The Psychology of Knowledge Ascriptions

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikkel Gerken
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Empirical Psychology ◽  
Knowledge Ascription ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Process Framework ◽  
Intuitive Judgments ◽  
Ordinary Knowledge

Chapter 5 surveys some empirical psychology and outlines some folk epistemological principles. By considering the heuristic and biases tradition, it is argued that ordinary knowledge ascriptions are standardly driven by heuristic processes and, therefore, associated with biases. This idea is integrated with a dual process framework for mental state ascriptions. On this basis, some of the central heuristic principles that govern intuitive judgments about knowledge ascriptions are articulated, and some of the biases associated with these principles are identified. The result is an account of an epistemic focal bias in intuitive judgments about knowledge ascription. Thus, Chapter 5 provides both a survey of relevant psychology and a development of the folk psychological principles governing knowledge ascriptions.

Single-Dose Testosterone Administration Impairs Cognitive Reflection in Men

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (10) ◽  
pp. 1398-1407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gideon Nave ◽  
Amos Nadler ◽  
David Zava ◽  
Colin Camerer
Keyword(s):  
Impulse Control ◽  
Behavioral Effects ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Math Skills ◽  
Reproductive Behaviors ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Process Framework ◽  
Testosterone Administration ◽  
Intuitive Judgments

In nonhumans, the sex steroid testosterone regulates reproductive behaviors such as fighting between males and mating. In humans, correlational studies have linked testosterone with aggression and disorders associated with poor impulse control, but the neuropsychological processes at work are poorly understood. Building on a dual-process framework, we propose a mechanism underlying testosterone’s behavioral effects in humans: reduction in cognitive reflection. In the largest study of behavioral effects of testosterone administration to date, 243 men received either testosterone or placebo and took the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), which estimates the capacity to override incorrect intuitive judgments with deliberate correct responses. Testosterone administration reduced CRT scores. The effect remained after we controlled for age, mood, math skills, whether participants believed they had received the placebo or testosterone, and the effects of 14 additional hormones, and it held for each of the CRT questions in isolation. Our findings suggest a mechanism underlying testosterone’s diverse effects on humans’ judgments and decision making and provide novel, clear, and testable predictions.

scholarly journals Epistemic evaluation and the need for ‘impure’ epistemic standards

Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikola Anna Kompa
Keyword(s):  
Context Sensitivity ◽  
Epistemic Standard ◽  
Epistemic Evaluation ◽  
Knowledge Ascription ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Epistemic Standards

AbstractThat knowledge ascriptions exhibit some form of sensitivity to context is uncontroversial. How best to account for the context-sensitivity at issue, however, is the topic of heated debates. A certain version of nonindexical contextualism seems to be a promising option. Even so, it is incumbent upon any contextualist account to explain in what way and to what extent the epistemic standard operative in a particular context of epistemic evaluation is affected by non-epistemic factors (such as practical interests). In this paper, I investigate how non-epistemic factors come into play when knowledge is ascribed. I argue that knowledge ascriptions often serve the purpose of providing actionable information. This, in turn, requires that epistemic interests be balanced against non-epistemic interests. Moreover, it raises the question of whose interests matter, those of the ascriber, the addressee (of the knowledge ascription), or the subject of ascription. Eventually, an answer to the question is suggested.

TIME CONSTRAINTS AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT ON KNOWLEDGE

Episteme ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Shin
Keyword(s):  
Time Constraints ◽  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Ordinary Knowledge ◽  
Experimental Findings ◽  
The Way

AbstractCiting some recent experimental findings, I argue for the surprising claim that in some cases the less time you have the more you know. More specifically, I present some evidence to suggest that our ordinary knowledge ascriptions are sometimes sensitive to facts about an epistemic subject's truth-irrelevant time constraints such that less (time) is more (knowledge). If knowledge ascriptions are sensitive in this manner, then this is some evidence of pragmatic encroachment. Along the way, I consider comments made by Jonathan Schaffer (2006) and Jennifer Nagel (2008, 2010) to construe a purist contextualist and a strict invariantist explanation of the data respectively, before giving reasons to resist them in favor of an account that indicates pragmatic encroachment. If successful, this may suggest a new way to argue for the controversial thesis that there is pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.

Further Insights on Fake-Barn Cases and Intuition Variation

Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Carsten Bergenholtz ◽  
Jacob Busch ◽  
Sara Kier Praëm
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Philosophy ◽  
Thought Experiment ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Risk Attitude ◽  
Knowledge Ascription ◽  
Underlying Factor ◽  
Demographic Group ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Group Variation ◽  
Fake Barn

Abstract Studies in experimental philosophy claim to document intuition variation. Some studies focus on demographic group-variation; Colaço et al., for example, claim that age generates intuition variation regarding knowledge attribution in a fake-barn scenario. Other studies claim to show intuition variation when comparing the intuition of philosophers to that of non-philosophers. The main focus has been on documenting intuition variation rather than uncovering what underlying factor(s) may prompt such a phenomenon. We explore a number of suggested explanatory hypotheses put forth by Colaço et al., as well as an attempt to test Sosa's claim that intuition variance is a result of people ‘filling in the details’ of a thought experiment differently from one another. We show (i) that people respond consistently across conditions aimed at ‘filling in the details’ of thought experiments, (ii) that risk attitude does not seem relevant to knowledge ascription, (iii) that people's knowledge ascriptions do not vary due to views about defeasibility of knowledge. Yet, (iv) we find no grounds to reject that a large proportion of people appear to adhere to so-called subjectivism about knowledge, which may explain why they generally have intuitions about the fake-barn scenario that vary from those of philosophers.

scholarly journals Rise of Machine Agency: A Framework for Studying the Psychology of Human–AI Interaction (HAII)

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 74-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
S Shyam Sundar
Keyword(s):  
Artificial Intelligence ◽  
Machine Learning ◽  
Media Effects ◽  
Interactive Media ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
User Perceptions ◽  
Human Control ◽  
Process Framework ◽  
Applications Of Machine Learning ◽  
Media And Communication

Abstract Advances in personalization algorithms and other applications of machine learning have vastly enhanced the ease and convenience of our media and communication experiences, but they have also raised significant concerns about privacy, transparency of technologies and human control over their operations. Going forth, reconciling such tensions between machine agency and human agency will be important in the era of artificial intelligence (AI), as machines get more agentic and media experiences become increasingly determined by algorithms. Theory and research should be geared toward a deeper understanding of the human experience of algorithms in general and the psychology of Human–AI interaction (HAII) in particular. This article proposes some directions by applying the dual-process framework of the Theory of Interactive Media Effects (TIME) for studying the symbolic and enabling effects of the affordances of AI-driven media on user perceptions and experiences.

scholarly journals What Are Dual Process Models? Implications for Cultural Analysis in Sociology

2016 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 287-310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omar Lizardo ◽  
Robert Mowry ◽  
Brandon Sepulvado ◽  
Dustin S. Stoltz ◽  
Marshall A. Taylor ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Interdisciplinary Approach ◽  
Cultural Sociology ◽  
Cultural Analysis ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Models ◽  
Memory Culture ◽  
Process Framework ◽  
Relevant Work ◽  
Theoretical Foundations

In this paper we introduce the idea of the dual process framework (DPF), an interdisciplinary approach to the study of learning, memory, thinking, and action. Departing from the successful reception of Vaisey (2009), we suggest that intradisciplinary debates in sociology regarding the merits of “dual process” formulations can benefit from a better understanding of the theoretical foundations of these models in cognitive and social psychology. We argue that the key is to distinguish the general DPF from more specific applications to particular domains, which we refer to as dual process models (DPMs). We show how different DPMs can be applied to a variety of analytically distinct issues of interest to cultural sociologists beyond specific issues related to morality, such as culture in learning, culture in memory, culture in thinking, and culture in acting processes. We close by outlining the implications of our argument for relevant work in cultural sociology.

scholarly journals A cue for rational reasoning: Introducing a reference point in cognitive reflection tasks

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaja Damnjanović ◽  
Vera Novković ◽  
Irena Pavlović ◽  
Sandra Ilić ◽  
Slobodan Pantelić
Keyword(s):  
Reference Point ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Reasoning Problem ◽  
Process Framework ◽  
System 2 ◽  
System 1 ◽  
Rational Reasoning ◽  
Adaptive Toolbox

The dual process framework posits that we reason using the quick System 1, and the deliberate System 2, both of which are part of our “adaptive toolbox”. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) estimates which system was used to solve a reasoning problem. Usually, the CRT tasks are solved incorrectly by using System 1, and correctly through System 2. We have applied the reference point hypothesis to the tasks of the CRT and proposed that this change would facilitate the switch between systems, resulting in better performance on the version of the test with a reference point, compared to the CRT without one. The results confirmed our assumptions, as evidenced by a generally higher score on the CRT with a reference point, albeit with different effects between items.

Staging a Strict Purist Invariantist Comeback

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikkel Gerken
Keyword(s):  
Functional Role ◽  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
Communicative Functions ◽  
Positive Account ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Intuitive Judgments ◽  
Folk Epistemology

Chapter 9 responds to arguments for pragmatic encroachment that appeal to the communicative functions of knowledge ascriptions or genealogical assumptions. The methodology of such arguments is criticized by way of a dilemma—the Functional Role Dilemma. A further dilemma for pragmatic encroachment—Pandora’s Dilemma—is then raised: many factors other than stakes can have an effect on knowledge ascriptions. So, pragmatic encroachers must either accept that these factors are partial determiners of knowledge or reject this. However, both options lead to trouble. Since these dilemmas are indicative of the mistakes in our intuitive judgments, Chapter 9 serves both the purpose of compromising mistaken appeals to folk epistemology and the purpose of guiding a positive account.

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