Introduction

Author(s):  
Matthew S. Seligmann

There is an old story about Winston Churchill and the Royal Navy that runs thus: during his time as First Lord of the Admiralty from 1911 to 1915, Churchill made a proposal for reform that was strenuously opposed by the naval officers on the Board of Admiralty, whose role it was to advise politicians on the administration of the service. The reason given for their objection was that Churchill’s measure was not in accord with what they referred to as ‘naval tradition’. Upon encountering such opposition, Churchill immediately and thunderously retorted, ‘Naval tradition? Naval tradition? Monstrous. Nothing but rum, sodomy, prayers and the lash.’...

Author(s):  
Matthew S. Seligmann

Although the flogging of adult sailors had been suspended in the Royal Navy in 1881, at the outset of the twentieth century boy sailors could still be caned or birched for infractions of naval discipline. Many naval officers regarded such physical chastisement as the only appropriate and effective punishment for the youths in their charge, but there were many important opinion formers and campaigners outside the Navy who regarded corporal punishment as a relic from a more barbaric age and sought its total abolition in the senior service. Pressure was particularly strong in Parliament on this point. Sensitive to this pressure, Winston Churchill set up a committee to examine the whole system of naval discipline and, under cover of its report, sought to limit the regime of corporal punishment in the Navy.


Author(s):  
Matthew S. Seligmann

There is an old story about Winston Churchill, which relates that, during his time as First Lord of the Admiralty, he made a proposal for reform that was strenuously opposed by the naval officers around him. The reason given was that Churchill’s measure was not in accord with naval tradition. Hearing this objection, Churchill immediately retorted, ‘Naval tradition? Naval tradition? Monstrous. Nothing but rum, sodomy, prayers and the lash.’ The quotation is frequently dismissed as apocryphal or a jest, but, interestingly, all four areas of naval life singled out were subject to major reform initiatives while Churchill was in charge of the Royal Navy between October 1911 and May 1915. During this period, not only were there major improvements in pay and conditions for sailors, but detailed consideration was given to the future of the spirit ration; to the punishing and eradicating of homosexual practices; to the spiritual concerns of the fleet; and also to the regime of corporal punishment that underpinned naval discipline for boy sailors. In short, under Churchill, the Royal Navy introduced a social reform programme perfectly encapsulated in this elegant quip. And, yet, not only has no one studied it; many people do not even know that such a programme even existed. This book rectifies that. It shows that Churchill was not just a major architect of welfare reform as President of the Board of Trade and as Home Secretary, but that he continued to push a radical social agenda while running the Navy.


Author(s):  
Matthew S. Seligmann

As soon as he was appointed First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911, Winston Churchill sought to buttress his credentials as a social reformer by improving conditions for sailors in the Navy and widening the social composition of the officer corps. This chapter examines his efforts towards both of these ends. It shows how he fought against the Treasury and his Cabinet colleagues to offer sailors their first meaningful pay rise in decades. It similarly catalogues the many schemes he introduced to entice people from a wider range of backgrounds, including sailors from the lower deck, to become naval officers. As with enhanced naval pay, this required him to persevere against entrenched interests, but as this chapter will show, his achievements in this area were considerable.


2019 ◽  
pp. 191-202
Author(s):  
Mary Wills

The final chapter assesses the cultural and political significance of the West Africa squadron and the work of the naval officers involved in its operation, looking at the wider implications of the question of ‘success’ in discussions about the impact of the squadron both at the time of its operation and since. It examines the shifts and changes that took place during the sixty years of the squadron’s operation, including: perceptions of the slave trade and the best methods of suppressing it; the position of the Royal Navy in Britain’s imperial ambitions; and racial and cultural attitudes of Britons towards Africans and ‘others’. This chapter discusses the ways in which notions of duty and professionalism had changed, and how what it meant to be a Royal Navy officer in 1870 had altered as compared to 1807. It asserts the individuality and independence of naval officers, and their engagement with themes of anti-slavery, empire and identity.


2019 ◽  
pp. 167-190
Author(s):  
Mary Wills

This chapter examines officers’ contributions to the metropolitan discourses about slavery and abolition taking place in Britain in the early to mid-nineteenth century. Furthering the theme of naval officers playing an important part in the social and cultural history of the West African campaign, it uncovers connections between the Royal Navy and domestic anti-slavery networks, and the extent to which abolitionist societies and interest groups operating in Britain during the first half of the nineteenth century forged relationships with naval officers in the field. Officers contributed to this ever-evolving anti-slavery culture: through support of societies and by providing key testimonies and evidence about the unrelenting transatlantic slave trade. Their representations of the slave trade were used to champion the abolitionist cause, as well as the role of the Royal Navy, in parliament, the press and other public arenas.


1970 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 67
Author(s):  
Trumbull Higgins ◽  
Peter Gretton
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Mary Wills

After Britain’s Abolition of the Slave Trade Act of 1807, a squadron of Royal Navy vessels was sent to the West Coast of Africa tasked with suppressing the thriving transatlantic slave trade. Drawing on previously unpublished papers found in private collections and various archives in the UK and abroad, this book examines the personal and cultural experiences of the naval officers at the frontline of Britain’s anti-slavery campaign in West Africa. It explores their unique roles in this 60-year operation: at sea, boarding slave ships bound for the Americas and ‘liberating’ captive Africans; on shore, as Britain resolved to ‘improve’ West African societies; and in the metropolitan debates around slavery and abolitionism in Britain. Their personal narratives are revealing of everyday concerns of health, rewards and strategy, to more profound questions of national honour, cultural encounters, responsibility for the lives of others in the most distressing of circumstances, and the true meaning of ‘freedom’ for formerly enslaved African peoples. British anti-slavery efforts and imperial agendas were tightly bound in the nineteenth century, inseparable from ideas of national identity. This is a book about individuals tasked with extraordinary service, military men who also worked as guardians, negotiators, and envoys of abolition.


2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-188
Author(s):  
Stanley Adamiak

Although neutral during the Mexican American War (1846-8), Great Britain’s Royal Navy had to navigate the war’s naval component, particularly commerce raiding and blockades, as it sought to protect and promote trade and neutral rights. While able to use international pressure to limit privateering, handling the blockade proved more problematic. Although US policies largely mirrored British expectations in the Gulf of Mexico, along Mexico’s Pacific coast, inconsistent US Navy actions created tension. The professionalism of both American and British naval officers and a willingness of both governments to compromise effectively diffused any potential crises. Bien qu’elle soit restée neutre pendant la guerre américano-mexicaine (1846-1848), la Marine royale de la Grande-Bretagne a dû s’occuper de l’aspect naval de la guerre, en particulier les corsaires marchands et les blocus commerciaux, alors qu’elle cherchait à protéger et à promouvoir le commerce et la neutralité des droits. Pour limiter la course, la Marine pouvait recourir à des pressions exercées au niveau international, mais la gestion des blocus s’est révélée plus difficile. Bien que les politiques américaines aient reflété en grande partie les attentes britanniques dans le golfe du Mexique, les mesures incohérentes prises par la Marine américaine ont créé des tensions le long de la côte pacifique du Mexique. Le professionnalisme des officiers de marine américains et britanniques et la volonté des deux gouvernements de faire des compromis ont efficacement dissipé toute crise potentielle.


2014 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 69-89
Author(s):  
Harry R:son Svensson

When studying a local society dominated by naval officers and the extent to which they integrated the Jewish community in their midst, a new perspective on Swedish naval history is revealed. The Swedish Royal Navy has always been internationally orientated, but previous research has not taken this into account. Furthermore, not much research has been undertaken on the Swedish Royal Navy at all. As a metropolitan outpost, Karlskrona has generally been seen, by historians and contemporaries alike, as largely peripheral to the upheavals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Jews were not allowed to settle in Sweden until 1779, but in 1782 their settlement was permitted, though restricted to Stockholm, Gothenburg and Norrköping. The naval city of Karlskrona became an exception to the regulations. Previous research on the Jewish parish in Karlskrona was undertaken in the 1910s, and mistakenly concluded that it was the most unfriendly environment for Jews in early modern Sweden. This article seeks to reinterpret old sources and add newly found ones, which together engender a new perception of Jewish integration in Karlskrona. This is done by adopting the Port Jews concept and recognizing naval cities as internationally orientated production centres. In line with this, the article argues that Karlskrona, together with Gothenburg, should be interpreted as a Swedish example of the Port Jews concept.


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