Gorbachev and the Abandonment of Anti-Imperialist Struggle

Author(s):  
George W. Breslauer

Gorbachev knew that reform at home could not be accomplished while the US-Soviet relationship remained confrontational and marked by arms races. His interactions and negotiations with President Reagan led Gorbachev continuously to augment Soviet concessions, even unilaterally, in hopes of ending the Cold War. He succeeded in doing so. Moreover, Gorbachev’s long-standing unwillingness to use military force to prevent democratization in Eastern Europe led directly to the collapse of these communist regimes in 1989.

Author(s):  
Dorle Hellmuth

This chapter assesses the strategic and doctrinal responses of Western Europe’s major powers and their armed forces to terrorism after the cold war. The chapter focuses on Europe’s ‘big three’, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, and examines the means, ends, and ways of military counterterrorism strategies and operations in these three countries. Select examples of medium and lesser powers include Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark. Critical of the central role military force played in the US global war on terror after the 9/11 attacks, many European powers called for the need to utilize alternative instruments of statecraft. Over time, they adapted their counterterrorism approaches to reflect the new realities at home and abroad. This shift became particularly apparent after the emergence of the Islamic State inspired violent attacks in various European countries, drawing a more military-centric response from Europe’s great, medium, and lesser powers.


2005 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Butler

Abstract. The polities of Canada and the United States are purportedly engaged in the process of value convergence; however, with regard to the legitimacy of foreign military intervention, divergence seems a more apt characterization. This research explores whether the current discord between Canada and the US reflects an aberration, or a realization of entrenched normative differences, over what justifies the use of military force. A series of regression models tests the hypothesis that justice considerations prompted the military interventions of both the US and Canada during the Cold War. The results herein fail to confirm this hypothesis, and in the process highlight the ways in which each country employed ‘justice’ selectively in the service of broader foreign policy objectives.Résumé. Les constitutions politiques des États-Unis et du Canada sont supposées tendre vers des valeurs communes; cependant, en ce qui concerne la reconnaissance de la légitimité des interventions militaires à l'étranger, la divergence semble être une caractérisation plus juste. Cette recherche explore si le désaccord actuel entre les États-Unis et le Canada reflète une certaine aberration ou la réalisation de différences profondément ancrées, concernant la justification de l'utilisation de la force militaire. Une série de modèles régressifs teste l'hypothèse selon laquelle des considérations de justice ont provoqué les interventions militaires des États-Unis et du Canada durant la guerre froide. Les résultats infirment cette hypothèse, et soulignent, en même temps, les façons dont chacun des deux pays a employé la “ justice ” de manière sélective pour servir des objectifs plus vastes de politique extérieure.


Author(s):  
Julien Kiss

The Cold War took place between 1948 and 1991 and centered on the antagonism between the two great superpowers, the US and the USSR, each with its allies and areas of influence. If the US had a significant influence in the West, the USSR dominated the countries of Eastern Europe. The USSR violently imposed communist totalitarian regimes after the end of the Second World War in the countries behind the Iron Curtain: the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. The psychological traditions consolidated up to that time were in many of these countries eradicated, meaning the restructuring or abolition of higher education, the abolition of scientific societies and journals. Many psychologists with connections to the Western academic world were purged and persecuted. There was the will to build a new socialist psychology, based strictly on Marxist ideology and Pavlovian physiology. Theories or approaches that did not reflect official ideology were forbidden and labeled as bourgeois pseudoscience. Authorities severely punished psychological practice based on such theories. There were similarities between what happened in these countries, especially in the first decade of the imposition of communism. However, after the death of Joseph Stalin, things developed somewhat differently in each country. Although in some places ideological policies in science had a progressive tendency toward liberalization, in other places there was significant negative interferences throughout the communist period. Due to this diversity, it is somewhat challenging to frame the development of psychology in Eastern Europe during the Cold War from a unitary perspective.


2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katherine Jenness

This paper explores the way American intellectuals depicted Sigmund Freud during the peak of popularity and prestige of psychoanalysis in the US, roughly the decade and a half following World War II. These intellectuals insisted upon the unassailability of Freud's mind and personality. He was depicted as unsusceptible to any external force or influence, a trait which was thought to account for Freud's admirable comportment as a scientist, colleague and human being. This post-war image of Freud was shaped in part by the Cold War anxiety that modern individuality was imperilled by totalitarian forces, which could only be resisted by the most rugged of selves. It was also shaped by the unique situation of the intellectuals themselves, who were eager to position themselves, like the Freud they imagined, as steadfastly independent and critical thinkers who would, through the very clarity of their thought, lead America to a more robust democracy.


Author(s):  
Vladimir Kontorovich

The academic study of the Soviet economy in the US was created to help fight the Cold War, part of a broader mobilization of the social sciences for national security needs. The Soviet strategic challenge rested on the ability of its economy to produce large numbers of sophisticated weapons. The military sector was the dominant part of the economy, and the most successful one. However, a comprehensive survey of scholarship on the Soviet economy from 1948-1991 shows that it paid little attention to the military sector, compared to other less important parts of the economy. Soviet secrecy does not explain this pattern of neglect. Western scholars developed strained civilian interpretations for several aspects of the economy which the Soviets themselves acknowledged to have military significance. A close reading of the economic literature, combined with insights from other disciplines, suggest three complementary explanations for civilianization of the Soviet economy. Soviet studies was a peripheral field in economics, and its practitioners sought recognition by pursuing the agenda of the mainstream discipline, however ill-fitting their subject. The Soviet economy was supposed to be about socialism, and the military sector appeared to be unrelated to that. By stressing the militarization, one risked being viewed as a Cold War monger. The conflict identified in this book between the incentives of academia and the demands of policy makers (to say nothing of accurate analysis) has broad relevance for national security uses of social science.


Author(s):  
Daniel Deudney

The end of the Cold War left the USA as uncontested hegemon and shaper of the globalization and international order. Yet the international order has been unintentionally but repeatedly shaken by American interventionism and affronts to both allies and rivals. This is particularly the case in the Middle East as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the nuclear negotiations with Iran show. Therefore, the once unquestioned authority and power of the USA have been challenged at home as well as abroad. By bringing disorder rather than order to the world, US behavior in these conflicts has also caused domestic exhaustion and division. This, in turn, has led to a more restrained and as of late isolationist foreign policy from the USA, leaving the role as shaper of the international order increasingly to others.


Author(s):  
Bhubhindar Singh

Northeast Asia is usually associated with conflict and war. Out of the five regional order transitions from the Sinocentric order to the present post–Cold War period, only one was peaceful, the Cold War to post–Cold War transition. In fact, the peaceful transition led to a state of minimal peace in post–Cold War Northeast Asia. As the chapter discusses, this was due to three realist-liberal factors: America’s hegemonic role, strong economic interdependence, and a stable institutional structure. These factors not only ensured development and prosperity but also mitigated the negative effects of political and strategic tensions between states. However, this minimal peace is in danger of unraveling. Since 2010, the region is arguably in the early stages of another transition fueled by the worsening Sino-US competition. While the organizing ideas of liberal internationalism—economic interdependence and institutional building—will remain resilient, whether or not minimal peace is sustainable will be determined by the outcome of the US-China competition.


2021 ◽  
pp. 096834452110179
Author(s):  
Raphaël Ramos

This article deals with the influence of Gen. George C. Marshall on the foundation of the US intelligence community after the Second World War. It argues that his uneven achievements demonstrate how the ceaseless wrangling within the Truman administration undermined the crafting of a coherent intelligence policy. Despite his bureaucratic skills and prominent positions, Marshall struggled to achieve his ends on matters like signals intelligence, covert action, or relations between the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency. Yet he crafted an enduring vision of how intelligence should supplement US national security policy that remained potent throughout the Cold War and beyond.


2021 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 691-702
Author(s):  
Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet

In 1946, the entertainer and activist Paul Robeson pondered America's intentions in Iran. In what was to become one of the first major crises of the Cold War, Iran was fighting a Soviet aggressor that did not want to leave. Robeson posed the question, “Is our State Department concerned with protecting the rights of Iran and the welfare of the Iranian people, or is it concerned with protecting Anglo-American oil in that country and the Middle East in general?” This was a loaded question. The US was pressuring the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops after its occupation of the country during World War II. Robeson wondered why America cared so much about Soviet forces in Iranian territory, when it made no mention of Anglo-American troops “in countries far removed from the United States or Great Britain.” An editorial writer for a Black journal in St. Louis posed a different variant of the question: Why did the American secretary of state, James F. Byrnes, concern himself with elections in Iran, Arabia or Azerbaijan and yet not “interfere in his home state, South Carolina, which has not had a free election since Reconstruction?”


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