Public-Key Management

Author(s):  
Keith M. Martin

This chapter builds on the previous one by considering additional key management issues that arise for management of public-key pairs. We identify why management of public keys presents special challenges and then consider different approaches to addressing these issues. We consider certification of public keys and examine the different stages in the lifecycle of a public-key certificate, paying particular attention to the creation and revocation of public-key certificates. In doing so, we investigate that it means to rely on a public-key certificate and what issues can arise with the deployment of public-key management infrastructures that are based on public-key certificates. We close by considering some alternative public-key management models that do not rely on public-key certificates.

Author(s):  
Abedelaziz Mohaisen ◽  
Tamer AbuHmed ◽  
DaeHun Nyang

The use of public key algorithms to sensor networks brings all merits of these algorithms to such networks: nodes do not need to encounter each other in advance in order to be able to communicate securely. However, this will not be possible unless “good” key management primitives that guarantee the functionality of these algorithms in the wireless sensor networks are provided. Among these primitives is public key authentication: before sensor nodes can use public keys of other nodes in the network to encrypt traffic to them, they need to make sure that the key provided for a particular node is authentic. In the near past, several researchers have addressed the problem and proposed solutions for it as well. In this chapter we review these solutions. We further discuss a new scheme which uses collaboration among sensor nodes for public key authentication. Unlike the existing solutions for public key authentication in sensor network, which demand a fixed, yet high amount of resources, the discussed work is dynamic; it meets a desirable security requirement at a given overhead constraints that need to be provided. It is scalable where the accuracy of the authentication and level of security are merely dependent upon the desirable level of resource consumption that the network operator wants to put into the authentication operation.


Author(s):  
Kannan Balasubramanian ◽  
M. Rajakani

The concept of Identity Based Cryptography introduced the idea of using arbitrary strings such as e-mail addresses and IP Addresses to form public keys with the corresponding private keys being created by the Trusted Authority(TA) who is in possession of a system-wide master secret. Then a party, Alice who wants to send encrypted communication to Bob need only Bob's identifier and the system-wide public parameters. Thus the receiver is able to choose and manipulate the public key of the intended recipient which has a number of advantages. While IBC removes the problem of trust in the public key, it introduces trust in the TA. As the TA uses the system-wide master secret to compute private keys for users in the system, it can effectively recompute a private key for any arbitrary string without having to archive private keys. This greatly simplifies key management as the TA simply needs to protect its master secret.


Author(s):  
Kannan Balasubramanian ◽  
M. Rajakani

The concept of identity-based cryptography introduced the idea of using arbitrary strings such as e-mail addresses and IP addresses to form public keys with the corresponding private keys being created by the trusted authority (TA) who is in possession of a systemwide master secret. Then a party, Alice, who wants to send encrypted communication to Bob need only Bob's identifier and the systemwide public parameters. Thus, the receiver is able to choose and manipulate the public key of the intended recipient which has a number of advantages. While IBC removes the problem of trust in the public key, it introduces trust in the TA. As the TA uses the systemwide master secret to compute private keys for users in the system, it can effectively recompute a private key for any arbitrary string without having to archive private keys. This greatly simplifies key management as the TA simply needs to protect its master secret.


2012 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pei-Yuan Shen ◽  
Maolin Tang ◽  
Vicky Liu ◽  
William Caelli

Current research in secure messaging for Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) focuses on employing a digital certificate-based Public Key Cryptosystem (PKC) to support security. However, the security overhead of such a scheme creates a transmission delay and introduces a time-consuming verification process to VANET communications. This paper proposes a non-certificate-based public key management for VANETs. A comprehensive evaluation of performance and scalability of the proposed public key management regime is presented, which is compared with a certificate-based PKC by employing a number of quantified analyses and simulations. In this paper, the authors demonstrate that the proposal can maintain security and assert that it can improve overall performance and scalability at a lower cost, compared with certificate-based PKC. The proposed scheme adds a new dimension to key management and verification services for VANETs.


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