Giving Reasons and Given Reasons

2021 ◽  
pp. 299-308
Author(s):  
John Broome
Keyword(s):  
Derek Parfit

Derek Parfit, as a leader of the ‘reasons first’ movement, says that the concept of a reason is fundamental and indefinable. But his concept of a reason differs from most philosophers’. Most philosophers take a reason to be a fact, whereas Parfit says that reasons are given by facts, not that they are facts. This paper distinguishes Parfit’s concept of a reason, which it calls a ‘given reason’, from the more common one, which it calls a ‘giving reason’. It argues that, whereas the concept of a giving reason is easily defined, the concept of a given reason is not. Parfit is therefore better placed than most philosophers to defend the claim that the concept of a reason is fundamental and indefinable.

Parfit's Moral Arithmetic and the Obligation to Obey the Law

1990 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Klosko
Keyword(s):  
Political Obligation ◽  
Derek Parfit ◽  
The Law

Though consequentialist theories of political obligation have been widely criticized in recent years, a series of arguments presented by Derek Parfit, in Reasons and Persons, are now believed to have given this position new life.

Why We Ought to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion

Utilitas ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
Torbjorn Tannsjo
Keyword(s):  
Quality Of Life ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Worth Living ◽  
Repugnant Conclusion ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Hedonistic Utilitarianism ◽  
Sentient Beings ◽  
Very High

Derek Parfit has famously pointed out that ‘total’ utilitarian views, such as classical hedonistic utilitarianism, lead to the conclusion that, to each population of quite happy persons there corresponds a more extensive population with people living lives just worth living, which is (on the whole) better. In particular, for any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth living. This world is better if the sum total of well-being is great enough, and it is great enough if only enough sentient beings inhabit it. This conclusion has been considered by Parfit and others to be ‘repugnant’.

Doing Wrong to ‘Lulu’ and ‘Nana’? Applying Parfit to the He Jiankui Experiment

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 157-170
Author(s):  
Norman K. Swazo ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Trial ◽  
In Vitro Fertilization ◽  
Research Team ◽  
Gene Editing ◽  
Genomic Research ◽  
Human Embryos ◽  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Identity Problem ◽  
Vitro Fertilization

In November 2018, Dr. He Jiankui announced the birth of two baby girls born through the use of in vitro fertilization technology and the use of the gene-editing tool CRISPR-Cas9. There has been nigh uniform international condemnation of the clinical trial for violating international norms governing genomic research, especially research in human embryos that has implications for the germline. At issue also is the question whether the parents and the clinical research team harmed, and therefore wronged, the two girls. Here this question is engaged through application of the reasoning Derek Parfit has provided on the non-identity problem. One concludes that on this reasoning the parents are not morally culpable on that argument, although there is other reasoning that is to be considered to resist the Parfitian conclusion.

Temporal Neutrality and the Bias Toward the Future

2021 ◽  
pp. 85-114
Author(s):  
Samuel Scheffler
Keyword(s):  
Derek Parfit ◽  
The Future ◽  
Equal Concern

Many philosophers have held that rationality requires one to have an equal concern for all parts of one’s life. In the view of these philosophers, temporal neutrality is a requirement of rationality. Yet Derek Parfit has argued that most of us are not, in fact, temporally neutral. We exhibit a robust bias toward the future. Parfit maintains that this future-bias is bad for us, and that our lives would go better if we were temporally neutral. Like other neutralists, he also believes that the bias is irrational, however widespread and robust it may be. This article assesses these criticisms and offers a qualified defense of the bias toward the future.

5. The self

2017 ◽  
pp. 67-82
Author(s):  
Susan Blackmore
Keyword(s):  
Default Mode Network ◽  
William James ◽  
The Self ◽  
Bundle Theory ◽  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Daniel Dennett ◽  
Default Mode

Who—or what—am I? ‘The self’ shows that this question is intimately bound up with the problem of consciousness because whenever there are conscious experiences it is easy to assume they must be happening to someone; that there cannot be experiences without an experiencer. Philosopher Derek Parfit distinguishes between ego theories and bundle theories to try to sort out some of the confusion. Buddhism is the only major religion to reject the idea of a persisting self and therefore subscribe to bundle theory. The concepts of hypnosis, dissociation, and the default mode network are also discussed along with the theories of William James, Ramachandran, and Daniel Dennett.

Relational Egalitarianism

2021 ◽  
pp. 417-438
Author(s):  
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Intergenerational Justice ◽  
Levelling Down Objection

Derek Parfit famously introduced a now commonly adopted distinction between telic and deontic distributive egalitarianism. This chapter argues that we can draw a similar distinction between telic and deontic relational egalitarianism. Interestingly, telic relational egalitarianism might be less vulnerable to the levelling-down objection than telic distributive egalitarianism. However, while some relational egalitarian concerns are best captured by telic relational egalitarianism, other concerns are better captured by deontic relational egalitarianism and yet others relating to intergenerational justice are better captured by telic distributive egalitarianism. Accordingly, insofar as we are egalitarians, we should be pluralist egalitarians in a more thoroughgoing way than Parfit entertained.

Parfit on Love and Partiality

2021 ◽  
pp. 151-166
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Derek Parfit ◽  
Concern For Others ◽  
Instrumental Reasons ◽  
What Matters

It is generally held that in his 1984 book Reasons and Persons Derek Parfit was advocating greater impartiality in ethics. In his later work, On What Matters, he seems more inclined to accept that we have partial reasons, for example, to give priority to those we love. This chapter raises some questions concerning Parfit’s arguments for partiality, including whether affection is too contingent to be valuable in itself, and whether partial concern for others, shared histories, or commitments can plausibly be said to ground non-instrumental reasons or value. The paper ends with a discussion of gratitude and an argument based on Parfit’s reductionist conception of personal identity.

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