The Innovation Problem

2019 ◽  
pp. 27-56
Author(s):  
Jason Potts

Explains the nature of the innovation problem as an economic problem in the context of economic trade and long-run growth. Distinguishes between a market failure definition of the innovation problem as an allocation problems and the innovation problem as a collective action problem of coordination and discovery. Defines the innovation commons as the zeroth phase of the innovation trajectory. Introduces the concept of discovery failure and discovery costs. This locates the argument of the book in the broader context of Schumpeterian, evolutionary, and Austrian “mainline economics” with a contextualization of the innovation problem simultaneously as both a knowledge problem and a coordination problem, and therefore as a governance problem solved with institutions.

2019 ◽  
pp. 57-72
Author(s):  
Jason Potts

This chapter furnishes a new theoretical foundation for thinking about the economics of innovation and the innovation problem as a knowledge problem, and a collective action problem, and therefore a governance problem. The theory of the innovation commons is therefore based in new institutional economics. It builds on the analytic frameworks of four key theorists: Deirdre McCloskey on the moral and cultural foundations under which innovation can occur as an evolutionary social process; Friedrich Hayek on “use of knowledge in society,” on cultural evolution, on the ideas of both distributed knowledge and group selection; Oliver Williamson on the coordination problem of idiosyncratic investment under uncertainty and the hazards that contains; and Elinor Ostrom, who resolves the Hayek and Williamson knowledge conditions with a general solution to the collective action problem of knowledge discovery by pooling knowledge through institutional evolution.


Author(s):  
Justin Buchler

This chapter presents a unified model of legislative elections, parties, and roll call voting, built around a party leadership election. First, a legislative caucus selects a party leader who campaigns based on a platform of a disciplinary system. Once elected, that leader runs the legislative session, in which roll call votes occur. Then elections occur, and incumbents face re-election with the positions they incrementally adopted. When the caucus is ideologically homogeneous, electorally diverse, and policy motivated, members will elect a leader who solves the collective action problem of sincere voting with “preference-preserving influence.” That leader will threaten to punish legislators who bow to electoral pressure to vote as centrists. Consequently, legislators vote sincerely as extremists and get slightly lower vote shares, but they offset that lost utility with policy gains that they couldn’t have gotten without party influence. Party leaders will rarely pressure legislators to vote insincerely.


Philosophies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
Philip J. Wilson

The problem of climate change inaction is sometimes said to be ‘wicked’, or essentially insoluble, and it has also been seen as a collective action problem, which is correct but inconsequential. In the absence of progress, much is made of various frailties of the public, hence the need for an optimistic tone in public discourse to overcome fatalism and encourage positive action. This argument is immaterial without meaningful action in the first place, and to favour what amounts to the suppression of truth over intellectual openness is in any case disreputable. ‘Optimism’ is also vexed in this context, often having been opposed to the sombre mood of environmentalists by advocates of economic growth. The greater mental impediments are ideological fantasy, which is blind to the contradictions in public discourse, and the misapprehension that if optimism is appropriate in one social or policy context it must be appropriate in others. Optimism, far from spurring climate change action, fosters inaction.


2013 ◽  
Vol 280 (1759) ◽  
pp. 20130081 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik P. Willems ◽  
Barbara Hellriegel ◽  
Carel P. van Schaik

2001 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans Pitlik

Abstract Due to the incentives of both suppliers and users of policy advice the influence of economists on government decisions is almost negligible. This paper aims to explore the prospects of policy advice addressed to the general public as a countervailing power. It is argued that in order to have some impact on public opinion economists must rely primarily on propaganda and have to overcome a serious collective action problem. Yet, the organization of the academic system provides no incentives for economists to fulfil the role of general-public-oriented advisers.


Author(s):  
Anne Schwenkenbecher

Abstract This chapter explores the question of whether or not individual agents are under a moral obligation to reduce their ‘antimicrobial footprint’. An agent’s antimicrobial footprint measures the extent to which her actions are causally linked to the use of antibiotics. As such, it is not necessarily a measure of her contribution to antimicrobial resistance. Talking about people’s antimicrobial footprint in a way we talk about our carbon footprint may be helpful for drawing attention to the global effects of individual behaviour and for highlighting that our choices can collectively make a real difference. But can we be morally obligated to make a contribution to resolving a collective action problem when our individual contributions by themselves make no discernible difference? I will focus on two lines of argument in favour of such obligations: whether a failure to reduce one’s antimicrobial footprint is unfair and whether it constitutes wrongdoing because it is harmful. I conclude by suggesting that the argument from collective harm is ultimately more successful.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Taisiya Voronkova ◽  
◽  
Anastasiia Vovkodav ◽  

A market economy requires flexibility in the operation of industrial enterprises, prompt adjustment of the nature and directions of production processes. That is why, in modern business conditions, the importance of not only ensuring the efficiency of economic entities, but also the formation of their potential and prospects for further development. It is proved that some modern industrial enterprises are characterized by the inability to really assess the production potential, incomplete use of available resources, the latest technologies, and modern methods of production management. Production potential has been identified as having several specific characteristics: integrity, interchangeability, interconnection, flexibility, or adaptability. It is noted that the potential concentrates three levels of connections and relationships at the same time: reflects the past, characterizes the present in terms of practical application, future-oriented. Six main methods used in the estimation of production potential are investigated and characterized: economic-statistical, method of production functions, method of cost estimation, index, indicator, and matrix methods. The principles that must be followed when diagnosing the production potential of the enterprise are determined: the completeness of the original data and the universality of the information base; reliability and availability of collected data; the possibility of using two types of assessment of production potential: resource-productive and rating; use of the concept of potential in a certain direction; use of basic and additional indicators; availability of certain evaluation criteria for the main and additional indicators. It is substantiated that the interpretation of the definition of “production potential” is ambiguous, as well as the methods of its evaluation. It is noted that without the study of production potential is not possible strategic development and planning of other activities of the enterprise and the process of managing the production potential of an industrial enterprise is aimed at efficient use of all its resources in the long run.


Author(s):  
Alma Schaafstal ◽  
Raegan M. Hoeft ◽  
Martin van Schaik

The process of training teams increasingly occurs in synthetic environments. However, it is often still modeled after live team training, including the disadvantages of live training, for example, the fact that all teammates must be available. This paper explores overcoming the disadvantages of human teammates in training teams in synthetic environments, while keeping the advantages of learning in a collaborative and cooperative fashion. Simulated teammates are a promising alternative because they are always available, may be modeled after experienced training personnel, and may be more cost effective in the long run. This paper details a research approach towards the definition of requirements for simulated teammates. In our approach, we carry out a set of experiments using confederates as simulated teammates, in a well-controlled simulation of a military command-and-control task The results of a first experiment show slightly better teamwork skills for those teams trained with simulated teammates.


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