Toward the Fifth Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law

2020 ◽  
pp. 335-358
Author(s):  
Pamela K. Bookman

This chapter discusses the debate that the Fourth Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States has sparked regarding the status of adjudicative jurisdiction under public international law. The Fourth Restatement has received considerable attention for its conclusion that adjudicative jurisdiction is not a concern of public international law. But exercises of adjudicative jurisdiction around the world are not static. Innovations and expansions of international adjudication in courts around the world are in process and looming on the horizon. This chapter surveys these developments and considers whether they could lead the next Restatement to alter its position on adjudicative jurisdiction. It also evaluates how these developments could translate into state practice and expressions of opinio juris that might affect the international law status of adjudicative jurisdiction.

Author(s):  
Martin S. Flaherty

Foreign relations under the US Constitution starts with the paradox, also seen in domestic matters, of relatively scant text providing guidance for the exercise of vast power. Founding understandings, structural inference, and ongoing constitutional custom and precedent have filled in much, though hardly all, of the framework over the course of two hundred years. As a result, two basic questions frame the relationship between the Constitution and US foreign policy: (1) which parts of the US government, alone or in combination, properly exercise authority in the making of foreign policy; and (2) once made, what is the status of the nation’s international legal obligations in the US domestic legal system. The making of American foreign policy is framed by the Constitution’s commitment to separation of powers. Congress, the president, and the courts are all allocated discrete yet significant foreign affairs authority. Determining the exact borders and overlaps in areas such as the use of military force, emergency measures, and treaty termination continues to generate controversy. The status of international law in the US legal system in the first instance turns on whether resulting obligations derive from agreements or custom. The United States enters into international agreements in three ways: treaties, congressional-executive agreements, and sole executive agreements. Complex doctrine deals with the domestic applicability of treaties in particular. US courts primarily apply customary international law in two basic ways. They can exercise a version of their common lawmaking authority to fashion rules of decision based on international custom. They also apply customary international law when incorporated into domestic law by statute.


2002 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence Collins

It is not generally appreciated that Francis Mann was not an international lawyer at all by training. His thesis at Berlin University was in company law. It was only after he had been in England for some time that he began to write about private international law,1 and his interest in public international law was developed as a result of his friendship with Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. It was not until 1943 that he published anything about public international law, and in that year he published a substantial article in two parts on the relationship between national law and international law, in which he built on the previous work on Judicial Aspects of Foreign Relations by Louis Jaffe2 and on acts of state by Sir William Holdsworth.3 Subsequently he came to make this subject his own, at least in England,4 where the subject has never attracted the attention which it has attracted in the United States.5


2020 ◽  
pp. 303-318
Author(s):  
Austen Parrish

This chapter explores how the Fourth Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States charts a new, unexpected path in the area of adjudicatory jurisdiction. The Fourth Restatement breaks with common understandings to find that personal jurisdiction is not a concern of international law. It indicates that “with the significant exception of various forms of immunity, modern customary international law generally does not impose limits on jurisdiction to adjudicate.” The Fourth Restatement’s discussion of adjudicatory jurisdiction also appears to premise its conclusion on two unorthodox approaches to international law. First, it implies that fundamental structural limits of the international legal system can disappear unless states are vigilant in protesting illegal activity of other states. However, states are not required to persistently protest illegal activity, and it is far from clear that the absence of protests can nullify long-standing principles of sovereignty. Second, the Restatement appears to assume that states have unfettered authority absent a limiting customary rule. Yet international legal practice has not traditionally addressed jurisdictional questions that way.


Author(s):  
Karen Knop

The two starting points for this chapter are that fields of law are inventions, and that fields matter as analytical frames. All legal systems deal with foreign relations issues, but few have a field of “foreign relations law.” As the best-stocked cabinet of issues and ideas, U.S. foreign relations law would be likely to generate the field elsewhere in the process of comparison. But some scholars, particularly outside the United States, see the nationalist or sovereigntist strains of the U.S. field, and perhaps even just its use as a template, as demoting international law. The chapter begins by asking whether this apprehension can be alleviated by using international law or an existing comparative law field to inventory the foreign relations issues to be compared. Finding neither sufficient, it turns to the U.S. field as an initial frame and sketches three types of anxieties that the U.S. experience has raised or might raise for international law. The chapter concludes by suggesting how Campbell McLachlan’s allocative conception of foreign relations law might be adapted so as to turn such anxieties about international law into opportunities.


1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 226-230

The Security Council discussed this question at its 1022nd–1025th meetings, on October 23–25, 1962. It had before it a letter dated October 22, 1962, from the permanent representative of the United States, in which it was stated that the establishment of missile bases in Cuba constituted a grave threat to the peace and security of the world; a letter of the same date from the permanent representative of Cuba, claiming that the United States naval blockade of Cuba constituted an act of war; and a letter also dated October 22 from the deputy permanent representative of the Soviet Union, emphasizing that Soviet assistance to Cuba was exclusively designed to improve Cuba's defensive capacity and that the United States government had committed a provocative act and an unprecedented violation of international law in its blockade.


2018 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 524-529 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leigh Patel

In the summer months of 2018, the world watched as thousands of young children were separated from their families and detained by immigration officials at the border between the United States and Mexico. On television screens and smartphone updates, it seemed the world collectively gasped at this cruel familial trauma and asked, “what can we do? How can we be in solidarity?” In this essay, I situate this state practice in a long-standing tradition of governance of who has rights and who does not. I also provide specific challenges for material solidarity that reaches beyond media soundbites.


Super Bomb ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 71-86
Author(s):  
Ken Young ◽  
Warner R. Schilling

This chapter examines the controversy's real or assumed moral and political aspects. Moral repugnance inflected the scientific judgments of Oppenheimer's General Advisory Committee, triggering discussion of the relative moral significance of thermonuclear bombing, the use of the atomic bomb, and the mass urban bombing campaigns of 1942–1945. More immediate concerns centered on the impact a decision to develop thermonuclear weapons might have on the pattern of international relations. Given a paucity of intelligence, the effects on the Soviet Union's own weapons program, and thereby on the United States' vulnerability, could only be guessed at. The chapter thus considers if the development of the Super would restore the status quo ante-1949 or lead to a thermonuclear arms race and ultimate stalemate—or even the end of the world.


2020 ◽  
pp. 145-178
Author(s):  
Gary Born

This chapter looks at the grave flaws in the current treatment of international law in American courts. Both the status and content of public and private international law in the United States are uncertain, frequently governed by contradictory or parochial rules of State law; the resulting body of international law that is applied by U.S. courts is unpredictable and incoherent. Over the past fifty years, U.S. federal courts have also increasingly marginalized both international law and the role of American courts in resolving international disputes. This treatment of international law threatens serious damage to historic U.S. values and frustrates vitally important national policies. The chapter then considers how the current treatment of international law in American courts is also contrary to the U.S. Constitution’s allocation of authority over the nation’s foreign relations and international trade, which vests the federal government with both plenary and exclusive authority over U.S. foreign relations and commerce, while, exceptionally, forbidding State involvement in either field. Moreover, this treatment conflicts with vital national interests and policies in both fields, frustrating long-standing national interests in the nation’s compliance with international law and development of the international legal system.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document