Staging a Strict Purist Invariantist Comeback

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikkel Gerken
Keyword(s):  
Functional Role ◽  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
Communicative Functions ◽  
Positive Account ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Intuitive Judgments ◽  
Folk Epistemology

Chapter 9 responds to arguments for pragmatic encroachment that appeal to the communicative functions of knowledge ascriptions or genealogical assumptions. The methodology of such arguments is criticized by way of a dilemma—the Functional Role Dilemma. A further dilemma for pragmatic encroachment—Pandora’s Dilemma—is then raised: many factors other than stakes can have an effect on knowledge ascriptions. So, pragmatic encroachers must either accept that these factors are partial determiners of knowledge or reject this. However, both options lead to trouble. Since these dilemmas are indicative of the mistakes in our intuitive judgments, Chapter 9 serves both the purpose of compromising mistaken appeals to folk epistemology and the purpose of guiding a positive account.

On Folk Epistemology

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikkel Gerken
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Psychology ◽  
Social Life ◽  
Epistemic Norms ◽  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
Cognitive Sciences ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Intuitive Judgments ◽  
Folk Epistemology ◽  
Central Claim ◽  
Do So

On Folk Epistemology is a book about how we ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others. Empirical evidence suggests that we do so early and often in thought as well as in talk. Since such knowledge ascriptions are central to how we navigate social life, it is important to understand our basis for making them. A central claim of the book is that factors that have nothing to do with knowledge may lead to systematic mistakes in everyday ascriptions of knowledge. These mistakes are explained by an empirically informed account of how ordinary knowledge ascriptions are the product of cognitive heuristics that are associated with biases. In developing this account, the book presents work in cognitive psychology and pragmatics. But it also contributes to epistemology proper. For example, it develops positive epistemic norms of action and assertion. Moreover, it critically assesses contextualism, knowledge-first methodology, pragmatic encroachment theories, and more. Many of these approaches are argued to overestimate the epistemological significance of folk epistemology. In contrast, the book develops an equilibristic methodology according to which intuitive judgments about knowledge cannot straightforwardly play a role as data for epistemological theorizing. Rather, epistemological theorizing is required to interpret empirical findings. Consequently, On Folk Epistemology helps to lay the foundation for an emerging subfield that intersects philosophy and the cognitive sciences: the empirical study of folk epistemology.

Theoretical Responses and Methodology

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikkel Gerken
Keyword(s):  
Critical Points ◽  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Intuitive Judgments ◽  
Theoretical Considerations

Chapter 3 begins with a partial taxonomy of the theoretical responses to the puzzling patterns of knowledge ascriptions. This includes a characterization of pragmatic encroachment that captures a wide variety of views. Moreover, the main lines of argument from the various effects on knowledge ascriptions to unorthodox theories of knowledge are sketched. The chapter concludes with a discussion of methodology. Some critical points are set forth against DeRose’s methodology of the straightforward. On a positive note, some principles of an alternative equilibristic methodology are articulated. According to this methodology, it is sometimes reasonable to revise our intuitive judgments in the light of theoretical considerations.

Thought and Talk about Knowledge

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikkel Gerken
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Competence ◽  
Relevant Alternatives ◽  
The Core ◽  
Traditional Epistemology ◽  
Communicative Functions ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Folk Epistemology ◽  
Epistemological Framework

Chapter 1 outlines the core assumptions of the epistemological framework to be defended. For example, a variety of a relevant-alternatives framework that appeals to normal circumstances is adopted, as is a competence epistemology according to which S may obtain knowledge and warranted belief only by exercising a cognitive competence. Moving from the epistemological framework to our folk epistemology, the ways in which the term ‘knowledge’ is central to our folk epistemology are considered. Special emphasis is given to knowledge ascriptions’ social and communicative functions. Thus, Chapter 1 introduces some core assumptions of a fairly traditional epistemology.

The Psychology of Knowledge Ascriptions

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikkel Gerken
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Dual Process ◽  
Empirical Psychology ◽  
Knowledge Ascription ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Process Framework ◽  
Intuitive Judgments ◽  
Ordinary Knowledge

Chapter 5 surveys some empirical psychology and outlines some folk epistemological principles. By considering the heuristic and biases tradition, it is argued that ordinary knowledge ascriptions are standardly driven by heuristic processes and, therefore, associated with biases. This idea is integrated with a dual process framework for mental state ascriptions. On this basis, some of the central heuristic principles that govern intuitive judgments about knowledge ascriptions are articulated, and some of the biases associated with these principles are identified. The result is an account of an epistemic focal bias in intuitive judgments about knowledge ascription. Thus, Chapter 5 provides both a survey of relevant psychology and a development of the folk psychological principles governing knowledge ascriptions.

TIME CONSTRAINTS AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT ON KNOWLEDGE

Episteme ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-180 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Shin
Keyword(s):  
Time Constraints ◽  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Ordinary Knowledge ◽  
Experimental Findings ◽  
The Way

AbstractCiting some recent experimental findings, I argue for the surprising claim that in some cases the less time you have the more you know. More specifically, I present some evidence to suggest that our ordinary knowledge ascriptions are sometimes sensitive to facts about an epistemic subject's truth-irrelevant time constraints such that less (time) is more (knowledge). If knowledge ascriptions are sensitive in this manner, then this is some evidence of pragmatic encroachment. Along the way, I consider comments made by Jonathan Schaffer (2006) and Jennifer Nagel (2008, 2010) to construe a purist contextualist and a strict invariantist explanation of the data respectively, before giving reasons to resist them in favor of an account that indicates pragmatic encroachment. If successful, this may suggest a new way to argue for the controversial thesis that there is pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.

Folk Epistemology and Epistemic Closure

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Kraft ◽  
Alex Wiegmann
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Test ◽  
Testable Hypothesis ◽  
Epistemic Closure ◽  
Folk Knowledge ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Series Of Experiments ◽  
Folk Epistemology

According to epistemic closure, if someone knows some proposition P and also knows that P entails Q, she knows Q as well. This is often defended by appealing to its intuitiveness. Only recently, however, was epistemic closure put to the empirical test: Turri ran experiments in which closure is violated in folk knowledge ascriptions surprisingly often. The chapter authors disagree with this diagnosis. It is by no means obvious which experimentally testable hypothesis proponents of epistemic closure should accept. The chapter formulates a different hypothesis and argues that it is more apt for empirically testing epistemic closure. In a series of experiments the chapter authors manipulated the strength of entailment between two propositions and found that the stronger the entailment, the lower the proportion of participants who violated closure, indicating folk knowledge ascriptions are sensitive to entailment. The chapter concludes that closure is a principle of folk epistemology after all.

Knowledge and action

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Moss
Keyword(s):  
Rational Action ◽  
Pragmatic Encroachment ◽  
Knowledge Norm ◽  
Transformative Experiences ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Probabilistic Knowledge ◽  
Intuitive Judgments ◽  
Imprecise Credences ◽  
Precise Interpretation ◽  
Knowledge Norms

This chapter develops and defends two probabilistic knowledge norms of action. The first is a knowledge norm for reasons, namely that you may treat a probabilistic content as a reason for action if and only if you know it. This norm can help explain intuitive judgments about rational action. It can also help us rethink alleged instances of pragmatic encroachment often cited as challenges for existing knowledge norms of action. The second norm defended in this chapter is a knowledge norm for decisions. According to this norm, an action is permissible for you if and only if it is considered permissible for an agent with imprecise credences whose beliefs exactly match your probabilistic knowledge. This norm provides a precise interpretation of the controversial view that standard decision theory cannot guide decisions about transformative experiences, where this interpretation succeeds in answering a wide range of recent objections to this view.

Coda

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mikkel Gerken
Keyword(s):  
General Framework ◽  
Social Power ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Ordinary Knowledge ◽  
Applied Epistemology ◽  
Folk Epistemology

The brief Coda considers the key conclusions and methodology as a general framework for the study of folk epistemology. In particular, it highlights how the study of folk epistemology simultaneously requires and contributes to epistemological theorizing. Moreover, it briefly considers how our folk epistemological practices may yield distinctive forms of epistemic injustice. For example, it is hypothesized that our ordinary knowledge ascriptions may be biased in terms of gender, race, or social power structure. So, the book concludes by emphasizing a key rationale for engaging in the study of folk epistemology: understanding our folk epistemology may serve as the basis for an important area of applied epistemology.

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