Executive Department

2020 ◽  
pp. 105-122
Author(s):  
Danny M. Adkison ◽  
Lisa McNair Palmer
Keyword(s):  
Attorney General ◽  
The State ◽  
Oklahoma City ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
General State ◽  
Five Civilized Tribes ◽  
Executive Authority ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
Public Instruction

This chapter addresses Article VI of the Oklahoma constitution, which concerns the executive department. Section 1 provides that “the Executive authority of the state shall be vested in a Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, State Auditor and Inspector, Attorney General, State Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Commissioner of Labor, Commissioner of Insurance, and other officers provided by law and this Constitution.” While these executive officers may hold meetings outside the state’s capital, they may not set up branch offices in any place other than Oklahoma City. Section 2 states that “the Supreme Executive power shall be vested in a Governor.” Sections 3 and 4 provides for the eligibility of an individual to certain state offices as well as the terms of office and succession, respectively. The chapter then details the provisions for the qualifications, powers, and duties of each of the executive officers. Article VI also includes the provision for the seal of the state (Section 35), which incorporates images from the Five Civilized Tribes along with the seal of Oklahoma Territory.

scholarly journals Improvement of legal bases of the system of central bodies of executive power of Ukraine

2020 ◽  
pp. 333-340
Author(s):  
Derets Viktoria
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
State Policy ◽  
Optimal Number ◽  
The State ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Service Agency ◽  
Strategic Objectives ◽  
Executive Authority ◽  
The Government ◽  
Sphere Of Influence

Introduction. By this time the ministry has not yet become central bodies of executive power (CEB), whose leading function is the formation of State policy. The type chosen for another CEB does not always correspond to the features performed by this organ. It is difficult to separate the "functions in the implementation of State policy" from "some functions for implementing State Policy". The law does not define "public policy". This negatively affects the functioning of the CEB system. The aim of the article. The purpose of the article is analysis of existing problems in organization and activity of the system of the CEB and scientific substantiation of ways of their solution. Results. The term "ministry" means a kind of CEB has two main features: 1) The ministry responsible for the development of State policy; 2) The ministry is headed by a member of the government-a politician and not a government official. The main purpose of the executive power-solving body of social problems; Task – A set of measures that are derived from the main goal and subject to resolution to achieve it, specify the main purpose of the activity of the Authority; The function is activity related to obtaining a clearly defined final result which directly reflects the goal achievement and tasks of the executive authority. As for the optimal number of ministries in Ukraine, we believe that the decisive should be that all directions of the State policy are in the sphere of influence of the government, their unjustified chopping or consolidation between the ministries, as well as the chosen The number of ministries allowed to implement program of CMU. Along with the agencies, services and inspections should allocate another category of "other" CEBs, which neither in the form nor on the functional orientation do not belong to services, agencies, inspections. State policy-enshrined in the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, other acts of legislation the rules of operation and strategic objectives of the State and their due directions of activity of the State, approved by the decisions of the competent bodies of State power. Conclusions. The basis for the reform of the existing system of COIS proposed to put a division of functions in the formation of State policy and functions for the implementation of State policy. The CMU should provide for the formation and implementation of State policy. Ministry – to form State policy and ensure its implementation. Other CEBs – implement State policy. The legislation should define the meaning of the term "public policy". The tasks and functions of ministries shall be clearly defined. The type of each other CEB (service, Agency, inspection) shall comply with the legally fixed features for it.

scholarly journals Administrative and legal bases of activity of local local law enforcement units in the conditions of decentralization of executive power

2020 ◽  
pp. 350-358
Author(s):  
Banchuk Oleksandr
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
The State ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Scientific Article ◽  
Law And Order ◽  
Wide Spread ◽  
Local Law Enforcement ◽  
Utility Companies ◽  
Local Law ◽  
Set Up

The scientific article is devoted to covering peculiarities of local units activities in providing law and order in the conditions of decentralization of executive power. It is stated that local units are set up by the decision of local councils as utility companies or as executive local self government bodies. The categories of cases which are investigated by local units are determined and the problems in the procedure of their solving are identified. The efficiency of measures of local self government bodies often depends on the activity of the state bodies because the representatives of the units can not start proceedings by themselves even when the circumstances of commitment of a certain administrative offense are identified. The conclusion is made that local units ( guards/ police) are a wide spread phenomenon in Ukraine, however, they have not received a proper law regulation so far. Their officers do not have the authority of police but, in fact, try to take over their powers. It is admitted that there is a necessity to continue the process of decentralization of the powers of local self government bodies in this sphere.

One Chief Executive or Many?

2021 ◽  
pp. 147-182
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Sutton
Keyword(s):  
National Level ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
The State ◽  
United States Constitution ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
State Constitutions ◽  
Executive Authority ◽  
Attorneys General ◽  
Surface Similarity

This chapter compares the unitary executive at the federal level with the plural executive at the state level. The fifty state constitutions and the United States Constitution share a “surface similarity” in describing the authority of their chief executives: They both vest executive power in a governor or president. But in practice, there are many differences. At the national level, the US Constitution places all executive authority in one president who controls the executive-branch officers through the singular authority to choose all cabinet members. What’s called a unitary executive largely is one, given the president’s authority to hire and fire these executive branch officers. Contrast the state side. In response to the states’ colonial experiences with a monarch, many of the first state constitutions created weak executive branches. All but one of the original state constitutions also mandated that the governor work alongside an executive council. In many states, constitutional executive offices—secretary, treasurer, auditor—are often chosen by the legislature. The rise of the state attorneys general as a source of local and national power offers one illustration of the salience of the plural executive.

Part III Structure of State Government, 11 The State Executive Branch

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Williams Robert F
Keyword(s):  
State Government ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
State Legislature ◽  
The State ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Executive Orders ◽  
State Constitutions ◽  
Executive Agencies ◽  
Executive Officers

This chapter discusses the differences between the state executive branch created by state constitutions and the federal executive. In many states there is a plural or fragmented executive, with more than one state-wide elected official in addition to the governor, such as the attorney general, treasurer, commissioner of education, etc. Such additional executive officers perform constitutional functions separate and apart from the governor's constitutional functions. State executive officials such as the governor do not exercise plenary authority like that of the legislature. Rather, their authority is delegated either in the state constitution or by statute. A governor's use of executive orders is therefore limited to implementing constitutional or statutory powers. The chapter discusses the variety of gubernatorial veto powers, together with the judicial involvement in controversies over the exercise of this power. This judicial involvement is particularly important with respect to the item veto power. Further, some state constitutions create executive agencies, and specify their powers (often including quasi-executive, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial powers), thereby divesting the state legislature of authority in those subject areas.

Executive Power in Crisis

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
KENNETH LOWANDE ◽  
JON C. ROGOWSKI
Keyword(s):  
National Survey ◽  
The State ◽  
Public Acceptance ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Authoritarian Rule ◽  
The Public ◽  
Institutional Authority ◽  
Policy Attitudes ◽  
Executive Authority

Major crises can threaten political regimes by empowering demagogues and promoting authoritarian rule. While existing research argues that national emergencies weaken formal checks on executive authority and increase public appetites for strong leadership, no research evaluates whether crises increase mass support for the president’s institutional authority. We study this question in the context of the coronavirus/COVID-19 pandemic with an experiment embedded in a national survey of more than 8,000 U.S. adults. We find no evidence that the public evaluated policies differently if they were implemented via unilateral power rather than through the legislative process, nor did the severity of the pandemic at either the state, local, or individual levels moderate evaluations of executive power. Instead, individuals’ partisan and ideological views were consistently strong predictors of policy attitudes. Perhaps paradoxically, our results suggest that elite and mass polarization limit the opportunity for crises to promote public acceptance of strengthened executive authority.

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