“Toward the World’s Center Stage”

2021 ◽  
pp. 261-276
Author(s):  
Rush Doshi

Chapter 11 discusses the dawn of China’s strategy of global expansion, its perception of American decline, and the arrival of a new Party concept—the “great changes unseen in a century”—associated with both. It argues that China’s strategy of expansion emerged following another “trifecta,” this time consisting of Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, and the West’s initial response to the coronavirus pandemic. In this period, the Chinese Communist Party reached a paradoxical consensus: it concluded that the United States was in decline globally but at the same time was waking up to the China challenge bilaterally. It argues that Beijing now perceives an opportunity to displace the United States as the leading global state by 2049, with the next decade deemed the most critical to this objective.

1987 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 256-275
Author(s):  
Jon W. Huebner

On 1 October 1949 the People's Republic of China was formally established in Beijing. On 7 December Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), who had earlier moved to Taiwan to secure a final base of resistance in the civil war, ordered the Kuomintang (KMT) regime to withdraw to the island from Chengdu, Sichuan, its last seat on the mainland. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) declared its commitment to the goal of unifying the nation under the People's Republic, and thus called for the “liberation” of Taiwan. Although Taiwan represented the final phase of the still unfinished civil war, it was the strategic significance of the island that became of paramount concern to the CCP, the KMT and the United States.


1950 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-258
Author(s):  
Herbert W. Briggs

On November 20, 1948, Chinese Communist Party soldiers, without previous warning, cordoned the United States Consul General's office and the residential compounds of the consular staff at Mukden, China, and subjected the entire United States consular staff and their families to house arrest inside the compounds. The detention lasted over a year. For almost seven months the party was held incommunicado and subjected to numerous privations. Adequate water, light, medical care, and sanitary and roofing repairs were denied, mobility within the compounds was restricted, and members of the staff were subjected to badgering interrogations and examinations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-33
Author(s):  
James R. Lewis ◽  

Falun Gong was originally a qigong group that entered into conflict with the Chinese state around the turn of the century. It gradually transformed into both a religious group and a political movement. Exiled to the United States, the founder-leader, Li Hongzhi, acquired property near Cuddebackville, New York, which he subsequently designated Dragon Springs. Dragon Springs, in turn, became the headquarters of Shen Yun Performing Arts, an ambitious touring dance and music company that claims to embody the traditional culture of China prior to its subversion by the Chinese Communist Party. Though Li’s earlier eschatology emphasized that individuals needed to become Falun Gong practitioners in order to survive the imminent apocalypse, the significant success of Shen Yun seems to have prompted Li Hongzhi to rewrite his eschatology, which now emphasizes that all one need do in order to be “saved” is to view live Shen Yun performances.


2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 140-169
Author(s):  
Gordon Barrett

Newly available archival sources in China illuminate how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) used transnational initiatives to advance its aims. This article explores Chinese interaction with the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs from 1957 to 1964 and discusses how the People's Republic of China (PRC) made deliberate use of transnational initiatives to further its own Cold War strategy and foreign policy. High-ranking CCP officials were directly involved in selecting China's scientific participants, shaping their message, and determining their objectives at the conferences, including winning over potentially sympathetic foreign scientists, demonstrating Sino-Soviet solidarity and, in 1960, potentially establishing back-channel communications with the incoming Kennedy administration in the United States. Chinese scientists’ involvement in Pugwash shows that transnational relations mattered to the PRC during the Cold War and, more broadly, underscores the importance of governments in transnational relations.


2001 ◽  
Vol 100 (647) ◽  
pp. 263-268
Author(s):  
Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom

When attempting to bring pressure on Beijing, the United States should stop using vague universal standards or comparisons with the contemporary United States. Washington's criticisms of the Chinese Communist Party should instead build on Beijing's own claims about history and politics.


Worldview ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 14-16
Author(s):  
Ross Terrill

Three propositions govern this essay. First, China feels more secure than at any point since 1949. Until the mid-1960's China felt a grave threat from the United States. For a period of several years, highlighted by the Cultural Revolution and crystallized at die Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1969, the Peking leadership felt danger alike from the U.S. and the USSR (and decided to defy bom simultaneously). From 1969 to 1972 the American threat was felt to be much diminished, but the Russian threat was felt to be fairly acute. Now, for the past three years or so China has felt a reduced danger from the North and, of course, a negligible danger from across the Pacific. (Hence its formal military budget shrinks.)


1986 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 505-518 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryosei Kokubun

Sino-Japanese ties have been expanding since formal diplomatic relations were established in 1972. Recently, both governments organized a China–Japan Friendship Committee for the 21 st Century, a Sino-Japanese version of the U.S.–Japan Wiseman's Group, which has played an important role in cementing links between the United States and Japan through the years. The new China–Japan Committee is jointly headed by Tadao Ishikawa, president of Keio University and a scholar of Chinese politics, and by Wang Zhaoguo, the 45 yearold head of the general office of the Chinese Communist Party. This committee holds annual meetings to explore Sino-Japanese relations in depth. In addition, since 1982, a China–Japan Civilian Meeting has been convened, alternately in Tokyo and Beijing, bringing together over 100 Chinese and Japanese businessmen, politicians and scholars to survey Sino-Japanese relations. Finally, since 1980, at an annual ministerial meeting, the top ministers of each government review their activities.


1994 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 475-502 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael M. Sheng

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Sino-Soviet conflict intensified and at the same time the Sino-American rapprochement was well under way. When the Americans began to search for an answer to the question of ‘Why Vietnam’, some US foreign relation documents in the later 1940s were released, which indicated that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had made certain friendly overtures toward the United States. Since then, it has become a widely-accepted interpretation among scholars that Washington ‘lost a chance’ to win over the CCP from Moscow in the late 1940s. The fundamental premise of this interpretation is that the CCP earnestly bid for American friendship and support as a counterweight to pressure from the Soviet Union. It is argued that the CCP sincerely sought the US recognition right up to the middle of and that it was only after their bids for American support were rejected by Washington that the Communists had to choose the ‘lean-to-one-side’ policy. In short, Washington's shortsighted policy in 1949 ‘forced Beijing into Moscow's embrace’, and therefore set in motion a train of disastrous events: the Korean War and the Vietnam War. A promising postwar Asian balance in favour of the US was ruined.


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