Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions
This book provides an account of how we might address wrongdoing given challenges to anger and retribution that arise from ethical considerations and from concerns about free will. It contends that we should dispense with basically deserved pain and harm, and with associated retributive sentiments. Without such desert, how might we understand blame? Blame can be conceived as taking on a non-retributive stance of moral protest, whose function is to secure forward-looking goals such as moral reform and reconciliation. Is it possible to justify effectively dealing with those who pose dangerous threats if they do not deserve to be harmed? Wrongfully posing such a threat, by contrast with deserving harm for posing the threat, is proposed as the core condition for the legitimacy of defensive harming. An account is then provided for addressing criminal behavior without a retributive justification for punishment, one in which the right of self-defense provides justification for measures such as preventative detention. How might we forgive if wrongdoers don’t basically deserve the pain of being resented, which forgiveness would then renounce? Forgiveness might instead be conceived as the renunciation of the stance of moral protest. But how might personal relationships function without retributive anger having a role in responding to wrongdoing? The stance of moral protest, together with non-retributive emotions, is argued to be sufficient. The book closes with a consideration of attitudes regarding the fate of humanity in a deterministic universe replete with wrongdoing, and defends the rationality of a transcendent hope for humanity.