Hearing God’s Command

2021 ◽  
pp. 108-125
Author(s):  
Gerald McKenny

When we claim that the command of God as a moral norm is rationally intelligible, we mean that it is in principle knowable, that we can reason about it, and that we can hold one another accountable to it. Barth’s theological ethics accommodates all three of these requisites. He holds that although we do not strictly know the specific action God will command, we have an approximate knowledge of it, and that in our asking it of God we stand in the space where it can be heard. He also holds that although our moral reasoning does not give us a definitive answer to what God requires and that we must bring our reasons before God’s ultimate verdict on them, the consideration of reasons for and against a proposed action or course of action is essential to hearing God’s command. Finally, he holds that human beings are bound to one another in relations of mutual speaking and hearing God’s commands, and these relations are at least implicitly relations of mutual accountability for what we hear as God’s command.

2021 ◽  
pp. 25-51
Author(s):  
Gerald McKenny

Barth’s divine command ethics claims that God’s grace to human beings in Jesus Christ is the norm of human action. In Jesus Christ, God both poses and answers the question of the good of human action, which is the question of its conformity to grace. Rather than a norm of a distinctively Christian way of acting or form of life, Barth argues that this is a moral norm that pertains to human action as such. When moral philosophy considers the question of conformity to the good that is posed to human action, it implicitly attests the grace of God which poses this question. And when moral philosophy considers the answers to the question of the good that derive from reason or experience, it implicitly attests the grace of God as the answer to the question. In its explicit attestation of the grace of God as the norm of human action, theological ethics makes use of this implicit attestation in moral philosophy. Barth thus endorses the traditional position according to which theology articulates the moral norm with the assistance of philosophy. However, Barth’s claim that the norm of human action is a revealed norm, and not a rational norm that is clarified, specified, and extended by revelation, qualifies the goodness of the human creature, fails to secure the mutual accountability of those who are inside and outside the circle of revelation, and limits the grounds on which Christians and others cooperate with one another in moral endeavors.


Author(s):  
Gerald McKenny

Does theological ethics articulate moral norms with the assistance of moral philosophy? Or does it leave that task to moral philosophy alone while it describes a distinctively Christian way of acting or form of life? These questions lie at the heart of theological ethics as a discipline. Karl Barth’s theological ethics makes a strong case for the first alternative. This book follows Barth’s efforts to present God’s grace as a moral norm in his treatments of divine commands, moral reasoning, responsibility, and agency. It shows how Barth’s conviction that grace is the norm of human action generates problems for his ethics at nearly every turn, as it involves a moral good that confronts human beings from outside rather than perfecting them as the kind of creature they are. Yet it defends Barth’s insistence on the right of theology to articulate moral norms, and it shows how Barth may lead theological ethics to exercise that right in a more compelling way than he did.


MANUSYA ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 23-38
Author(s):  
Charles Freeland

Aristotle understood ethics to be a practical rather than a theoretical science. It is a pragmatics, if you will, concerned with bringing about a good life . But the problem and the question from which Aristotle’s ethics begins arid to which it constantly returns concerns the relation of the theoretical to the practical: his concern is for the type or mode of discourse one could use in providing an account of the good life (Eudaimonia). Is this a propositional, apophantic discourse, a discourse claiming to represent the truth and what is true and from which one could then go on to prescribe a course of action, or, and this may be closer to Aristotle, is the philosophical discourse on ethics rather a descriptive one which takes humankind for what it is, not what it ought to be? This relation between theory and practice, between description and prescription, between science and action, is a question and a problem for Aristotle. It is my purpose to take up this question in connection with Aristotle’s texts on Eudaimonia. Another question shall be raised here: What is the relevance of Aristotle’s treatment of Eudaimonia to our contemporary, “modern” concern for ethics and the good life? I would assume, naively perhaps, that even today we are not indifferent to this question of what is a good life, and that we are not indifferent to the many ways in which the “good life” has been described. It would seem, then, that Aristotle’s texts have a particularly striking importance for us today insofar as we prolong the philosophical questioning of the possibilities for ethical and political discourse today and continue to ask who and what we are as human beings.


2005 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Karl Golser

Storicamente si può affermare che la Santa Sede è stata all’avanguardia nell’attenzione posta ai problemi ecologici, perché le sue prime prese di posizione risalgono all’inizio degli anni ‘70. Un’etica teologica cattolica si è sviluppata dalla metà degli anni ’80, dopo che le scienze bibliche hanno dovuto confutare l’accusa che l’antropocentrismo della Bibbia sia stata una delle cause dello sfruttamento della terra. Le ragioni storiche di un atteggiamento sbagliato verso la natura sono da vedere piuttosto nel pensiero filosofico moderno che si è sviluppato spesso in contrapposizione al cristianesimo, mentre la Bibbia e la teologia hanno in verità una visione teocentrica della creazione. I tentativi filosofici, che al posto dell’uomo vogliono mettere al centro della riflessione etica la natura stessa o la vita o anche la possibilità di soffrire, non hanno consistenza perché soltanto la persona umana come essere consapevole e libero può assumersi una responsabilità etica. Bisogna però tener conto di tutte le altre creature che in quanto create hanno una loro dignità propria. Essere creati significa essere relazionati a Dio; la fede in Dio Creatore comporta così un l’antropocentrismo relazionale. Da questi presupposti può essere sviluppata un’etica ecologica teologica che ha due percorsi, uno che insiste sul cambiamento necessario degli atteggiamenti di fondo verso la natura (le virtù ecologiche), ed uno che da determinati principi e da esperienze consolidate formula delle norme concrete per l’agire ecologico responsabile. ---------- Historically, one can say that the Holy See has been a pioneer for the attention paid to ecological issues, as it started taking a stance on the topic already in the early ‘70s of XX century. A catholic theological ethics was developed in the mid-‘80s, after the biblical sciences had to refuse the accusation that made biblical anthropocentrism one of the main causes of the exploitation of the earth. The historical reasons for a wrong attitude toward nature are to be found instead in the contemporary philosophical thinking that often developed against Christianity, while theology and the Bible promote a theocentric vision of creation. The philosophical attempts that place nature or life, or even the chance to suffer in lieu of man at the center of the ethical way of thinking, have no grounds because only human beings, self-aware and free, can take ethical responsibility. One needs to consider all creatures that, being created, have a dignity of their own. Being created means having a relation with God. Hence, the faith in the Creator involves a relational anthropocentrism. Departing from such assumptions, a theological environmental ethics can be developed along two paths, one insisting on the necessary change of the basic stance toward nature (i.e. ecological virtues), the other starting from recognized principles and experiences and postulating actual rules for responsible ecological behavior.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 337-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Anderson ◽  
Susan Leigh Anderson

Abstract We argue that ethically significant behavior of autonomous systems should be guided by explicit ethical principles determined through a consensus of ethicists. Such a consensus is likely to emerge in many areas in which intelligent autonomous systems are apt to be deployed and for the actions they are liable to undertake, as we are more likely to agree on how machines ought to treat us than on how human beings ought to treat one another. Given such a consensus, particular cases of ethical dilemmas where ethicists agree on the ethically relevant features and the right course of action can be used to help discover principles needed for ethical guidance of the behavior of autonomous systems. Such principles help ensure the ethical behavior of complex and dynamic systems and further serve as a basis for justification of this behavior. To provide assistance in discovering ethical principles, we have developed GenEth, a general ethical dilemma analyzer that, through a dialog with ethicists, uses inductive logic programming to codify ethical principles in any given domain. GenEth has been used to codify principles in a number of domains pertinent to the behavior of autonomous systems and these principles have been verified using an Ethical Turing Test, a test devised to compare the judgments of codified principles with that of ethicists.


2018 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Manitza Kotze

The recent advances made by biotechnology have been swift and sundry. Technological developments seem to happen sooner than they can be ethically reflected upon. One such trend is the endeavours launched to try and enhance human beings and what it means to be human with movements such as transhumanism, advocating strongly that we should overcome our natural limitations by any means available. With both critics and advocates utilising the expression ‘playing God’, the question of human enhancement is one in which the interplay between church and society comes compellingly to the fore. In this contribution, I wish to examine the bioethical challenges that technologies such as genetic engineering, robotics and nanotechnology raise, specifically from a theological perspective on human enhancement and indicating some paths that future research might take. Christian anthropological views on what it means to be human, especially to be created imago Dei [to the image of God] will provide the doctrinal and theological support to this contemplation.


2011 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oded Korczyn

AbstractThis paper will shed light on the deportation process of visaless sojourners staying and working in Israel. I will explain how state bureaucrats, specifically border control officers of the Enforcement Unit of the Interior Ministry (in Hebrew,hamemune al bikoret hagvulot beyekhidat ha'akhifa, misrad hapnim) are able to conduct activities that cause suffering to sojourners while still viewing themselves as moral human beings, by breaking down the decision-making process into a series of dichotomic categories, by defining Zionism as a context that justifies deportation, and by governing their emotions. I claim that in Israel, state bureaucrats view sojourners as unmanageable and incorrigible. Consequently, deportation becomes a logical course of action. Such an approach, which stresses the bureaucratic aspect of national projects, enables a better understanding of how the “State” is able to perform large-scale projects that cause suffering to individuals.


2021 ◽  
pp. 93-116
Author(s):  
Nathan Myrick

This chapter interweaves theological reflections from the traditions of American theological ethics and music philosophy with the author’s fieldwork, showing how an ethic of responsiveness makes claims on participants in the activity of musical worship. It argues that caring responsibilities that arise from such musical activity will require attentiveness to both relationships and justice. The chapter claims that this kind of care oriented toward restorative justice is a Christian response to biblical depictions of “the greatest commandment[s].” The chapter shows examples of how this just and caring responsiveness in musical worship may be enacted, concluding with an affirmation of the centrality of relationships for human beings.


Author(s):  
Nathan Myrick

Musical activity is one of the most ubiquitous and highly valued forms of social interaction in North America—from sporting events to political rallies, concerts to churches. Its use as an affective agent for political and religious programs suggests that it has ethical significance, but it is one of the most undertheorized aspects of both theological ethics and music scholarship. Music for Others: Care, Justice, and Relational Ethics in Christian Music fills part of this scholarly gap by focusing on the religious aspects of musical activity, particularly on the practices of Christian communities. It is based on ethnomusicological fieldwork at three Protestant churches and interviews with a group of seminary students, combined with theories of discourse, formation, response, and care ethics oriented toward restorative justice. The book argues that relationships are ontological for both human beings and musical activity. It further argues that musical meaning and emotion converge in human bodies such that music participates in personal and communal identity construction in affective ways—yet these constructions are not always just. Thus, Music for Others argues that music is ethical when it preserves people in and restores people to just relationships with each other, and thereby with God.


2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
William S. Brewbaker

Theological explorations of law have sometimes followed a “prophetic” model in which scripture or theological ethics serves as the primary norm for human law. After all, if God has spoken his Law into the world, especially a world beset by sin and oppression, should not human law answer to that Law? Moreover, is not law more authoritative when it is “found” or “discovered” within the framework of divine revelation than when it is “made” autonomously by fallen human beings?


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