Love and Freedom

2021 ◽  
pp. 123-148
Author(s):  
Derk Pereboom
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
The Other ◽  
Personal Relationships ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Ethical Considerations ◽  
Ability To Do Otherwise

Chapter 6 contends that love and relationships need not be compromised if we, motivated by ethical considerations and skepticism about free will, relinquished the retributive emotions. When we are wronged in relationships, there are non-retributive emotions available to us, whose expressions can play the relevant roles. These emotions include feeling hurt or shocked or disappointed about what the offending agent has done, and sadness or sorrow and concern for him, and taking on the stance of moral protest against him. Personal relationships might presuppose free will due to being structured by moral obligations, and, by way of the ‘ought implies can principle,’ moral obligations presupposing the ability to refrain from wrongdoing. Two responses are offered, one compatibilist about the relevant ability to do otherwise, and the other invoking a sense of ‘ought’ that does not imply ‘can’ in the threatening sense.

Wrongdoing and the Moral Emotions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derk Pereboom
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Criminal Behavior ◽  
Moral Emotions ◽  
Personal Relationships ◽  
Moral Reform ◽  
Ethical Considerations ◽  
The Core ◽  
Self Defense ◽  
Core Condition ◽  
The Right

This book provides an account of how we might address wrongdoing given challenges to anger and retribution that arise from ethical considerations and from concerns about free will. It contends that we should dispense with basically deserved pain and harm, and with associated retributive sentiments. Without such desert, how might we understand blame? Blame can be conceived as taking on a non-retributive stance of moral protest, whose function is to secure forward-looking goals such as moral reform and reconciliation. Is it possible to justify effectively dealing with those who pose dangerous threats if they do not deserve to be harmed? Wrongfully posing such a threat, by contrast with deserving harm for posing the threat, is proposed as the core condition for the legitimacy of defensive harming. An account is then provided for addressing criminal behavior without a retributive justification for punishment, one in which the right of self-defense provides justification for measures such as preventative detention. How might we forgive if wrongdoers don’t basically deserve the pain of being resented, which forgiveness would then renounce? Forgiveness might instead be conceived as the renunciation of the stance of moral protest. But how might personal relationships function without retributive anger having a role in responding to wrongdoing? The stance of moral protest, together with non-retributive emotions, is argued to be sufficient. The book closes with a consideration of attitudes regarding the fate of humanity in a deterministic universe replete with wrongdoing, and defends the rationality of a transcendent hope for humanity.

scholarly journals Do Androids Dream of Electric Shocks?  Utilitarian Machine Ethics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Brendan Vize
Keyword(s):  
Science Fiction ◽  
Emotional Experience ◽  
The Other ◽  
Machine Ethics ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Star Wars ◽  
Electric Shocks ◽  
Tv Shows ◽  
The One

<p>Consider Lt. Commander Data from Star Trek: The Next Generation, the droid C3PO from Star Wars, or the Replicants that appear in Bladerunner: They can use language (or many languages), they are rational, they form relationships, they use language that suggests that they have a concept of self, and even language that suggests that they have “feelings” or emotional experience. In the films and TV shows that they appear, they are depicted as having frequent social interaction with human beings; but would we have any moral obligations to such a being if they really existed? What would we be permitted to do or not to do to them? On the one hand, a robot like Data has many of the attributes that we currently associate with a person. On the other hand, he has many of the attributes of the machines that we currently use as tools. He (and other science-fiction machines like him) closely resembles one of the things we value the most (a person), and at the same time, one of the things we value the least (an artefact), leading to an apparent ethical paradox. What is its solution?</p>

scholarly journals Do Androids Dream of Electric Shocks?  Utilitarian Machine Ethics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Brendan Vize
Keyword(s):  
Science Fiction ◽  
Emotional Experience ◽  
The Other ◽  
Machine Ethics ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Star Wars ◽  
Electric Shocks ◽  
Tv Shows ◽  
The One

<p>Consider Lt. Commander Data from Star Trek: The Next Generation, the droid C3PO from Star Wars, or the Replicants that appear in Bladerunner: They can use language (or many languages), they are rational, they form relationships, they use language that suggests that they have a concept of self, and even language that suggests that they have “feelings” or emotional experience. In the films and TV shows that they appear, they are depicted as having frequent social interaction with human beings; but would we have any moral obligations to such a being if they really existed? What would we be permitted to do or not to do to them? On the one hand, a robot like Data has many of the attributes that we currently associate with a person. On the other hand, he has many of the attributes of the machines that we currently use as tools. He (and other science-fiction machines like him) closely resembles one of the things we value the most (a person), and at the same time, one of the things we value the least (an artefact), leading to an apparent ethical paradox. What is its solution?</p>

scholarly journals Motivational Situations of Choice

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Elliott ◽  
◽  
Paul Story ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Time Constraints ◽  
External Regulation ◽  
Extra Credit ◽  
Instructor Feedback ◽  
Academic Settings ◽  
Regulation Strategies

The present research explores situations that demonstrate enhancing effects on motivation based on the amount of choice seen by individuals. Individuals who are intrinsically motivated see more choice in certain academic settings, including those that foster self-regulation and autonomy. Extrinsically motivated individuals are predicted to see more promise in reward and external regulation strategies. We identified six separate situations: a free will situation, a learning of materials situation, an instructor feedback situation, an extra credit situation, and two time-based situations. Four of these situations target a certain type of motivation, either intrinsic or extrinsic. The other two situations were used as a means to analyze pressure and tension due to time constraints. The goal of the present research was to identify correlations in these crafted situations with motivational measures from previous studies which examined choice and autonomy.

scholarly journals Nærlys på tvang og makt overfor personer med utviklingshemming

2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 4 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margunn Rommetveit ◽  
Anita Tollefsen
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Intellectual Disability ◽  
Object Relation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Font Size ◽  
Ethical Considerations ◽  
The Way

<p align="left"><strong><span style="font-size: medium;">Focusing at the use of coercion and force against people with intellectual disability </span></strong></p><em><em></em></em><p>The use of coercion and force against people with intellectual disability has been regulated by law in Norway since 1999. Each episode of coercion is challenging the human rights and has the potential to be an act of violation. The requirements for proceedings, ethical considerations and the requirements for professional competences, is special in Norway comparing to the other Scandinavian Countries. The article examines the notifications of coercion and the claim form from the staff working in communities with people with intellectual disability. The notifications of coercion have different approach. The attitude and the way of behavior are strongly related to the approach. The language in the notifications is strongly different. We talk about a subject-subject-relation and a subject-object-relation. It seems like there can be less use of coercion and force, if the staff involved, has the knowledge of how important the relation affect on the good interaction. The staffs own role, in preventing the need of using coercion and force, can be better recognized and improved.</p><em></em>

Comparative analysis of empathic abilities of foreign and Kazakhstani students of Karaganda Medical University

2020 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 79-84
Author(s):  
D. Sharma ◽  
◽  
M. Ospanova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Students ◽  
The Other ◽  
Personal Relationships ◽  
Emotional States ◽  
Emotional Responsiveness ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Complete Identification ◽  
Increase Productivity ◽  
Medical University ◽  
Different Cultures

The article deals with the problems of empathic abilities of foreign students and Kazakh students of Karaganda Medical University. Special attention is paid to the characteristics of empathy in different cultures, the definitions of which cover a wide range of emotional States, including caring for others and the desire to help them; to experience emotions that correspond to the emotions of another person; to distinguish what the other person thinks or feels. Empathy is needed to increase productivity, to develop competence in communication, to create deeper and personal relationships. Empathy can also be understood as a person’s emotional responsiveness to the experiences of another person, a response to the feelings of another, as well as empathy – a person’s experience of the same emotional States that the other is experiencing, on the basis of complete identification.

Sense and Sensibility in Mill’s Political Thought

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Political Thought ◽  
The Other ◽  
Personal Relationships ◽  
Sense And Sensibility ◽  
The Way

This chapter examines John Stuart Mill's political thought, asking in particular what we can learn about his intellectual project from attention to his Autobiography. It explores the way Mill's depiction of his own life and personality illuminates his social, political, and intellectual allegiances by focusing on the interconnections between On Liberty, Autobiography, and The Subjection of Women. It suggests that Mill's ambivalence about passivity and self-assertion is related to his arguments in The Subjection of Women. There are two views one might take of this matter. One would be to argue that liberalism is ideologically committed to an unsatisfactory view of marriage and perhaps of all close personal relationships; the other would be to argue that there is no particular reason why a satisfactory liberal view of these matters cannot be developed, but that Mill himself came up short.

Fate and Foreknowledge in Greek Philosophy

2021 ◽  
pp. 53-72
Author(s):  
Claire Hall
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Greek Philosophy ◽  
Ethical Considerations ◽  
Logical Problem ◽  
Early Christian ◽  
Future Contingent ◽  
The Future ◽  
Human Autonomy

The majority of this chapter focuses on Greek philosophical approaches to fate and foreknowledge. To understand the background of Origen’s thought on these topics, we must distinguish between three distinct types of problem: a) logical problems that concern the possibility of making true statements about the contingent future, b) the problem of how human beings can be held morally responsible for their actions if their actions are fated, and c) the problem of how human beings can choose freely between courses of action if God (or the gods) can have foreknowledge of the future. This chapter shows where and why these conceptions of fate, prophecy, and human autonomy differ, and why these distinctions matter. First, it examines the puzzles set and answered by Aristotle concerning the logical problem of future contingent statements. Then it explores some of the terminological difficulty in talking about ‘free will’ in the Greek context. Next it examines Stoic and Platonist discussions about choice and autonomy, which focus primarily on ethical considerations. Finally, it argues that Origen’s framing of these issues was heavily influenced by his pagan near-contemporary Alexander of Aphrodisias. The chapter ends with a survey of some other early Christian texts on autonomy and moral responsibility that show the Christian context in which Origen was arguing and sets the stage for the argument that Origen deviates significantly from his Christian contemporaries.

Moral dilemmas

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shyam Nair
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Deontic Logic ◽  
Moral Dilemma ◽  
Moral Dilemmas ◽  
Careful Consideration ◽  
Moral Emotions ◽  
The Other ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Course Of Action

A moral dilemma is a situation where an agent’s obligations conflict. Debate in this area focuses on the question of whether genuine moral dilemmas exist. This question involves considering not only the nature and significance of dilemmas, but also the connections between dilemmas, the logic of obligation and moral emotions. Certain cases involving difficult choices suggest that moral dilemmas exist. These cases also suggest that dilemmas are significant because they show that moral theory cannot help with these choices. If this is right, morality may be unimportant because it may be a system of inconsistent rules that cannot be used as a guide that tells us what to do. But this understanding of the cases is disputable. Perhaps the cases show that agents can be ignorant about what they ought to do. Or perhaps dilemmas are not significant because moral theory tells agents to do the most important of their obligations. On the other hand, principles from the logic of obligation or deontic logic can be used to argue against the existence of moral dilemmas. Principles of deontic logic such as the ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ principle and the agglomeration principle, which says that if you ought to do a and ought to do b, then you ought to do a and b, taken together with the assumption that moral dilemmas exist, turn out to entail a contradiction. This means that one of these principles must be given up, or else it must be the case that moral dilemmas do not exist. Careful consideration of the moral emotions has suggested that dilemmas do exist. It is appropriate for agents to feel guilt only if they ought to have done otherwise. In cases involving difficult choices, it is appropriate to feel guilt no matter what course of action is taken. This suggests that such cases involve genuine dilemmas.

scholarly journals To Be Able To, or To Be Able Not To? That is The Question

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 13-32
Author(s):  
Nadine Elzein ◽  
Tuomas K. Pernu
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Alternative Possibilities ◽  
Transcendental Argument ◽  
Ought Implies Can ◽  
Libertarian Free Will

A type of transcendental argument for libertarian free will maintains that if acting freely requires the availability of alternative possibilities, and determinism holds, then one is not justified in asserting that there is no free will. More precisely: if an agent A is to be justified in asserting a proposition P (e.g. "there is no free will"), then A must also be able to assert not-P. Thus, if A is unable to assert not-P, due to determinism, then A is not justified in asserting P. While such arguments often appeal to principles with wide appeal, such as the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, they also require a commitment to principles that seem far less compelling, e.g. the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘able not to’ or the principle that having an obligation entails being responsible. It is argued here that these further principles are dubious, and that it will be difficult to construct a valid transcendental argument without them.

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