International Law in American Courts

2020 ◽  
pp. 145-178
Author(s):  
Gary Born

This chapter looks at the grave flaws in the current treatment of international law in American courts. Both the status and content of public and private international law in the United States are uncertain, frequently governed by contradictory or parochial rules of State law; the resulting body of international law that is applied by U.S. courts is unpredictable and incoherent. Over the past fifty years, U.S. federal courts have also increasingly marginalized both international law and the role of American courts in resolving international disputes. This treatment of international law threatens serious damage to historic U.S. values and frustrates vitally important national policies. The chapter then considers how the current treatment of international law in American courts is also contrary to the U.S. Constitution’s allocation of authority over the nation’s foreign relations and international trade, which vests the federal government with both plenary and exclusive authority over U.S. foreign relations and commerce, while, exceptionally, forbidding State involvement in either field. Moreover, this treatment conflicts with vital national interests and policies in both fields, frustrating long-standing national interests in the nation’s compliance with international law and development of the international legal system.

2020 ◽  
pp. 251-264
Author(s):  
Thomas H. Lee

This chapter describes specific points of divergence between the Third and Fourth Restatements of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States regarding how U.S. courts should engage with customary international law. The Third Restatement, adopted in 1987, envisioned U.S. courts fluent in and engaged with international law, deploying a U.S. foreign relations jurisprudence in dialogue with international law and lawyers. Customary international law was a central feature of this vision because it was the prime pathway for human rights litigation in federal courts when U.S. treaty-based human-rights initiatives had stalled. Appearing thirty years later, the Fourth Restatement exhibits a fundamentally different orientation toward customary international law. Customary international law is no longer embraced as it was in the Third Restatement as an opportunity to play offense, to advance the international law of human rights. That vision inspired a reaction among some U.S. legal scholars who questioned the U.S. federal law status of customary international law and the legitimacy of U.S. judges advancing the customary international law of human rights. The Fourth Restatement seeks a middle ground by defending against this revision of customary international law’s status role in the United States, concerned that the revisionist view might encourage and provide cover for U.S. courts to dismiss cases and claims with foreign policy ramifications that they should be adjudicating. The approaches of the two Restatements, taken together, have contributed to the disengagement of U.S. judges from customary international law altogether, to the detriment of U.S. conduct of foreign policy and contrary to the original constitutional specification of the judicial power of the United States as reflected in Article III, the Judiciary Act of 1789 that established the federal courts, and early historical practice.


2020 ◽  
pp. 359-370
Author(s):  
Donald Earl Childress

This chapter analyzes the approach taken by the Fourth Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States to the forum non conveniens doctrine in light of the doctrine’s history and present usage. The Fourth Restatement states succinctly the forum non conveniens doctrine: A U.S. federal court “may dismiss a case if: (a) there is an available and adequate alternative forum; and (b) despite the deference owed to the plaintiff’s choice of forum, the balance of public and private interests favors dismissal.” The Fourth Restatement next details in the comments various intricacies of the doctrine and proposes rules derived from U.S. federal court decisions with the hope of constraining judicial discretion in applying the main rule. These rules illustrate that the Fourth Restatement treats the forum non conveniens doctrine as a doctrine of law, as opposed to one of judicial discretion. In so doing, the Fourth Restatement formulates clear rules for U.S. federal courts to apply in resolving a forum non conveniens motion. This chapter considers Supreme Court decisions developing the doctrine to set the stage for assessing the Fourth Restatement’s approach and explores the doctrine as it has developed through various restatement projects, including the Fourth Restatement. The chapter concludes by examining the role of party interests in the forum non conveniens analysis and explores tensions in the doctrine that should be accounted for by U.S. federal courts and in future restatement projects.


Author(s):  
Martin S. Flaherty

Foreign relations under the US Constitution starts with the paradox, also seen in domestic matters, of relatively scant text providing guidance for the exercise of vast power. Founding understandings, structural inference, and ongoing constitutional custom and precedent have filled in much, though hardly all, of the framework over the course of two hundred years. As a result, two basic questions frame the relationship between the Constitution and US foreign policy: (1) which parts of the US government, alone or in combination, properly exercise authority in the making of foreign policy; and (2) once made, what is the status of the nation’s international legal obligations in the US domestic legal system. The making of American foreign policy is framed by the Constitution’s commitment to separation of powers. Congress, the president, and the courts are all allocated discrete yet significant foreign affairs authority. Determining the exact borders and overlaps in areas such as the use of military force, emergency measures, and treaty termination continues to generate controversy. The status of international law in the US legal system in the first instance turns on whether resulting obligations derive from agreements or custom. The United States enters into international agreements in three ways: treaties, congressional-executive agreements, and sole executive agreements. Complex doctrine deals with the domestic applicability of treaties in particular. US courts primarily apply customary international law in two basic ways. They can exercise a version of their common lawmaking authority to fashion rules of decision based on international custom. They also apply customary international law when incorporated into domestic law by statute.


2020 ◽  
pp. 335-358
Author(s):  
Pamela K. Bookman

This chapter discusses the debate that the Fourth Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States has sparked regarding the status of adjudicative jurisdiction under public international law. The Fourth Restatement has received considerable attention for its conclusion that adjudicative jurisdiction is not a concern of public international law. But exercises of adjudicative jurisdiction around the world are not static. Innovations and expansions of international adjudication in courts around the world are in process and looming on the horizon. This chapter surveys these developments and considers whether they could lead the next Restatement to alter its position on adjudicative jurisdiction. It also evaluates how these developments could translate into state practice and expressions of opinio juris that might affect the international law status of adjudicative jurisdiction.


2012 ◽  
Vol 106 (3) ◽  
pp. 531-546 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos M. Vázquez

Much of the recent debate about the status of customary international law in the U.S. legal system has revolved around the alien tort provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789, currently section 1350 of Title 28. In Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, the decision that launched modern human rights litigation in the United States, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit relied on the view that customary international law has the status of federal common law in upholding section 1350’s grant of federal jurisdiction over a suit between aliens. The court’s position that customary international law was federal law was the prevailing view at the time—a view that has subsequently been dubbed the “modern position.” It was the view set forth in the black letter of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law. Filártiga triggered a revisionist challenge to the modern position, with revisionists arguing that customary international law has the status of federal law only if given that status through statute or treaty, or perhaps through sole executive action; in the absence of such incorporation, customary international law has, at best, the status of State law in our legal system.


Author(s):  
Congyan Cai

This chapter adds a Chinese perspective to the comparative study of how national courts treat international law. The chapter finds that the application of international law in Chinese courts is influenced by several major factors, including China’s ambivalence toward international law, the role that the judiciary plays in China’s national governance, and the professional competence of Chinese judges. In particular, the failure of China’s Constitution to specify the status of international law makes secondary laws less likely to embrace international law: many secondary laws do not mention international law at all; only a modest number of secondary laws automatically incorporate international law. This also means that Chinese judges are discouraged from invoking international law in adjudicating disputes. However, in line with and in support of China’s economic opening policy since the late 1970s, Chinese judges regularly apply those treaties that deal with commercial relations between private actors. A major development is that, as China rises as a great power, Chinese courts have begun to prudently become more involved in foreign relations by applying international law.


Author(s):  
Karen Knop

The two starting points for this chapter are that fields of law are inventions, and that fields matter as analytical frames. All legal systems deal with foreign relations issues, but few have a field of “foreign relations law.” As the best-stocked cabinet of issues and ideas, U.S. foreign relations law would be likely to generate the field elsewhere in the process of comparison. But some scholars, particularly outside the United States, see the nationalist or sovereigntist strains of the U.S. field, and perhaps even just its use as a template, as demoting international law. The chapter begins by asking whether this apprehension can be alleviated by using international law or an existing comparative law field to inventory the foreign relations issues to be compared. Finding neither sufficient, it turns to the U.S. field as an initial frame and sketches three types of anxieties that the U.S. experience has raised or might raise for international law. The chapter concludes by suggesting how Campbell McLachlan’s allocative conception of foreign relations law might be adapted so as to turn such anxieties about international law into opportunities.


Author(s):  
Aryeh Neier

This chapter focuses on the two sources of international law: custom and treaties. Customary international law is the term used to describe rules that are so widely accepted and so deeply held that they help to define what it means to belong to a civilized society. The question of whether customary international law is binding on the United States came before the U.S. Supreme Court as long ago as 1900 in a case called Paquete Habana. Whereas treaty law often covers the same ground as customary international law. Torture is forbidden by customary international law, for example, and prohibitions against torture are also set forth in several multilateral treaties. The effect is to reinforce recognition that a particular norm set forth in a treaty has the status of customary law.


Author(s):  
Aryeh Neier

This chapter discusses custom and treaties as the two sources of international law. It explains the customary international law as the term used to describe rules that are widely accepted and deeply held and are used to define what it means to belong to a civilized society. It also recounts the case called “Paquete Habana” in the U.S. Supreme Court that addresses the question of whether customary international law is binding on the United States. The chapter talks about the treaty law or conventional law as the source of multilateral conventions that often covers the same ground as customary international law. It analyzes the prohibitions against “torture” that are set forth in several multilateral treaties and reinforce recognition that a particular norm set forth in a treaty has the status of customary law.


2020 ◽  
pp. 35-70
Author(s):  
Scott Slorach ◽  
Judith Embley ◽  
Peter Goodchild ◽  
Catherine Shephard

This chapter focuses on the sources of law in England & Wales, and is organised as follows. Section 2.1 describes the key jurisdictions relevant to lawyers in England and Wales. Section 2.2 deals with the issue of where the law comes from: sources of law. Section 2.3 reviews the development of the two ‘traditional’ sources of law in England and Wales: case law and statutes. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 consider the status and operation of EU and international law, including the potential effect of Brexit. Section 2.7 goes on to discuss public and private law, common law, and civil law, and other classifications used by lawyers. This is followed by a discussion of legal systems and their cultures across the world.


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