determinants of generalized trust that usually command the most research are ethnic homogeneity, institutional performance, civic culture, and economic development. Despite the popularity and insight of this research, there is little quantitative empirical evidence that explores the impact of technology—a necessary and exogenous condition for many of these determinants—on generalized trust. In this chapter, technology measures from the World Bank are combined with a generalized trust measure from the World Values Survey and other country-level predictors from various data sources to test two competing theories of generalized trust across 57 countries. One theory, new institutional economics, argues that technology will yield formal institutions, which structure incentives and reduce uncertainty, that, in turn, increase generalized trust. The other perspective, overjustification and crowding theory, argues that actors constrained by extrinsic motivators, such as technology and institutional incentives, will attribute trust to the incentive rather than to the individual, and generalized trust, as a result, will decrease. Structural equation model results confirm the new institutional economics claim that the positive effects of technology on generalized trust are positively mediated by formal institutions. The authors conclude by outlining various managerial implications and directions for future research.

Innovation Is a Knowledge Problem

2019 ◽  
pp. 57-72
Author(s):  
Jason Potts
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Social Process ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Coordination Problem ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Cultural Foundations ◽  
Economics Of Innovation ◽  
Knowledge Problem ◽  
Use Of Knowledge

This chapter furnishes a new theoretical foundation for thinking about the economics of innovation and the innovation problem as a knowledge problem, and a collective action problem, and therefore a governance problem. The theory of the innovation commons is therefore based in new institutional economics. It builds on the analytic frameworks of four key theorists: Deirdre McCloskey on the moral and cultural foundations under which innovation can occur as an evolutionary social process; Friedrich Hayek on “use of knowledge in society,” on cultural evolution, on the ideas of both distributed knowledge and group selection; Oliver Williamson on the coordination problem of idiosyncratic investment under uncertainty and the hazards that contains; and Elinor Ostrom, who resolves the Hayek and Williamson knowledge conditions with a general solution to the collective action problem of knowledge discovery by pooling knowledge through institutional evolution.

Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary field of institutional analysis

2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 239-264 ◽  
Author(s):  
ELINOR OSTROM
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Institutional Analysis ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Behavioral Game Theory ◽  
Interdisciplinary Field ◽  
Behavioral Game ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Public Economies ◽  
The Individual

Abstract:This article briefly describes some of the intellectual challenges during the last half-century to the traditional fields of economics and political science: the public choice approach, the tragedy of the commons debate, the ‘new’ institutional economics, and behavioral game theory. Then, the components of a basic institutional analysis framework are presented that provide a general method for analyzing public economies and diverse forms of collective action. Empirical research related to metropolitan public economies, common-pool resources, and behavioral game theory is summarized that has contributed to the field of institutional analysis. The last section concludes that the macro foundations of institutional analysis appear firmer than the micro foundations related to the model of the individual to be used and discusses this puzzle.

Introduction

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
John N. Drobak
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
The United States ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Market Regulation ◽  
The Great Recession ◽  
Individual Mandate ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Individual

Chapter 1 explains that this book examines two economic “principles,” or beliefs, that have shaped the perception of the economic system in the United States today: (1) the belief that the U.S. economy is competitive, making government market regulation unnecessary, and (2) the belief that corporations exist for the benefit of their shareholders, but not for other stakeholders. Contrary to what many economists and policymakers believe, the chapter shows that numerous markets in the United States are not competitive and that the belief in shareholder primacy is not an economic principle but a normative notion. In addition, the belief in the existence of competitive markets is used to argue that market regulation is unnecessary because competition provides all the needed constraints. If there are no constraints from competition and no regulation, serious harm can result, as shown by the Great Recession of 2008. The chapter also points out that there never was a purely laissez-faire market economy. The real question is how much market regulation is desirable. It is often difficult to debate this issue because many people label any expansion of government regulation as socialism. In addition, some people just do not like being told what to do by the government. That was a principle reason for the objection to the individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act. The chapter then introduces the relationship between the two economic narratives and the millions of job losses this century, using lessons from the new institutional economics to analyze the issues.

scholarly journals About the governance pillar of agrarian sustainability

2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 16-27
Author(s):  
Hrabrin Bachev
Keyword(s):  
Sustainable Development ◽  
Reference Values ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Objective Data ◽  
Business Organizations ◽  
New Governance ◽  
Critical Factors ◽  
Academic Literature ◽  
The Individual

Introduction. Most of suggested and practically used framework for assessing the agrarian sustainability include three pillars – economic, social, and environmental. In recent years a new “fourth” governance pillar of sustainability has been introduced in academic literature and appeared in official documents of governmental, international, professional and business organizations. Nevertheless, the elaboration of the approach for assessing the governance sustainability of agriculture still is at the beginning stage. This article suggests a holistic framework for assessing the new governance pillar of agrarian sustainability. Materials and methods. A framework of new evolving interdisciplinary methodologies of Sustainable Development and the New Institutional Economics has been incorporated and a holistic system comprising of well-defined principles, criteria, indicators and reference values used for assessing governance sustainability of Bulgarian agriculture at national and (sub)sectoral (industry) levels. Results. Multi-principle, multi-criteria and multi-indicators assessment indicates that the Overall Governance Sustainability of Bulgarian agriculture is at a “Good” but very close to the “Satisfactory” level. Besides, there is a considerable differentiation in the level of Integral Governance sustainability of different agro-industries in the country. What is more, the individual indicators with the highest and lowest sustainability values determine the “critical” factors enhancing and deterring the particular and integral Governance sustainability of evaluated agro-system. Conclusion. Holistic assessments of governance and overall sustainability are important for improving the management of agrarian sustainability in general, and the Governance sustainability of agriculture in particular. Therefore, they are to be expended and their precision and representation increased. The later requires improvement of the precision through enlargement of surveyed farms and stakeholders, and incorporating more “objective” data from surveys, statistics, expertise of professionals in the area, etc.

Successful organizational change through win-win

2015 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-214 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Georg Will
Keyword(s):  
Organizational Change ◽  
Change Management ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Management Measures ◽  
Conceptual Paper ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Practical Implications ◽  
Relevant Factors

Purpose – This paper aims to show new ways of overcoming resistance during organizational change by applying insights from New Institutional Economics. Design/methodology/approach – This is a conceptual paper that adapts findings from New Institutional Economics. Findings – The paper highlights the relevance of interactions between managers and employees for value creation processes: interactions can generate either win–win or lose–lose situations. By altering the restrictions on managers’ and employees’ behavior, change managers can create mutual benefits for the staff and the firm. The paper thus explicitly considers the individual interests of employees and managers and highlights an approach to link individual interests with the collective interests of the firm by means of appropriate interactions. Additionally, the paper elaborates the relevant factors that determine the success of classical change management measures, like communication or participation, to overcome resistance during organizational change. Research limitations/implications – The developed framework also indicates important conditions where approaches inspired by management, psychological and sociological theories can be successfully applied and where change management will benefit from being complemented by New Institutional Economics. Practical implications – Change managers can optimize inter-organizational competition or cooperation to generate a win–win situation by means of appropriate formal or informal restrictions (like incentives or binding mechanisms). Originality/value – This paper applies insights from New Institutional Economics to show how organizational change can be facilitated by producing mutual benefits. This paper postulates that organizational change often fails or, at the very least, meets with stiff resistance due to dysfunctional interactions within the company. However, such interactions actually contain great opportunities for change managers: by shifting the focus of these interactions, they can generate the potential for win–win situations. In this approach, mutual benefits are a decisive factor in increasing the acceptance to organizational change and overcoming resistance.

scholarly journals Transaction Cost Economics and Recource Based View: complementary aspects in the treatment of governance structures

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cleiciele Albuquerque Augusto ◽  
José Paulo De Souza
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Governance Structures ◽  
Competitive Advantages ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Sustainable Competitive Advantages ◽  
Complementarity Theory ◽  
Theoretical Foundations

The transaction cost economics (TCE), in the field of New Institutional Economics, have been shown as one of the most elaborate theoretical and explanatory constructs of arrangements existing in organizational reality. However, recent studies have sought on the Resource Based View (RBV) approach the theoretical foundations about setting these arrangements, in addition to highlighting a required complementarity between TCE and the RVB in understanding how they are formed. In this sense, the objective in this article was to understand how the complementarity theory TCE and RBV explain the configuration of the governance structures in the context of New Institutional Economics. The discussion presented in the form of essay, demonstrated that resources and differentiated capabilities could provide the basis for the proper choice of governance structures. These structures, in turn, are chosen in order to protect and achieve sustainable competitive advantages from these resources. Thus, that the complementary view of TCE with RBV is able to encompass more fully the aspects related to the choice of firm boundaries, minimizing the individual limitations of these approaches in terms of strategic analysis.

Vertical Restrictions: Development of Theory, Antitrust Legislation and Enforcement

2010 ◽  
pp. 110-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva ◽  
N. Dzagurova
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Theory ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theory Of The Firm ◽  
New Institutional Economics ◽  
Hierarchical Organization ◽  
Vertical Restraints ◽  
New Institutional Theory ◽  
Antitrust Laws ◽  
Antitrust Legislation ◽  
Market Organization

The article examines the interpretation of vertical restraints in Chicago, post-Chicago and New Institutional Economics approaches, as well as the reflection of these approaches in the application of antitrust laws. The main difference between neoclassical and new institutional analysis of vertical restraints is that the former compares the results of their use with market organization outcomes, and assesses mainly horizontal effects, while the latter focuses on the analysis of vertical effects, comparing the results of vertical restraints application with hierarchical organization. Accordingly, the evaluation of vertical restraints impact on competition differs radically. The approach of the New Institutional Theory of the firm seems fruitful for Russian markets.

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