Introduction

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avner Baz
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Philosophical Practice ◽  
Philosophical Significance ◽  
Present Book ◽  
Method Of Cases

There is little question that experimental philosophy constitutes one of the most significant developments in analytic philosophy in the last couple of decades. What is less clear is what its philosophical significance is, or has been. Whereas its proponents tend to present it as a way of moving forward in philosophy, I would argue that its singular contribution thus far has been that of pressing analytic philosophers to reflect on their favored method of inquiry, thereby helping to bring out fundamental problems with that method. More specifically, the present book argues that the new experimental movement and the responses to it by traditional, “armchair” philosophers have helped to make clear that what is known in contemporary analytic philosophy as “the method of cases”—that is, the widespread philosophical practice of theorizing on the basis of the “application” of terms to “cases”—rests on substantive and challengeable assumptions about language.

Acquiring “Knowledge”—An Alternative Model

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avner Baz
Keyword(s):  
Language Acquisition ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Alternative Model ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
First Language ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Empirical Science ◽  
First Language Acquisition ◽  
Method Of Cases ◽  
Striking Fact

The chapter argues that empirical studies of first-language acquisition lend support to the Wittgensteinian-Merleau-Pontian conception of language as against the prevailing conception that underwrites the method of cases in either its armchair or experimental version. It offers a non-representationalist model, inspired by the work of Michael Tomasello, for the acquisition of “knowledge,” with the aim of showing that we could fully account for the acquisition of this and other philosophically troublesome words without positing independently existing “items” to which these words refer. The chapter also aims at bringing out and underscoring the striking fact that, whereas many in contemporary analytic philosophy regard and present themselves as open and attentive to empirical science, they have often relied on a conception of language that has been supported by no empirical evidence.

Conceptual Analysis Rebooted

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edouard Machery
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Method ◽  
Conceptual Analysis ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Traditional Use ◽  
Philosophical Significance ◽  
Conceptual Engineering ◽  
Method Of Cases

Chapter 7 proposes a new, naturalistic characterization of conceptual analysis, defends its philosophical significance, and shows that usual concerns with conceptual analysis do not apply to this revamped version. So understood, conceptual analysis encompasses both a descriptive project and a normative project, similar to explication or to conceptual engineering. Chapter 7 also defends the philosophical significance of this novel form of conceptual analysis and its continuity with the role of conceptual analysis in the philosophical tradition. Furthermore, naturalized conceptual analysis often requires empirical tools to be pursued successfully, and an experimental method of cases 2.0 should often replace the traditional use of cases in philosophy.

scholarly journals Against a Sequestered Philosophy

Dialogue ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 443-464
Author(s):  
EYJA M. BRYNJARSDÓTTIR
Keyword(s):  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Western World ◽  
Contributing Factors ◽  
Philosophical Practice ◽  
Intellectual Humility ◽  
Philosophical Thought

This paper argues that philosophical practice in the Western world, in particular analytic philosophy, suffers from problems that contribute to its lack of diversity in two senses: the exclusion of women and minorities, and a narrow choice of subjects and methods. This is not fruitful for philosophical exchange and the flourishing of philosophical thought. Three contributing factors are covered: a flawed execution when instilling intellectual humility; the gaslighting of women in philosophy; and an overemphasis on a narrow conception of intelligence. The conclusion calls for a more humane and socially aware practice of philosophy.

scholarly journals Are thought experiments “disturbing”? The case of armchair physics

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Schindler ◽  
Pierre Saint-Germier
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Method Of Cases

Proponents of the “negative program” in experimental philosophy have argued that judgements in philosophical cases, also known as case judgements, are unreliable and that the method of cases should be either strongly constrained or even given up. Here we put one of the main proponent’s account of why philosophical cases may cause the unreliability of case judgements to the test. We conducted our test with thought experiments from physics, which exhibit the exact same supposedly “disturbing characteristics” of philosophical cases.

scholarly journals Different Voices, Perfect Storms, and Asking Grandma What She Thinks: Situating Experimental Philosophy in Relation to Feminist Philosophy

2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gaile Pohlhaus
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Feminist Philosophy ◽  
Philosophical Practice ◽  
Critical Literature

At first glance it might appear that experimental philosophers and feminist philosophers would make good allies. Nonetheless, experimental philosophy has received criticism from feminist fronts, both for its methodology and for some of its guiding assumptions. Adding to this critical literature, I raise questions concerning the ways in which “differences” in intuitions are employed in experimental philosophy. Specifically, I distinguish between two ways in which differences in intuitions might play a role in philosophical practice, one which puts an end to philosophical conversation and the other which provides impetus for beginning one. Insofar as experimental philosophers are engaged in deploying “differences” in intuitions in the former rather than the latter sense, I argue that their approach is antithetical to feminist projects. Moreover, this is even (and perhaps especially) the case when experimental philosophers deploy “differences” in intuitions along lines of gender.

scholarly journals Degrees of Freedom: Is Good Philosophy Bad Science?

Disputatio ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (61) ◽  
pp. 73-94
Author(s):  
Timothy Williamson
Keyword(s):  
Degrees Of Freedom ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Natural Sciences ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
International Language ◽  
Mathematics History ◽  
Global Spread ◽  
Alternative Methodology

Abstract The lecture starts by considering analytic philosophy as a tradition, and its global spread over recent years, of which Disputatio’s success is itself evidence. The costs and benefits of the role of English as the international language of analytic philosophy are briefly assessed. The spread of analytic philosophy is welcomed as the best hope for scientific philosophy, in a sense of ‘science’ on which mathematics, history, and philosophy can all count as sciences, though not as natural sciences. Arguably, experimental philosophy provides no plausible alternative methodology for philosophy, only a way of psychologizing it. However, it serves a useful purpose by highlighting the inadequacy of current methods for detecting errors in judgments on possible cases, which may result from reliance on possibly universal but imperfectly reliable cognitive heuristics. The problem is exacerbated by analytic philosophers’ tendency to regard increased flexibility in a theoretical framework as progress, where natural scientists would treat it as methodologically vicious profligacy with degrees of freedom. The result is a familiar type of bad science, overfitting theory to uncritically accepted data. The recent ‘hyperintensional revolution’ may be an example of such overfitting, it is suggested. The lecture ends with a call for a more miserly attitude to degrees of freedom.

Methodological Confusion in Armchair and Experimental Philosophy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avner Baz
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Lottery Paradox ◽  
The Lottery Paradox ◽  
Method Of Cases

The chapter closely examines John Hawthorne’s introduction of the “lottery paradox” in Knowledge and Lotteries (2004) and Joshua Knobe and Sean Nichols’ “Experimental Philosophy Manifesto” (2008), together with other related works of experimental philosophers, with the aim of illustrating the deep confusion about the method of cases on the part of both its armchair practitioners and their experimental critics/reformers. The examination of these texts also serves to raise some of the main issues that will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

Eight Defenses of the Method of Cases

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edouard Machery
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Method Of Cases

Chapter 5 examines eight different ways of defending the method of cases against Unreliability, Dogmatism, and Parochialism, and finds them wanting. It defends the experimental bona fides of experimental philosophy, provides evidence that reflective judgments do not differ from the judgments reported by experimental philosophers, shows that philosophers are not expert judgers, explains why their findings generalize beyond the cases that have been examined, argues that the lesson to be drawn from experimental philosophy can’t just be that judgments are fallible, explains why the prospects for a reform of the method of cases are dim, makes the point that Unreliability, Dogmatism, and Parochialism do not rest on a mischaracterization of the use of cases in philosophy, and defuses the threat that if sound these three arguments would justify an unacceptable general skepticism about judgment.

Experimental Philosophy and Philosophy of Religion

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 139-158
Author(s):  
Daniel F. Lim
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Philosophy Of Religion ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Short Paper ◽  
Language Philosophy ◽  
Work Done

Experimental Philosophy is a new and controversial movement that challenges some of the central findings within analytic philosophy by marshalling empirical evidence. The purpose of this short paper is twofold: (i) to introduce some of the work done in experimental philosophy concerning issues in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics and (ii) to connect this work with several debates within the philosophy of religion. The provisional conclusion is that philosophers of religion must critically engage experimental philosophy.

Wittgenstein on Logic as the Method of Philosophy

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oskari Kuusela
Keyword(s):  
Language Use ◽  
Analytic Philosophy ◽  
Ordinary Language ◽  
Philosophical Approach ◽  
Philosophical Significance ◽  
The Status ◽  
Language Schools ◽  
Further Development ◽  
Philosophical Progress ◽  
The Ideal

This book is an examination of Wittgenstein’s early and late philosophies of logic in relation to accounts of logic and its philosophical significance in early and middle analytic philosophy, with particular reference to Frege, Russell, Carnap, and Strawson. It argues that not only the early but also the later Wittgenstein sought to further develop the logical-philosophical approaches of Frege and Russell. Throughout his career Wittgenstein’s aim was to resolve problems with and address the limitations of Frege’s and Russell’s accounts of logic and their logical methodologies so as to achieve the philosophical progress that originally motivated the logical-philosophical approach. By re-examining the roots and development of analytic philosophy, the book seeks to open up covered-up paths for the further development of analytic philosophy. It explains how Wittgenstein extends logical methodology beyond calculus-based logical methods and how his novel account of the status of logic enables one to do justice to the complexity and richness of language use and thought while retaining rigour and ideals of logic such as simplicity and exactness. The book also outlines the new kind of non-empiricist naturalism developed in Wittgenstein’s later work as well as explaining how Wittgenstein’s account of logic can be used to dissolve the longstanding methodological dispute between the ideal and ordinary language schools of analytic philosophy.

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