scholarly journals A cue for rational reasoning: Introducing a reference point in cognitive reflection tasks

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaja Damnjanović ◽  
Vera Novković ◽  
Irena Pavlović ◽  
Sandra Ilić ◽  
Slobodan Pantelić
Keyword(s):  
Reference Point ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Reasoning Problem ◽  
Process Framework ◽  
System 2 ◽  
System 1 ◽  
Rational Reasoning ◽  
Adaptive Toolbox

The dual process framework posits that we reason using the quick System 1, and the deliberate System 2, both of which are part of our “adaptive toolbox”. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) estimates which system was used to solve a reasoning problem. Usually, the CRT tasks are solved incorrectly by using System 1, and correctly through System 2. We have applied the reference point hypothesis to the tasks of the CRT and proposed that this change would facilitate the switch between systems, resulting in better performance on the version of the test with a reference point, compared to the CRT without one. The results confirmed our assumptions, as evidenced by a generally higher score on the CRT with a reference point, albeit with different effects between items.

Single-Dose Testosterone Administration Impairs Cognitive Reflection in Men

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (10) ◽  
pp. 1398-1407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gideon Nave ◽  
Amos Nadler ◽  
David Zava ◽  
Colin Camerer
Keyword(s):  
Impulse Control ◽  
Behavioral Effects ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Math Skills ◽  
Reproductive Behaviors ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Process Framework ◽  
Testosterone Administration ◽  
Intuitive Judgments

In nonhumans, the sex steroid testosterone regulates reproductive behaviors such as fighting between males and mating. In humans, correlational studies have linked testosterone with aggression and disorders associated with poor impulse control, but the neuropsychological processes at work are poorly understood. Building on a dual-process framework, we propose a mechanism underlying testosterone’s behavioral effects in humans: reduction in cognitive reflection. In the largest study of behavioral effects of testosterone administration to date, 243 men received either testosterone or placebo and took the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), which estimates the capacity to override incorrect intuitive judgments with deliberate correct responses. Testosterone administration reduced CRT scores. The effect remained after we controlled for age, mood, math skills, whether participants believed they had received the placebo or testosterone, and the effects of 14 additional hormones, and it held for each of the CRT questions in isolation. Our findings suggest a mechanism underlying testosterone’s diverse effects on humans’ judgments and decision making and provide novel, clear, and testable predictions.

scholarly journals Systems 1 and 2 thinking processes and cognitive reflection testing in medical students

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. e97-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shu Wen Tay ◽  
Paul Macdara Ryan ◽  
C Anthony Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Clinical Practice ◽  
Medical Students ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Analytic Thinking ◽  
Intuitive Thinking ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
System 2 ◽  
Thinking Processes ◽  
Analytical System ◽  
System 1

Background: Diagnostic decision-making is made through a combination of Systems 1 (intuition or pattern-recognition) and Systems 2 (analytic) thinking. The purpose of this study was to use the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) to evaluate and compare the level of Systems 1 and 2 thinking among medical students in pre-clinical and clinical programs.Methods: The CRT is a three-question test designed to measure the ability of respondents to activate metacognitive processes and switch to System 2 (analytic) thinking where System 1 (intuitive) thinking would lead them astray. Each CRT question has a correct analytical (System 2) answer and an incorrect intuitive (System 1) answer. A group of medical students in Years 2 & 3 (pre-clinical) and Years 4 (in clinical practice) of a 5-year medical degree were studied.Results: Ten percent (13/128) of students had the intuitive answers to the three questions (suggesting they generally relied on System 1 thinking) while almost half (44%) answered all three correctly (indicating full analytical, System 2 thinking). Only 3-13% had incorrect answers (i.e. that were neither the analytical nor the intuitive responses). Non-native English speaking students (n = 11) had a lower mean number of correct answers compared to native English speakers (n = 117: 1.0 s 2.12 respectfully: p < 0.01). As students progressed through questions 1 to 3, the percentage of correct System 2 answers increased and the percentage of intuitive answers decreased in both the pre-clinical and clinical students. Conclusions: Up to half of the medical students demonstrated full or partial reliance on System 1 (intuitive) thinking in response to these analytical questions. While their CRT performance has no claims to make as to their future expertise as clinicians, the test may be used in helping students to understand the importance of awareness and regulation of their thinking processes in clinical practice.

Cognitive Reflection Effects on Time Discounting

2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 99-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michał Białek ◽  
Przemysław Sawicki
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Individual Difference ◽  
Delay Discounting ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Reference Points ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Process Information ◽  
Time Discounting ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
The Way

Abstract. In this work, we investigated individual differences in cognitive reflection effects on delay discounting – a preference for smaller sooner over larger later payoff. People are claimed to prefer more these alternatives they considered first – so-called reference point – over the alternatives they considered later. Cognitive reflection affects the way individuals process information, with less reflective individuals relying predominantly on the first information they consider, thus, being more susceptible to reference points as compared to more reflective individuals. In Experiment 1, we confirmed that individuals who scored high on the Cognitive Reflection Test discount less strongly than less reflective individuals, but we also show that such individuals are less susceptible to imposed reference points. Experiment 2 replicated these findings additionally providing evidence that cognitive reflection predicts discounting strength and (in)dependency to reference points over and above individual difference in numeracy.

EXPRESS: Fooling System 1 in the field of perception: Failure to Intuitively Detect Attribute Substitution in the Flushtration Count Illusion

2021 ◽  
pp. 174702182110693
Author(s):  
Cyril Thomas ◽  
Marion Botella ◽  
André Didierjean
Keyword(s):  
Human Brain ◽  
Cognitive Style ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Substitution Error ◽  
Perceptual Illusion ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Ball Problem ◽  
Perceptual Attribute ◽  
System 1 ◽  
The Relationship

To facilitate our interactions with the surroundings, the human brain sometimes reshapes the situations that it faces in order to simplify them. This phenomenon has been widely studied in the context of reasoning, especially through the attribute substitution error. It has however been given much less attention in the field of perception. Recent research on the bat-and-ball problem suggests that reasoners are able to intuitively detect attribute substitution errors. Using a perceptual illusion drawn from the field of magic, we investigate the extent to which a perceptual form of attribute substitution depends on executive resources and can be detected. We also investigate the relationship between susceptibility to attribute substitution error in the flushtration count illusion and in a French adaptation of the bat-and ball problem. Finally, we investigate the link between the intuitive cognitive style (assessed by the Cognitive Reflection Test) and the susceptibility to the flushtration count illusion. Our results suggest that participants do not detect perceptual attribute substitution error, that this phenomenon could be independent of the executive resources allocated to the task, and could rest on mechanisms distinct from those that produce errors in reasoning. We discuss differences between these two phenomena, and factors that may explain them.

scholarly journals Three levels of naturalistic knowledge

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Stephens
Keyword(s):  
Semantic Memory ◽  
Conceptual Knowledge ◽  
Procedural Knowledge ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Long Term Memory ◽  
Cognitive Ethology ◽  
System 2 ◽  
System 1 ◽  
Level Of Analysis

A recent naturalistic epistemological account suggests that there are three nested basic forms of knowledge: procedural knowledge-how, conceptual knowledge-what, and propositional knowledge-that. These three knowledge-forms are grounded in cognitive neuroscience and are mapped to procedural, semantic, and episodic long-term memory respectively. This article investigates and integrates the neuroscientifically grounded account with knowledge-accounts from cognitive ethology and cognitive psychology. It is found that procedural and semantic memory, on a neuroscientific level of analysis, matches an ethological reliabilist account. This formation also matches System 1 from dual process theory on a psychological level, whereas the addition of episodic memory, on the neuroscientific level of analysis, can account for System 2 on the psychological level. It is furthermore argued that semantic memory (conceptual knowledge-what) and the cognitive ability of categorization are linked to each other, and that they can be fruitfully modeled within a conceptual spaces framework.

scholarly journals The psychology of diagnostic error

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 91-98
Author(s):  
L. Zwaan
Keyword(s):  
Diagnostic Errors ◽  
Diagnostic Error ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Diagnostic Process ◽  
Cognitive Errors ◽  
System 2 ◽  
System 1 ◽  
Analytic Reasoning

Diagnostic errors in medicine occur frequently and the consequences for the patient can be severe. Cognitive errors as well as system related errors contribute to the occurrence of diagnostic error, but it is generally accepted that cognitive errors are the main contributor. The diagnostic reasoning process in medicine, is an understudied area of research. One reason is because of the complexity of the diagnostic process and therefore the difficulty to measure diagnostic errors and the causes of diagnostic error. In this paper, I discuss some of the complexities of the diagnostic process. I describe the dual-process theory, which defines two reasoning modes, 1. a fast, automatic and unconscious reasoning mode called system 1, and a slow and analytic reasoning mode called system 2. Furthermore, the main cognitive causes of diagnostic error are described.

Advancing the rationality debate

2000 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 701-717 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith E. Stanovich ◽  
Richard F. West
Keyword(s):  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Heuristics And Biases ◽  
Behavioral Regulation ◽  
Thinking Dispositions ◽  
Target Article ◽  
System 2 ◽  
System 1

In this response, we clarify several misunderstandings of the understanding/acceptance principle and defend our specific operationalization of that principle. We reiterate the importance of addressing the problem of rational task construal and we elaborate the notion of computational limitations contained in our target article. Our concept of thinking dispositions as variable intentional-level styles of epistemic and behavioral regulation is explained, as is its relation to the rationality debate. Many of the suggestions of the commentators for elaborating two-process models are easily integrated into our generic dual-process account. We further explicate how we view the relation between System 1 and System 2 and evolutionary and normative rationality. We clarify our attempt to fuse the contributions of the cognitive ecologists with the insights of the original heuristics and biases researchers.

scholarly journals Logic, Fast and Slow: Advances in Dual-Process Theorizing

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 503-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wim De Neys ◽  
Gordon Pennycook
Keyword(s):  
Logical Reasoning ◽  
Process Models ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Thought Processes ◽  
Dual Process Models ◽  
Process Characterization ◽  
System 2 ◽  
Reasoning Tasks ◽  
System 1

Studies on human reasoning have long established that intuitions can bias inference and lead to violations of logical norms. Popular dual-process models, which characterize thinking as an interaction between intuitive (System 1) and deliberate (System 2) thought processes, have presented an appealing explanation for this observation. According to this account, logical reasoning is traditionally considered as a prototypical example of a task that requires effortful deliberate thinking. In recent years, however, a number of findings obtained with new experimental paradigms have brought into question the traditional dual-process characterization. A key observation is that people can process logical principles in classic reasoning tasks intuitively and without deliberation. We review the paradigms and sketch how this work is leading to the development of revised dual-process models.

Cognitive Structure of Moral Reasoning, Development, and Evolution With Age and Pathology

2020 ◽  
pp. 30-57
Author(s):  
Veronique Salvano-Pardieu ◽  
Leïla Oubrahim ◽  
Steve Kilpatrick
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Cognitive Structure ◽  
Autism Spectrum ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Process Theory ◽  
Process Theory ◽  
Moral Orientation ◽  
System 2 ◽  
The Difference ◽  
System 1

This chapter presents research on moral judgment from the beginning of the 20th century to the present day. First, the authors will present the contribution of Piaget and Kohlberg's work on moral development from childhood to adulthood as well as the work of Gilligan on moral orientation and the difference observed between men and women. Then, the authors will analyze underlying structures of moral judgment in the light of the Dual Process Theory with two systems: system 1: quick, deontological, emotional, intuitive, automatic, and system 2: slow, utilitarian, rational, controlled, involved in human reasoning. Finally, the model of Dual Process Theory will be confronted with data from moral judgment experiments, run on elderly adults with Alzheimer's disease, teenagers with Autism Spectrum Disorder, and children and teenagers with intellectual disability in order to understand how cognitive impairment affects the structures and components of moral judgment.

scholarly journals Dual Processing in Syllogistic Reasoning

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-145
Author(s):  
Predrag Teovanović
Keyword(s):  
Individual Difference ◽  
Rating Scales ◽  
Task Complexity ◽  
Conflict Detection ◽  
Syllogistic Reasoning ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Dual Processing ◽  
Cognitive Reflection Test ◽  
Cognitive Reflection ◽  
Reasoning Tasks

The study aimed to examine several assumptions of dual process theories of reasoning by employing individual difference approach. A set of categorical syllogisms was administered to a relatively large sample of participants (N = 247) along with attached confidence rating scales, and measures of intelligence and cognitive reflection. As expected, response accuracy on syllogistic reasoning tasks highly depended on task complexity and the status of belief-logic conflict, thus demonstrating beliefbias on the group level. Individual difference analyses showed that more biased subject also performed poorer on Raven's Matrices (r = .25) and Cognitive Reflection Test (r = .27), which is in line with assumptions that willingness to engage and capacities to carry out type 2 processes both contribute to understanding of rational thinking. Moreover, measures of cognitive decoupling were significantly correlated with the performance on conflict syllogisms (r = .20). Individual differences in sensitivity to conflict detection, on the other side, were not related to reasoning accuracy in general (r = .02). Yet, additional analyses showed that noteworthy correlation between these two can be observed for easier syllogistic reasoning tasks (r = .26). Such results indicate that boundary conditions of conflict detection should be viewed as a function of both tasks' and participants' characteristics.

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